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Abstract
Data sharing enhances the utilisation of data and promotes competition of scientiﬁc
ideas as well as promoting collaboration. Sharing and reusing public data sets has the
potential to increase research eﬃciency and quality. Sharing data that contains personally
identiﬁable or sensitive information, such as medical records, always has privacy and
security implications. For research purposes, having access to large sets of data, often
from various regions, improves statistical outcomes of analysis. However, shared data is
usually considered to be sensitive and access to it is restricted by law and regulation.
This thesis employs privatization techniques to provide an architecture which enables
sharing of sensitive data. Utilization of our architecture is demonstrated by means of a
case study based on four medical data sets. This thesis also provides a solution for sharing
the sensitive data where large numbers of data contributors publish their privatized data
sets and aggregates on a cloud so that data can be made available to anyone who wants
access to it, for whatever purpose. Additionally, our solution determines how aggregated
data can be eﬃciently and eﬀectively queried, while retaining privacy not only of the
data, but also of the original data owner and of both the query and person querying.
The testing results of our proposed diagonal data aggregation method and data querying
method are eﬃcient and also maintain acceptable data privacy and acceptable data utility.
This thesis demonstrates a number of applications of aggregating privatized data sets
in the sharing environment.
(i) When providing critical emergency care in a remote location, a local response team
needs access to the patient’s healthcare data. We present a system designed to enhance
privacy protection of sensitive data downloaded to a mobile client device from a remote
server, (ii) Developing a methodology for privatizing data and delivering it in a secure
manner from a server to a remote wireless device.
The solution of the above-mentioned applications is maintaining the privacy of data
released en masse in a controlled manner, and for providing secure access to the original
xvi
data for authorized users. The results show that the solution is provably secure and
maintains privacy in a more eﬃcient manner than previous solutions.
This thesis examines data privatization methods by testing them (methods) against
well-known attacks; we show that all of these attacks successfully retrieve a relatively
large (and unacceptable) portion of the original data. We compare the strengths of the
attacks based on over 4500 data sets. Finally, we indicate how the data privatization
method examined can be modiﬁed to assist it to withstand these attacks.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
This chapter provides the motivation and general background material for this thesis.
Section 1.1 describes the current state of querying aggregated data solutions and why a
good architecture is needed. Section 1.2 describes formally the research problem of this
study, and in Section 1.3 we explain its signiﬁcance. Section 1.4 provides an outline of
the remainder of this thesis, and the chapter is summarized in Section 1.5.
1.1 Motivation for the Research
Data about individuals is considered to be ‘sensitive’ if exposing it to public knowl-
edge may have adverse aﬀects on the individuals identiﬁed. (An example is information
about a patient being treated for a socially unacceptable illness.) On the other hand,
the aggregation by governments, businesses and researchers of such data about com-
munities of individuals is needed to support planning, forecasting and budgeting. Over
many years, research literature has provided data privatization techniques for producing
meaningful statistical data from aggregated data without revealing information about
speciﬁc individuals. Given any data set, its contents can be classiﬁed into three types:
‘unique identiﬁers’ [Zha08], [AY08a], [Dat04] that identify individuals (and so are not
made public in published data), ‘quasi-identiﬁers’ [Zha08], [FKWY10], [AY08a] which can
be combined with an external database to identify individuals, and ‘sensitive attributes’
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[Zha08], [AY08a], [Dat04] which need to be protected; medical data about patients is a
typical example of such data. When making data sets public, the owners usually remove
identiﬁers in order to prevent re-identiﬁcation of individuals. However, when data sets
are shared, it may be possible for an attacker to compile combinations of quasi-identiﬁers
from multiple data sets and re-identify individuals. Medical professionals often ensure
that sensitive attributes are not available to unauthorised parties by limiting access; Sar-
tipi et al. in 2013 [SKM13] develop such an access control system for sharing medical
images in localized environments.
When investigating causes of disease, market-place instability, or the principal rea-
sons for traﬃc fatalities, a single research team may have insuﬃcient data to test their
hypotheses. In this case, a potential solution is to exchange data with those of other
research centres in order to expand the data set. Large data sets can manage the prob-
lem of inconsistent or contradictory data, as well as identiﬁcation of outliers, and thus
provide better statistical conclusions. As an example, many medical research groups may
wish to determine the principal causes of heart disease in their region; having access to
many data sets from within their region, and many from outside their region, provides
the opportunity to test the ‘local’ against ‘non-local’ data in order to include relevant
causes and exclude irrelevant ones in their results.
The sharing of data repositories in cloud storage leads logically to opportunities of
sharing data in order to improve the identiﬁcation of ‘cause and eﬀect’ in health, to ef-
fectively track cyclones, or money laundering activities, and eﬃciently respond to major
ﬂood, ﬁre and earthquake disasters. On the other hand, diverse requirements for pri-
vacy of sensitive data have been a stumbling block to such an ideal. These requirements
can be overcome using the above solution of limiting access. Many large organizations
have developed data warehouses which consolidate all pertinent static business data and
allow read-only access to authorised personnel for the purposes of reporting and fore-
casting. However, this approach does not work well for data sharing between competing
organizations who hold sensitive data.
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Sharing data reinforces open scientiﬁc inquiry, encourages diversity of analysis and
opinion, promotes new research, makes possible the testing of new or alternative hypothe-
ses and methods of analysis, supports studies on data collection methods and measure-
ment, facilitates the education of new researchers, enables the exploration of topics not
envisioned by the initial investigators, and permits the creation of new data sets when
data from multiple sources are aggregated. Thus, each group could use the aggregated
shared data for diﬀerent purposes.
The ideal principal reason for sharing data is to permit querying of the data by anyone
who can use it to solve problems facing humanity, including medical, agricultural and
resource challenges.
This Thesis
– analyses and proposes solutions for the challenges of aggregation of sensitive data
and of data querying on aggregated data on a cloud server,
– delineates applications of aggregation of sensitive medical data in several application
scenarios, and also
– tests data privatization techniques to assist in improving the strength of both their
privacy and utility.
Unfortunately, the sharing of data is hampered by local laws and regulations about
data privacy. In order to overcome these, each group must ﬁrst identify the sensitive com-
ponents of their data set, privatize these sensitive components and secure transmission
of data between collaborators, or to a common server in the case of data aggregation.
Privacy preserving data mining (PPDM) has become an important enabling technol-
ogy for integrating data and determining interesting patterns from private collections of
databases, thus improving productivity and competitiveness for many businesses. PPDM
requires data modiﬁcation, which limits information loss (thus increasing utility), as it
is intended that a legitimate receiver of the modiﬁed data be able to recover the original
data needed for a response. Thus, PPDM involves two tasks:
1. Extract useful information or knowledge from large data sets (data utility).
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2. Complete the task without access to the original data set (data privacy).
The eﬃciency of PPDM methods should be maintained.
This thesis is focused on applications in the medical ﬁeld. For example, when pro-
viding critical emergency care in a remote location, a local response team needs access
to the patient’s medical data. Such medical data is protected by privacy rules and laws
in most jurisdictions. Therefore it is a challenge to be able to provide the response team
with the relevant data while protecting the privacy of that data.
1.2 Research Problems and Contributions
From our study of the literature, we have identiﬁed the following research problems
and steps in providing solutions:
Research Problem 1: Describe a solution by which several parties in a closed en-
vironment may share sensitive data in order to analyse it for research purposes.
Our solution includes four steps:
STEP 1. An appropriate list of potential privatization techniques is chosen by all
initial participants, tailored to comply both with the format of the data and with local
legal requirements.
STEP 2. All participants apply each of these techniques to their data and choose
those which provide good privacy and good (querying) utility. A short list of potential
techniques usable by every party is selected.
STEP 3. Each party now focuses on privatized versions of their data based on
the short list selection from Step 2. These privatized versions are compared with the
original data set to determine the one with features closest to the original data using
a comparative analysis method of their choosing. (We propose classiﬁcation algorithms
from WEKA (http://www.cs.waikato.ac.nz/ml/weka/.)
STEP 4. A ﬁnal selection of privatization method is agreed upon by all parties;
participants are now able to send each other privatized versions of their data.
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Research Problem 2: Describe an architecture in which a large number of data
contributors share their privatized data sets through a cloud server and data requesters
can access to such publicly available data sets privately and eﬃciently using data querying
method.
We provide a two-fold solution:
1. We privately aggregate the publicly available contributed data sets using our
proposed diagonal data aggregation method. Our proposed diagonal data aggregation
method ensures the aggregated data set achieves acceptable privacy, acceptable utility,
practical computation cost, and storage cost. A large number of data contributors pub-
lished their privatized data sets on a cloud so that all the data can be made available
to anyone who wants access to it, for whatever purpose. In our experiment, we consider
four data sets as an example: two real data sets and two synthetic data sets. Data
contributors use the below steps to privatize data.
– The acquisition of two real medical data sets on heart disease
– The production of two synthetic data sets also on heart disease
– A selection of perturbation methods with which to privatize the data sets
– Measuring the accuracy with which privacy and utility are provided
– Determining a best choice for common privatization of all four data sets.
2. We provide a solution for privately query the public online aggregated data set by
data requesters. Our solution includes “single-database private block retrieval from V-
DGHV method based on selective encryption approach” privacy preserving data querying
method, which protect individual’s privacy when querying a public online data services
such that an individual query is not revealed to the public data service manager, but
still allows the individual to obtain answers to her query also achieves practical query
performance. Our proposed solution also accepts diﬀerent types of queries such as join,
aggregate, range, nested, ordered by, and pattern matching queries.
As a major application of our solution to Research Problems 1 and 2, we develop the
following challenge case scenarios.
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Research Problem 3: Develop a privacy preserving, secure and eﬃcient architec-
ture, which aggregates large medical data sets in order to share it to support emergency
response to a patient in a remote region.
Under the assumption that a resource-constrained (mobile) device with bandwidth
limitations is available on the site of the emergency. Our solution:
– provides a complete server-client architecture and communication protocol
– employs eﬃcient cryptographic protocols to provide security
– enforces privacy at the user end and provides data conﬁdentiality
– authenticates the mobile hardware, the software running on it and the user
– has a ﬂexible, scalable, architecture provided by a modular approach.
The choice of a good privatization technique is measured by both the amount of
privacy it delivers, as well as the level of querying utility. We therefore considered attacks
on some of the recent privatization methods to determine if it was possible to recover
sensitive information. We used the results to recommend improvements to the methods.
Research Problem 4: Test data Privatization Methods using well-known Data-
Reconstruction Attacks. Our solution:
– includes derivation of 4500 test sets
– incorporates privatization of each data set using the ‘Chebyshev polynomials of the
ﬁrst kind’ method
– includes application on each privatized data set of four attacks: Spectral Filtering
(SPF), Bayes-Estimated Data Reconstruction (BE-DR), Multiple Miner attack with
Fusion (MDMF) and the Known Sample Method (KSA); in each case, we are able
to recover sensitive data
– speciﬁes how to modify the data privatization algorithm to make the data resistant
to these attacks
– produces a revised data privatization method and shows that it is resistant to these
attacks.
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1.3 Justiﬁcation of Research
In my thesis, I focus on data sharing that allows researchers, industry people and
the public to expedite the translation of research results into knowledge, products,
and procedures to improve results; it also promotes collaboration. In order to share
data, each entity must privatize the data before it is made accessible to other groups
(for legal and/or regulatory reasons). Productivity today depends on the sharing of
public data in any location, and on using it to collaborate with researchers, institu-
tions and individuals anywhere in the world, for example, in the international context
of global issues such as health, environmental change, and food production. Govern-
ment and organizations increasingly recognize the critical value and opportunities in
sharing such a wealth of information across multiple distributed, private, and possi-
bly untrusted databases. Most government-released public data sets such as those of
the Australian National Data Service (http://ands.org.au/index.html), The World
Bank (http://data.worldbank.org/) and Amazon (http://docs.aws.amazon.com/
AWSEC2/latest/UserGuide/using-public-data-sets.html), are designed to provide
rich connections between data, researchers and institutions, and to promote visibility of
research data collections in search engines. However, such data usually contains per-
sonal sensitive information the privacy of which must be retained for various legal and
commercial reasons because the disclosure of may violate the individual’s privacy.
With the continuous increase of collaborative computation, the subject of data ag-
gregation is progressively important. Privacy has become one of the top priorities and
requirements of many distributed collaborative applications in data aggregation.
Data requesters need these public data set services but they are concerned that their
personal information might be disclosed or compromised. Privacy is thus a big concern
when a user queries these public online data services. As the public data sets are not
under the data owner’s control, data conﬁdentiality and integrity are of more concern in
outsourced databases. Data requesters want to access these shared data sets from service
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manager but at the same time they do want to preserve the privacy of data query with
acceptable cost. The solutions to these mentioned problems are the core of the research
problem of this thesis.
The sharing of data is hampered by local laws and regulations about data privacy. In
order to overcome these, each group must ﬁrst identify the sensitive components of their
data set and privatize this sensitive data. To our best knowledge, no research attempts
have addressed a solution, permitting participants to determine for themselves which
privatization techniques best meet their privacy needs, and then agreeing by consensus
with the group on which one (or even two or three) to use across all data sets. The
existing research works do not provide private query processing over public data set and
achieves acceptable data privacy and query privacy with practical query performance.
Additionally, existing research work do not support diﬀerent types of queries beyond
simple data retrieval.
We propose an architecture, which provides acceptable data privacy, acceptable data
utility, practical performance during private data querying and privacy preserving data
aggregation on cloud, which supports public data sets. As an application, we propose an
architecture for privatizing aggregated data sets and delivering them in a secure manner
from a server to a remote wireless device. Additionally, our system enhances privacy
protection of sensitive data downloaded to a mobile client device from a remote server such
as in the case of accessing medical information in emergency situations. Our architecture
also provides a solution for delivering health-care data to remote locations. This thesis
also examines attack analysis on privacy preserving data mining methods. The thesis
includes analysis and testing of data privatization methods.
1.4 Outline of the Thesis
The thesis comprises seven chapters, as depicted in Figure 1.1. Chapter 2 lays the
foundation of the thesis model by giving an overview of the theoretical basis for the
research, including Data Privatization Methods, Privacy Preserving Data Aggregation
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Methods, Privacy Preserving Data Querying, and Security and Privacy issues on Mobile
Communication. This chapter concludes by proposing that a new architecture by means
of which several parties may share sensitive data can be derived. Next, Chapter 3 employs
Figure 1.1. Thesis Outline
privatization techniques to provide an architecture which enables sharing of sensitive
data. Chapter 3 examines suitable privatization methods for sharing sensitive data sets.
Speciﬁcally, Chapter 3 proposes an entirely new approach, permitting participants to
determine for themselves which privatization techniques best meet their privacy needs,
and then agreeing by consensus with the group on which one (or even two or three) to
use across all data sets. A cloud manager aggregates the data and makes it available on
a cloud to whomever the contributor group wishes to provide access. Then, we apply our
data sharing architecture to four medical data sets as a case study. Chapter 4 solves the
issue of sharing heterogeneous and public data sets in diﬀerent locations by proposing
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a data aggregation method which achieves good privacy, good utility, low computation
cost, low time consumption, and low storage cost. Additionally, this chapter provides
solution for the aggregated data sets which can be eﬃciently queried, while retaining
privacy not only of the data sets, but also of the original data owner and of both the
query and person querying.
Chapter 5 focuses on the application of the use of aggregated privatized medical data
sets. This chapter develops the architecture for privatizing aggregated data sets and de-
livering them in a secure manner from a server to a remote wireless device and validating
the proposed architecture by experimental analysis. The testing analysis is broken into
three parts. In the ﬁrst part we conducted a three-fold comparison analysis: privacy,
security and eﬃciency. Also, we presented proof of security of our proposed architecture.
In the second part, we developed a mobile application and server architecture to simulate
the proposed architecture. In the last part, our experiments focused on the mobile device
end and the communication between client and server. Chapter 6 examines data priva-
tization by testing it against well-known classical data-reconstruction methods. Chapter
7 concludes the thesis.
1.5 Summary
This chapter has laid the foundations for the thesis. It introduced the research prob-
lem and research issues. It then justiﬁed the research, brieﬂy described and justiﬁed the
methodology, outlined the thesis, and stated the assumptions. On these foundations, the
thesis now proceeds with a detailed description of the research.
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Chapter 2
Literature Review
The key purpose of this chapter is to lay a foundation for the thesis model. This
chapter examines the essence of sharing, aggregating and querying data. The data can
be available in the same state/region or between international groups. Also, the research
examines security and privacy issues on transferring or delivering data in emergency
healthcare.
This chapter is divided into four main Sections 2.1, 2.3, 2.4 and 2.5. The ﬁrst Section
2.1 illustrates literature work on data privatization methods, and use of data privatization
methods in data sharing environment. Section 2.3 surveys the current development of
data aggregation methods in sharing data. Section 2.4 illustrates the survey on data
querying methods. Section 2.5 presents the literature work delivering/transmitting data
on the mobile communication. Section 2.7 concludes this chapter.
2.1 Data Privatization Methods
With the rapid expansion of large-scale information systems, privacy is becoming
more and more important in data analysis and computation. Speciﬁcally, privacy is a
critical requirement when data mining is applied to ﬁnancial, medical or government
organizations (http://www.w3.org/TR/P3P/), [AHK05], [ESAG04] (http://www.csa.
ca/standards/privacy/Default.asp?laguage=English). As healthcare data is quite
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valuable to many organizations for scientiﬁc research or analysis, the demands of sharing
healthcare data have been growing rapidly. Nevertheless, health care data usually con-
tains a lot of private data of patient. Sharing that data directly would threaten patient
privacy. Therefore, it is necessary to develop practical methods to balance health care
data sharing and privacy protection. For medical research purposes, having access to
large sets of data, often from various regions, improves statistical outcomes of analysis.
However, patient data is usually considered to be sensitive and access to it is restricted
by law and regulation. The data privatization methods [VMP03], [SB13], [BEM07],
[LDHS14] and [MT] provide an architecture which enables sharing of sensitive data.
Protecting the privacy of individuals is a challenging task in sharing data and collab-
oration work. Some organizations, such as governments and census bureaus, are required
to make personal information available, while other organizations, such as hospitals may
want to publish their data voluntarily for research purposes. On the other hand, data
publishers are prohibited by law from disseminating any person-speciﬁc information that
compromises an individual’s privacy. Therefore, a common precaution adopted by data
publishers is to remove all explicit identiﬁers [XT06] such as name, address and social
security number to make the resulting data look completely anonymous [Zha10]. Unfortu-
nately, the remaining information still has a high probability of disclosing an individual’s
identity and the information becomes more sensitive when it is linked to other data re-
sources. A study [Swe00] estimates that 87% of the population of the United States can
be uniquely identiﬁed by using the seemingly innocuous attributes of gender, date of
birth and 5-digit zip code. Clearly, the released data containing such information about
individuals should not be considered anonymous. When the data set contains sensitive
information, such as that related to health-care, the result can be a serious breach of
privacy. Accordingly, the data should be further processed before being published so
that it is resistant to privacy leakage while still oﬀering maximal utility to data analysts.
Data privatization is an important issue in many data mining applications dealing
with sensitive data. Privacy preserving data mining (PPDM) has become an important
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enabling technology for integrating data and determining interesting patterns from pri-
vate collections of databases, thus improving productivity and competitiveness for many
businesses. PPDM requires data modiﬁcation, which limits information loss (thus in-
creasing utility) as it is intended that a legitimate receiver of the modiﬁed data be able
to recover the original data needed for a response. Thus, PPDM involves two tasks: (i)
Extract useful information or knowledge from large data sets (data utility); (ii) Do the
job without access to the original data set (data privacy).
In order to resolve the issue of real-life privacy preservation in data management
where real-time publication of the data is required; two optimization problems need to
be addressed: (i) Trade-oﬀ between privacy requirement and utility loss; (ii) Trade-oﬀ
between response/publishing time and the complexity of privacy protecting techniques.
Many approaches have been proposed in past years to eliminate the privacy concerns
of individuals and help institutions/researchers to comply with privacy protection reg-
ulations. Based on the problems these approaches are trying to address, they can be
classiﬁed into three categories:
1. The ﬁrst category focuses on privacy protection about data sharing during data
usage. These kinds of approaches try to protect patient privacy by transforming the
healthcare data before they are shared. The sensitive information may be wiped oﬀ
or reduced after the transforming process. Privacy preserving data publishing models
such as k-anonymity [Sam01] and [SS98], l-diversity [MKGV07], the PPDM models and
methods like privacy preserving decision tree, privacy preserving associate rule mining
[ESAG04] have been developed as a result.
2. The second category focuses on privacy data management. Many access con-
trol models and systems have been developed to enhance the ﬂexibility of privacy data
management and compliance of regulation. Elements such as access purpose, data con-
tent and personal preferences have been brought into these data access management
models. The legal and privacy acts and models are used in this category, for example
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Australian Law Reform Commission’s report [ALR13], the US Health Insurance Porta-
bility and Accountability Act 1996 (US) (HIPAA), and Australian national data service
(http://www.ands.org.au/guides/ethics-working-level.html).
3. The third category focuses on privacy data storage and management. The pri-
vacy data storage and management in the cloud environment has attracted quite a lot
of attention in recent years [WAA11], [VFS12b], [CWL+14], [VFP+11], and [WAA14].
Approaches for privacy-aware data storage and auditing in the cloud environment are
proposed to protect private data. All approaches listed above may be used in privacy
data sharing or management.
Previous work in the PPDM is based on two approaches. In the ﬁrst one, the aim
is to preserve individual privacy by perturbing the data values [AS00]. The key result is
that the distorted data, together with the information on the distribution of the random
data used to distort the data, can be used to generate an approximation to the original
data distribution without revealing the original data values. Later, reﬁnements of this
approach tightened the bounds on what private information is disclosed, by showing that
the ability to reconstruct the distribution can be used to tighten estimates of the original
values based on the distorted data [AA01]. Since then many good approaches have
been proposed [KDWS03], [EGS03], [HDC05]. There are considerable research eﬀorts for
designing privacy preserving methods [ALY11], [BLW11], [CL11], [Dwo06], [KSSM11],
[LLBW11], [TYYC11], [YP12b]. Several of these methods focus on data sharing [ALY11],
[BLW11], [FWY05], [LLV07], [MKGV07] and fall into two general categories [AY08b],
[FKWY10]. The ﬁrst category of methods attempts to prevent sensitive patterns, such
as frequent itemsets [OZ03] or sequences [GDL11], or association rules [GDV09], from
being mined from the data, while the second one, referred to as privacy preserving data
mining, aims to protect the privacy of individuals whose information is contained in the
data.
In the literature, the existing solutions for maintaining data privacy are based on
determining how to reduce the probability of an individual’s identity discovery when a
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large amount of private data is shared in an online environment. However, there is always
a trade-oﬀ between privacy loss and utility loss, and to preserve the utility of results and to
reduce loss of information, a number of techniques have been developed. Most existing
solutions focus on data modiﬁcation [AW89], [Kim86], [DFMS02], [MS99], [ESAG02],
which requires that the data be altered before its release. However, this may consequently
reduce data utility. In addition, such solutions overlook the possibility of security breaches
in which whole sets of (modiﬁed) data may be intercepted in transmission and read or
altered. The PPDM deals with data modiﬁcation, which limits information loss as it is
intended that a legitimate receiver of the modiﬁed data is able to recover that speciﬁc
data needed for a response.
In the line of research work cryptographic based data privatization methods are pro-
posed in distributed data. The secure multiparty computation (SMC) technique is used
in the context of privacy preserving data between diﬀerent participants, in distributed
data which is known as privacy preserving distributed data mining (PPDDM) method.
The aim of the SMC is to enable parties to carry out such distributed computing tasks in
a secure manner. In the literature [LP00], [VZC06], [CKV+02], [GMW87], [CCD88] and
[Yao86] due to high computation and communication costs, authors proposed data pertur-
bation methods. The perturbation method randomizes the original data so that certain
underlying patterns, such as the distribution of values, are retained in the randomized
data [AS00]. The perturbation approach is much more eﬃcient than the cryptographic
approach, but appears to suﬀer a tradeoﬀ between privacy and accuracy.
From the existing work we ascertained the PPDM has been studied extensively during
the past several years. Several techniques ranging from perturbation to secure multi-party
computation have been explored.
In the next subsection we classify existing data privatization methods and present
detailed recent work on each data privatization method. Also, we discuss the advantages
and disadvantages of each mentioned data privatization method in Tables 2.1, 2.2 and
2.3.
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2.2 Classiﬁcation of Data Privatization Methods
Data Privatization methods [SB13], [BEM07], and [LDHS14] take one of the three
philosophical approaches:
1. data hiding, in which sensitive raw data such as identiﬁers, name, and addresses
were altered, blocked, or trimmed out from the original database, in order for the
users of the data not to be able to compromise another individual’s privacy;
2. rule hiding, in which sensitive knowledge extracted from the data mining process is
excluded for use, because conﬁdential information may be derived from the released
knowledge; and
3. The SMC, in which distributed data are encrypted before released or shared for
computations; thus, no party knows anything except its own inputs and the results.
The ultimate goal of data privatization method is to develop eﬃcient algorithms that
allow one to extract relevant knowledge from a large amount of data, while preventing
sensitive data and information from disclosure or inference. We classify existing data
privatization methods, as presented in Figure 2.1:
Figure 2.1. Classiﬁcation of Data Privatization Techniques
The description of common data privatization methods are described below:
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2.2.1 Anonymization Methods
One of the oldest solutions for protecting privacy of digital data is known as k-
anonymity [Swe02b]. In [Swe02b] and [SS98], the ideas of ‘generalization’ and ‘suppres-
sion’ [Sam01] are used to achieve k-anonymity. The generalization technique works by
substituting the original value of given attributes with more generalized ones based on the
generalization hierarchy built on top of each attribute’s domain [FKWY10]. For example,
a speciﬁc age might be replaced with an age range. However, most generalization meth-
ods [Swe02b], [FKWY10], [Swe02a] suﬀer from a signiﬁcant drawback, that the processed
data is not restorable. In suppression some data is not released at all [FKWY10].
There are other well studied anonymization methods such as exist l-diversity
[MKGV07], (α, k)-anonymity [WLFW06], t-closeness [LLV07], and (k, e)-anonymity
[ZKSY07]. These methods are described below.
Distribution of Anonymization Methods
k-anonymity The k-anonymity method is developed because of the possibility of in-
direct identiﬁcation of records from public databases. Sweeney introduces k-anonymity
[Swe02b], [Sam01] as a property that each record is indistinguishable with at least k − 1
records. This is because combinations of record attributes can be used to exactly identify
individual records. In the k-anonymity method, the authors reduce the granularity of
data representation with the use of techniques such as generalization and suppression
[Sam01]. This granularity is reduced suﬃciently that any given record maps onto at least
k other records in the data. k-anonymity [Swe02b] is a property that captures the pro-
tection of released data against possible re-identiﬁcation of the respondents to whom the
released data refer. This method [Swe02b] is proposed to prevent the linking attack and
laid a foundation for measuring privacy in the context of generalization. This method fails
to preserve the privacy against homogeneity and background knowledge attacks.
l-diversity Machanavajjhala et al. [MKGV07] proposed the diversity principle, called
l-diversity, to prevent attribute linkage and to overcome the drawbacks of k-anonymity.
l-diversity not only maintains the minimum group size of k, but also focuses on main-
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taining the diversity of the sensitive attributes. In l-diversity, the entropy of the sensitive
attribute should be at least log l. Entropy l-diversity is ﬁrst proposed by Ohrn and
Ohno-Machado [oOM99] as a way of defending against the homogeneity problem. In
order to preserve privacy of a database from an attacker, aspects of both k-anonymity
and l-diversity need to be incorporated. However, it is very impractical in the real-life
applications where real-time release of large data is required, to k-anonymize, l-diverse
database sanitization. l-diversity fails to preserve the privacy against skewness and
similarity attacks.
There exist many variations of l-diversity methods, such as (α, k)-anonymity
[WLFW06], t-closeness [LLV07], and (k, e)-anonymity [ZKSY07]. Here we describe (α, k)-
anonymity [WLFW06] and t-closeness [LLV07] approaches as these are mostly considered
in the literature.
(α, k)-Anonymity In this [WLFW06] method, a view of the table is said to be an
(α, k)-anonymization, if the modiﬁcation of the table satisﬁes both k-anonymity [Swe02b]
and α-deassociation [WLFW06] properties with respect to the quasi-identiﬁer [XT06]. α-
deassociation is deﬁned in Deﬁnition 1 of the paper [WLFW06]. It does not address the
identity disclosure attack [FKWY10].
t-closeness In the t-closeness method [LLV07], an equivalence class is said to have t-
closeness if the diﬀerence of values between the distribution of a sensitive attribute in this
class and the distribution of the attribute in the whole table is no more than a threshold
t. A table is said to have t-closeness if all equivalence classes have t-closeness. It preserves
the privacy against homogeneity and background knowledge attacks but can not
provide privacy against attribute disclosure attack.
Drawbacks of Anonymization Methods The existing schemes for database pri-
vacy preservation algorithms such as k-anonymity and l-diversity search over space of
possible multi-dimensional solutions, so they are NP-hard in nature [MW04], (http:
//epubs.siam.org/doi/abs/10.1137/1.9781611972771.38). The high dimensionality
of these methods also adds computational overhead [Agg07]. Therefore, these types of
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solutions are not suitable in real-time systems. Another point to note is that computa-
tional complexity of privacy preserving algorithms presented in the literature [FKWY10]
is high. Approximate solution of k-anonymity is O(klogk) [AFK+05], which is improved
to O(k) [MW04] and that of l-diversity is O(l2) [MKGV07]. k-anonymity [Swe02b] can
prevent the identity disclosure attack but not attribute disclosure attack. l-diversity
[MKGV07] preserves the privacy against attribute disclosure attack, however it can not
provide privacy against identity disclosure attack. t-closeness [LLV07] is also not able
to prevent the attribute disclosure attack additionally it is computationally complex in
achieving the privacy.
To deal with these drawbacks, data perturbation algorithms are employed, which
allow the restoration of the original data. Data perturbation works by combining noise
with the original data, by addition and/or by multiplication [Isl07], [MPS99], [AS00],
[Liu07], [CSL07].
2.2.2 Data Perturbation Methods
Data perturbation methods are often used to protect conﬁdential, numerical data
from unauthorized queries while providing maximum access and accurate information to
legitimate queries.
In the literature, perturbation is of two main types: additive [AS00], [Dat04] and mul-
tiplicative [Liu07], where random data (noise) is respectively either added or multiplied
with the original data. Multiplicative noise techniques can provide a good level of privacy,
as shown by Kargupta et al. [KDWS05] while additive noise perturbation techniques are
more eﬀective in reducing information loss [Isl07]. Noise addition methods are used in
classiﬁcation, clustering and association rule mining. Perturbation techniques have to
manage the intrinsic trade-oﬀ between preserving data privacy and data utility, as each
aﬀects the other. Several perturbation techniques [AS00], [Dat04], [Liu07], [SZBB12a],
[MS99] have been proposed for mining purposes. These methods have been described for
preserving the privacy of individuals when publishing data; simulation [AW89], noise ad-
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dition [Kim86], micro aggregation [DFMS02], randomization and perturbation methods
[MS99], [ESAG02] are some prominent examples. These algorithms modify the initial
data in order to preserve privacy while still providing usable data. However, modiﬁca-
tion to the original data needs to be performed carefully, as large modiﬁcations may lead
to loss of important information, while minor changes may not be suﬃcient to protect
privacy [OYGB04].
Distribution of Data Perturbation Methods
Additive Perturbation Method There is a growing body of literature on additive
perturbation methods which work by adding random noise to the data in such a way
that the individual data values are distorted while, at the same time, the underlying
distribution properties are preserved thus helping to reduce information loss. Agrawal
and Srikant [AS00] propose a scheme using random perturbation in which a random
number is added to the value of each sensitive attribute and they constructed a decision
tree on the perturbed data to demonstrate its utility. It has been shown [AS00] that
this scheme suﬀers from data loss, but Agrawal and Aggarwal [AA01] develop a novel
reconstruction algorithm, which minimizes the data loss of the former scheme.
Drawbacks of Additive Perturbation Method The usefulness of additive noise
perturbation methods in preserving privacy is ﬁrstly questioned by Kargupta et al.
[KDWS03] who show that attackers can derive a good estimation of the original data
set values from the perturbed data set using a spectral ﬁlter that exploits some theo-
retical properties of random matrices and, as a result, the data privacy can be seriously
compromised. Huang et al. [HDC05] further propose two data reconstruction algorithms
which are eﬃcient when the added noise is independent of the original data; one is based
on Principal Component Analysis [HDC05], the other one chooses Maximum Likelihood
Estimation [HDC05] to estimate the data. One interesting reconstruction approach is pro-
posed by Kargupta et al. in [KDWS03]. By using random matrix properties, Kargupta
et al. [KDWS03] successfully separate the data from the random noise and subsequently
reconstructs a good approximation to original data. Recently Huang et al. [HDC05]
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analyze the conditions under which the privacy of the underlying data used in perturba-
tion method could be violated. Their results indicate that when the correlations between
the data items are high, the original result can be constructed more easily. Additive
perturbation techniques leak data under the reconstruction attacks Spectral Filtering
(SPF), Bayes-Estimated Data Reconstruction (BE-DR), Multiple Data Mining and Fu-
sion (MDMF) [SB13]. As mentioned in [HDC05] and [KDWS03] additive perturbation
is vulnerable to attacks based on data correlations.
Data Swapping Method Data swapping [FM04] aims to protect the sensitive data
in certain attributes by swapping a subset of attributes among the records. [DR82],
[FM04] proposed a data swapping method where some values of attributes are swapped
over certain mutually selected rows. Thus the data is perturbed by keeping the t-order
statistics unchanged.
Drawbacks of Data Swapping Method This method is unsafe as there is no
guarantee that the swapped values will be very diﬀerent from the original values. [AY04]
suggests a condensation approach of using properties of clusters to regenerate data sim-
ulating the actual one but obfuscating the original values. However the privacy levels for
this method are not very high [FKWY10].
Randomized Response Method Another data perturbation method is the random-
ized response method [DZ03], [War65]. This method is proposed for preserving the pri-
vacy of respondents while asking sensitive questions in an interview. The concept here is
to protect the identity of the interviewee by randomizing the response. [DZ03] proposes
a decision-tree classiﬁcation method to support this scheme. The perturbation approach
has been also applied to Boolean association rules [ESAG02], [RH02]. The idea here is
to modify data values in such a way that it is diﬃcult to reconstruct the values for any
individual transaction, but at same time ensure that the rules learned on the distorted
data are still valid. One interesting feature of this work is called randomized response
technique [DZ03]. The obstacle of this method is individuals/participants often are very
skeptical about the whole process because, either they do not understand it or because
they feel that their privacy is not really protected.
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Microaggregation method Domingo-Ferrer et al. [DFMS02] discuss microaggrega-
tion, a technique for statistical conﬁdentiality that uses aggregation operators. They
described the goals of statistical conﬁdentiality and its application to continuous and
categorical data. They showed the application of the method to a small publicly avail-
able data set.
General Additive Data Perturbation Muralidhar et al. [MPS99], describe a new
method (General Additive Data Perturbation) that does not change relationships between
attributes. All existing methods of additive data perturbation are shown to be special
cases of this method. When the database has a multivariate normal distribution, the new
method provides maximum security and minimum bias. For non normal databases, the
new method provides better security and bias performance than the multiplicative data
perturbation method.
Multiplicative Perturbation Method For large scale data mining applications, Liu
[Liu07] propose a distance preserving approach where the data is multiplied by a randomly
generated matrix - in eﬀect, the data is projected into a lower dimensional space. Oliveira
and Za¨ıane [OZ04], and Chen [Che06] discuss the use of random rotation for privacy
preserving clustering and classiﬁcation.
Chen et al., 2005 [CL05b] propose a random rotation perturbation method which
multiplies the original data matrix with a random orthogonal matrix. This method can
preserve the distances of the original data points. Liu. et al., 2006 [LKR06] propose
a random projection perturbation method in which the set of data points from
high-dimensional space are projected to a randomly chosen low-dimensional subspace.
Du et al., 2004 [DHC04] propose secure matrix multiplication and secure matrix inverse
protocols, and hence designed privacy preserving linear regression protocols for vertically
partitioned data sets. Their method protects the data matrix by multiplying with ran-
dom matrices, which cannot provide theoretical guarantee about privacy. These authors
observed that the distance preserving nature of random rotation enables a third party to
produce exactly the same data mining results on the perturbed data as on the original
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data. However, they did not analyze the privacy limitations of random rotation. Only a
small number of these proposed methods have explored the applicability of the pertur-
bation based approaches on variety of real-world data sets. Liu [Liu07] also addresses
the privacy issues of distance preserving perturbation by studying how well an attacker
can recover the original data from the transformed data and prior information. The
paper proposed two attack techniques: the ﬁrst based on basic properties of linear alge-
bra and the second on principal component analysis. These attacks are labeled Known
Input-Output and Known Sample by the author. Chen et al. 2011 [CL11] propose the
geometric data perturbation method. Geometric perturbation is an enhancement to
rotation perturbation by incorporating additional components such as random transla-
tion perturbation and noise addition to the basic form of multiplicative perturbation.
This method includes the linear combination of the three components: rotation pertur-
bation, translation perturbation, and distance perturbation. Geometric perturbation can
preserve the important geometric properties; thus, most data-mining models that search
for geometric class boundaries are well preserved with the perturbed data. Geomet-
ric perturbation approach not only preserves the accuracy of models, but also provides
much higher privacy guarantee, compared to the existing multidimensional perturbation
techniques [CL11].
Drawbacks of Multiplicative Perturbation Method Multiplicative perturba-
tion methods are aﬀected from known input-output, known sample attack (KSA) and
ICA attacks. Limitations of multiplicative perturbation methods are that they are inac-
curate when used in distance based querying methods and also, they are vulnerable to
correlation attacks.
Hybrid Perturbation Method A hybrid perturbation method with better utility
preservation and privacy preservation based on Chebyshev polynomial is presented in the
paper [SB13]. In the hybrid method, the noise matrix is generated using a Chebyshev
polynomial of the ﬁrst kind [MH02], [SZL13], and [Sin12], includes an orthogonal, rotation
transformation matrix, and a translation matrix. Rotation transformation matrix is
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added because rotation transformations preserve the most critical information for many
classiﬁcation models [Liu07]. Translation matrix is added to increase resilience to attack
[Che06].
The authors of the paper [SB13] tested the hybrid method and ﬁnd that the none
of the data reconstruction attacks SPF, BE-DR, MDMF or KSA was able to breach the
privacy of the hybrid method [SB13].
2.2.3 -Diﬀerential Privacy Method
Another concept that needs to be mentioned here is -diﬀerential privacy [Dwo06].
Dwork has proposed a diﬀerential privacy method that provides a worst-case privacy
guarantee for statistical databases [Dwo06]. The basic idea is to perturb the results
of statistical queries such that whether an individual is included in the database will
only have limited impact on the results. As a result, attackers can infer very limited
information from the results.
”It is often disregarded that the utility of the anonymized results provided by diﬀerential
privacy is quite limited, due to the amount of noise that needs to be added to the output,
or because utility can only be guaranteed for a restricted type of queries” [SCDFSM14]
There are two possible use scenarios: the interactive scenario when users do not have
direct access to data and can only ask statistical queries against the database, and the
non-interactive scenario when data is sanitized and given to users. Most research on
diﬀerential privacy focuses on the interactive scenario [BDMN05], [Dwo08], [DMNS06],
[LHR+10], [RR10] and [XBHG11]. There has been some work on applying diﬀerential
privacy to non interactive scenario [BLR08], [DMNS06], [DNR+09], [XWG11]. However,
it remains an open problem to ﬁnd eﬃcient solutions in many domains for the non
interactive scenario [DNR+09].
Other recent solutions are provided in this line of research.
In [CRKK09], data linkage is made more diﬃcult by the addition of fake patient
data to the original data set. The amount of fake data to be added is a function of the
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diversity of the data to be privatized; the more diverse the data, the more fake data
is added. This approach has the disadvantage of having to manage or transmit larger
data sets than necessary. The algorithm in [PP09] numerically transforms the original
data ﬁrst by grouping and then applying a method that keeps relationships between data
items while obfuscating the real values. In the transformation process the entire data
value domain is split into categories and each category is assigned a number. Each data
item is put in a category and a membership value within the category is assigned. Then
a new, transformed value is calculated by concatenating the category number and the
membership number. However, the applicability of this method is limited to cases when
the actual value of the original data is not important, such as in some data mining situa-
tions. In [MZB10], the authors manipulate the subject identiﬁers to prevent information
leakage, while the associated data remains unchanged. The method generates new sub-
ject identiﬁers and attaches them to the data, so no personally identiﬁable information
is revealed when the data is published. To make the de-identiﬁcation process reversible
for authorised users, the parameters of the algorithm generating the new identiﬁer is
communicated via a secure channel to those users. A signiﬁcant advantage of this so-
lution is that it preserves data utility. The computational costs of de-identiﬁcation are
reasonable, but the secure communication channel for reversing the de-identiﬁcation is
more expensive.
2.2.4 Cryptographic Based Data Privatization Methods
Data perturbation method randomizes the original data so that certain underlying
patterns, such as the distribution of values are retained in the randomized data [AS00].
Generally, cryptographic techniques are employed to protect the privacy of each data
holder while still ensuring the result is accurate compared with non-privacy preserving
techniques exerted on data mining algorithms. In cryptographic techniques, multiple
data sources scattered around diﬀerent spots and jointly conduct computation to reach
a common result. However, due to legal constraints privacy issues arise in the area of
distributed data mining, thus leading to the interests from research community of both
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data mining and information security. These kinds of requirements give rise to the ﬁeld of
PPDDM, which aims to design secure protocols which allow multiple parties to conduct
collaborative data mining while protecting the privacy of their data. There exists a
rich body of work in PPDDM based on cryptographic based solutions for example SMC
techniques [LP00], [VZC06], [CKV+02], [GMW87], [CCD88], [Yao86]. These techniques
develop data mining algorithms that will work in a distributed scenario and will not reveal
critical information of the parties involved. However, these algorithms generally suﬀer
from two major setbacks: (i) most of them handle only a single data mining method;
therefore, if the participating parties are interested in exploratory data analysis, they
will have to go through a diﬀerent secure distribution protocol for every mining task they
intend to perform; (ii) These algorithms involve many expensive encryption operations.
In many cases, individual entities may wish to derive aggregate results from data sets
which are partitioned across these entities. Such partitioning [dVFJ+10], [dVFJ+13],
[dVFJ+14] may be horizontal or vertical. While the individual entities may not desire
to share their entire data sets, they may consent to limited information sharing with the
use of a variety of protocols. The overall eﬀect of such methods is to maintain privacy for
each individual entity, while deriving aggregate results over the entire data. The current
work of horizontal and vertical partitioning methods are described in Subsection 4.5.1 of
Chapter 4.
1. Vertical partition. All the parties have the same set of subjects, but each party
has a diﬀerent set of attributes. The set of data held by employer companies, banks
and hospitals is an example of a vertical partition.
2. Horizontal partition. Multiple parties have disjoint sets of subjects, and each
party has the data of all the attributes for each subject he/she holds. For example,
diﬀerent colleges have information on disjoint sets of students.
I experimentally analysed the horizontal and vertical partitioning methods in Section
4.17 of Chapter 4. I consider data for both partitioning methods in table form and that
rows and columns of the table are labelled, described in Example 4.9.1 of Chapter 4.
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Most work in a distributed setting uses SMC. Survey articles can be found in [VZC06].
[VC02], [VC05] and [KC04b] deal with vertically partitioned data and horizontally parti-
tioned data respectively. Clifton and Vaida [CKV+02] propose a toolkit of techniques that
can be used to address various kinds of PPDDM issues in a practical and performance-
friendly manner. The assumption of their ideas and techniques is that all participants
of the joint computation conduct the algorithm strictly within themselves, rather than
inviting any other external parties of any trust level to assist the computation. They ar-
gue that most distributed data mining tasks can be reduced to computing certain simple
functions, such as sum, average, frequency, and sets union, with inputs of individual par-
ties, which are the private information that needs protecting. The PPDDM has attracted
much attention and many secure protocols have been proposed for speciﬁc data mining
algorithms, including support vector machines [VCKP08], Bayesian network [YW06], k-
nearest neighbor [QA08], k- means [BO07], EM-clustering [LCZ05], regression [DHC04],
[HFN11], association rules mining [VC02], [VC05] and outlier detection [VC04]. Some
of these protocols are provably secure in the semi-honest model, such as the secure pro-
tocols for decision tree [LP00], and k-means [BO07]. Some protocols choose to disclose
additional information to achieve better eﬃciency. For example, the secure support vec-
tor machine proposed by Vaidya et al., 2008 [VYJ08] discloses the kernel matrix. Other
protocols use algebraic techniques to protect the private data; for example, a vector or
matrix is protected by multiplying with random matrices in [VC02], [DHC04]. How-
ever, one should be cautious of using such methods because they may leak signiﬁcant
information [GLLM04].
Secure Multiparty Computation
Privacy is a critical requirement in distributed data mining. Cryptography-based
SMC is a main approach for privacy preserving. However, it shows poor performance in
large scale distributed systems. Meanwhile, data perturbation techniques are compara-
tively eﬃcient but are mainly used in centralized PPDM. SMC is used to solve the privacy
preserving problem in distributed data mining (DDM). The goal of the methods for SMC
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is to enable parties to jointly and eﬃciently compute a function over their inputs, while
at the same time keeping these inputs private. With the help of SMC, many cooperative
computations among parties that do not necessarily trust each other can be achieved by
keeping the privacy property of the data, thereby addressing a quite common problem in
business and government administration.
Secure two-party computation is ﬁrst investigated by Yao, 1986 [Yao86], and later
extended to multi-party computation in [GMW87], [CCD88]. The seminal paper by Gol-
dreich, Micali and Wigderson, 1987 [GMW87] extend this to many fully malicious parties
that may arbitrarily deviate from the protocol speciﬁcation. Since then, the problem of
MPC has become a fundamental question in cryptography. Lindell and Pinkas [LP00]
ﬁrst apply the concept of SMC in the ﬁeld of data mining and develop a provably se-
cure two-party decision tree using the ID3 algorithm, over horizontally partitioned data
[KC04b]. Du & Zhan [DZ02] propose a protocol for making the ID3 algorithm privacy
preserving over vertically partitioned data [VC02]. Wright & Yang [WY04] apply homo-
morphic encryption to the Bayesian networks induction for the case of two parties. Zhan
et al., [ZMC07] propose a cryptographic approach to tackle collaborative association rule
mining among multiple parties. For most SMC-based methods, cost of communication is
higher than O(n6) and the number of computation rounds is higher than O(n) [CCD88],
[CDN01] because of the cryptographic operations, where n refers to the number of nodes.
Therefore, SMC is less practical in large-scale distributed applications due to its com-
plexity.
Homomorphic Encryption
Homomorphic encryption has been one of critical techniques to tackle the multiparty
computation (MPC) problem and can be found in volumes of research work [Gen09b],
[GH11], [MSS11], [BV11a], [CMNT11]. However, simply adopting the homomorphic
encryption does not work in the MPC because of the fact that homomorphic encryption
scheme only could perform homomorphism evaluation in the case of ciphertexts under the
same public/private keys. In MPC the inputs of the functions are from multiple clients
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with their own public/private key, which prohibits adopting homomorphic encryption
schemes directly. A very diﬀerent approach to secure computation or the MPC relies on
fully homomorphic encryption (FHE) scheme [Gen09b].
Fully Homomorphic Encryption
A very diﬀerent approach to secure computation relies on the FHE. The FHE scheme
provides a mechanism to design communication-eﬃcient protocols in the two-party set-
ting. An FHE scheme allows us to perform arbitrary computations on encrypted data
without decrypting it. The idea of FHE was suggested by Rivest, Adleman and Der-
touzos [RAD77] back in 1978, yet the ﬁrst plausible candidate came thirty years later
with Gentry’s breakthrough work in 2009 [Gen09b]. A number of progressively more
eﬃcient and simpler FHE constructions have surfaced [CMNT11], [SV10], most recently
the works of Brakerski and Vaikuntanathan [BV11b], [BV11a] and the work of Brakerski,
Gentry and Vaikuntanathan [BGV11]. In an FHE approach all parties ﬁrst encrypt their
input under the FHE scheme; then they evaluate the desired function on the ciphertexts
using the homomorphic properties, and ﬁnally they perform a distributed decryption on
the ﬁnal ciphertexts to get the results. The advantage of the FHE-based approach is that
interaction is only needed to supply inputs and get output. However, the low bandwidth
consumption comes at a price; current FHE schemes are very slow and can only evalu-
ate small circuits, that is, they only provide what is known as somewhat homomorphic
encryption (SHE) [DPSZ12]. This can be circumvented in two ways; either by assuming
circular security and implementing an expensive bootstrapping operation [Gen09b], or
by extending the parameter sizes to enable a “levelled FHE” scheme which can evaluate
circuits of large degree (exponential in the number of levels) [BGV11]. The main cost,
much like other approaches, is in terms of the number of multiplications in the arithmetic
circuit. So whilst theoretically appealing, the approach via FHE is not competitive in
practice with the traditional MPC approach. Moreover, the protocol consists of only two
rounds of interaction, which is optimal (matching [Yao86]).
Several other FHE schemes have been proposed. Gentry and Halevi describe in [GH11]
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the ﬁrst implementation of Gentry’s scheme, using many clever optimizations, including
some suggested in a previous work by Smart and Vercauteren [SV10]. van Dijk et al.,
[DGHV10] scheme over the integers, this scheme is conceptually simpler than Gentry’s
scheme, because it operates on integers instead of ideal lattices. This simplicity comes at
the expense of a public key size in O(λ10) which is too large for any practical system. It
is shown in [CMNT11] how to reduce the public key size by storing only a small subset
of the original public key and generating the full public key on the ﬂy by combining
the elements in the small subset multiplicatively. In [CMNT11], the author presents
the reduced public key size of the somewhat homomorphic scheme from O(λ10) down to
O(λ7). Using some of the optimizations from [GH11], the authors of [CMNT11] report
similar performances: a 802 MB public key and a ciphertext refresh in 14 minutes. In
[CNT12], authors describe a compression technique that reduces the public key size of the
paper [CMNT11] fully homomorphic scheme over the integers from O(λ7) to O(λ5). In
addition, authors obtained an implementation of the full scheme with a 10.1 MB public
key instead of 802 MB using similar parameters as in [CMNT11].
Recent Breakthroughs
Recent research progress on the SMC data privatization methods have been made as
follows:
Lo´pez-Alt et al. [LATV11] present their MPC protocol is eﬃcient in computation,
communication and communication round using the key homomorphic property of the
recent FHE scheme of Brakerski and Vaikuntanathan [BV11b], [BV11a]. [LATV12] in-
vent a new notion of the FHE that called a multikey FHE (MK-FHE). MK-FHE permits
computation on the data encrypted under multiple unrelated keys, and a new method of
achieving on-the-ﬂy multiparty computation using a multikey FHE scheme. Li et al, 2013
[LL13] propose a multi-scheme FHE (MS- FHE) where participants from diﬀerent coun-
tries, diﬀerent companies, or diﬀerent political parties may have their own preferred FHE
schemes. This MS-FHE scheme is proposed using a cipher text tree. This scheme is use-
ful where the number of participants is limited, but in the worst case, users are met with
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exponential complexity. Choudhury et al., 2013 [CLO+13] interpolate between the two
extremes of traditional MPC protocols (with high communication but low computational
costs) and Gentry’s FHE based solution (with high computation but low communication
costs).
They proposed an eﬃcient MPC protocols with almost zero communication costs in
an online phase. However, they do not mention the cost of computation nor of com-
munication round. Many researchers have considered the problem that organizations
wish to outsource computation to the cloud together with their private data stored in
the cloud. The idea of using a cloud to alleviate the computational eﬀorts of parties was
recently explored in the work on “server-aided MPC” by Kamara, Mohassel and Raykova
[KMR11]. Their protocols, however, require some of the parties to do a large amount of
computation, essentially proportional to the size of the function being computed.
Thus, their protocols are not computation-eﬃcient. The works of Myers, Sergi and
Shelat [MSS11], Bendlin et.al [BDOZ10], and Damg˚ard et. al. [DPSZ12] construct MPC
protocols using FHE schemes and somewhat homomorphic schemes. Their protocols
are communication-eﬃcient, but not computation-eﬃcient. Halevi, Lindell and Pinkas
[HLP11] consider the model of “secure computation on the web” wherein the goal is to
minimize interaction between the parties. Unfortunately, as they show, their notion can
only be achieved for a small class of functions. The paper [AJLA+12] constructs the SMC
protocols which are secure against fully malicious attackers, tolerating any number of cor-
ruptions, and providing security in the universal composability framework. In particular,
the paper [AJLA+12] achieves full security in the model where the computation occurs
in 2 stages (optimal) and each party “logs in” once per stage to post a message to the
server. As an additional beneﬁt, the server does not do any processing on messages until
the end of each stage. Thus, the parties may, in fact, “log in” concurrently in each stage,
unlike [HLP11] where the parties must “log in” sequentially. But the paper [AJLA+12]
suﬀers from two main problems: (i) It does not preserve round complexity; (ii) It uses the
“heavy machinery” of generic MPC compilers and zero-knowledge proofs on top of FHE
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and is unlikely to yield practical solutions. In 2013, Lo´pez-Alt et al. [LATV12] emphasis
that while the cloud oﬀers numerous advantages in costs and functionality, it raises grave
questions of conﬁdentiality, since data stored in the cloud could be vulnerable to snooping
by the cloud provider or even by other cloud clients [RTSS09]. The FHE is only suitable
in settings where the computations involve a single user, since it requires inputs to be
encrypted under the same key. The FHE is appropriate in such an asymmetric setting
of computing with the cloud. Yet, traditional FHE schemes are single-key in the sense
that they can perform (arbitrarily complex) computations on inputs encrypted under the
same key.
Asharov et al. [AJLA+12] propose a cloud assisted MPC protocol which yields a
5-round on-the-ﬂy MPC protocol (one oﬄine round, and four online rounds to perform
decryption). As an additional beneﬁt, in the resulting on-the-ﬂy protocol, the parties
may communicate with the server concurrently at each stage. The only disadvantage of
this approach is that it requires a CRS setup. This does not, however, aﬀect the on-the-
ﬂy nature of the protocol since only an apriori bound N on the number of computing
parties needs to be known when creating the CRS.
Now, we summarize the above mentioned all data Privatization methods accord-
ing to the some considered features in the Tables 2.1, 2.2 and 2.3. The values of the
considered features in the tables are described as follows: For privacy, Low refers
to no security from record linkage/attribute linkage attacks; Moderate refers to secure
from record linkage/attribute linkage/probabilistic homogeneity/background knowledge/
SPF/BE-DR/MDMF/known input-output/KSA attacks; High refers to low and moder-
ate values mentioned attacks not possible at all. For utility, Low refers to the per-
turbed/anonymized data are distorted a relatively large (and unacceptable) portion of
the perturbed/anonymized data, i.e. originality of data is lost; Moderate refers to the
information loss of perturbed/anonymized data is acceptable; High refers to the infor-
mation loss of perturbed/anonymized data is zero or less than the value in Moderate.
For complexity, Low refers if the CPU time takes less than second for the privatization
32
Table 2.1. Comparison Analysis of Data Privatization Methods - Part I
Methods→ k-
anonymity
l-diversity
(α, k)-
anonymity
t-closeness Additive
Features↓
Privacy Moderate Moderate Moderate Moderate Moderate
Utility Low Low Low Low High
Complexity Moderate Moderate Moderate Moderate Low
Practical No No No No Yes
Scalability High High High High High
Security Record
Linkage
Record Link-
age, Attribute
Linkage
Record Link-
age, Attribute
Linkage
Attribute
Linkage,
Probabilistic,
Homogene-
ity and,
Background
Knowledge
attacks
Low security
Possible
Attacks
Homogeneity,
Background
Knowledge
attacks
Skewness,
Similarity
and Attribute
disclosure
attacks
Identity dis-
closure attack
Attribute dis-
closure attack
SPF, BE-DR,
and MDMF
attacks
Eﬃciency Moderate Moderate Moderate Moderate High
Table 2.2. Comparison Analysis of Data Privatization Methods - Part II
Methods→
DM
Condens-
ation
RR RP Hybrid
Features↓
Privacy Moderate Moderate Moderate Moderate Moderate
Utility Moderate Low Moderate Moderate Moderate
Complexity Low Moderate Moderate Moderate Moderate
Practical Yes No Yes Yes Yes
Scalability High Moderate Moderate Moderate Moderate
Security Disclosure
Control
High
Anonymity
SPF, BE-DR,
and MDMF
SPF, BE-DR,
and MDMF
SPF, BE-
DR, MDMF,
Known Input-
Output, and
KSA attacks
Possible
Attacks
Clustering
Problem
Disclosure
Attack, Seri-
ous conﬂicts
between
preserving
covariance in-
formation and
preserving
privacy
Known Input-
Output, KSA,
and ICA
Known Input-
Output, KSA,
and ICA
No Additive
and Multi-
plicative data
reconstruction
attacks
Eﬃciency High Moderate Moderate Moderate Moderate
Note: Where, DM - Data Microaggregation, RR - Random Rotation, RP - Random Projection
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Table 2.3. Comparison Analysis of Data Privatization Methods - Part III
Methods→
DS RR SMC -DP Geometric
Features↓
Privacy Moderate Moderate High High Moderate
Utility Moderate Low Low Low Moderate
Complexity Low Low High Low Moderate
Practical Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Scalability High High Low Moderate Moderate
Security Anonymiza-
tion attacks
Protecting
data Privacy
Highly Secure Table Link-
age and
Probabilistic
Attacks
Additive per-
turbation at-
tacks
Possible
Attacks
No guaran-
tee that the
swapped
values will
be very dif-
ferent from
the original
values
Participants
often are
very skep-
tical about
the whole
process be-
cause, either
they do not
understand
it or because
they feel that
their privacy
is not really
protected
None Adversarial
queries, Tim-
ing, State,
and Pri-
vacy budget
attacks
Known Input-
Output, KSA,
and ICA
Eﬃciency High High Low High Moderate
Note: Where, DS - Data Swapping, RR - Randomized Response, DP - Diﬀerential Privacy
method to produce a perturbed/anonymized data from the original data; Moderate refers
if the CPU time takes several seconds to minute for the privatization method to produce
a perturbed/anonymized data from the original data; High refers if the CPU time takes
several minutes to hour for the privatization method to produce a perturbed/anonymized
data from the original data. For scalability, Low refers to increase computation when
process to handle a growing amount of data; Moderate refers to handle growing amount of
data without increasing computation, but increase computation when process to handle
big data; High refers no penalty on computation, but with excessive memory requirement.
For security, k-anonymity is secure from record linkage attack; l-diversity is secure from
k-anonymity and attribute linkage attacks; (α, k)-anonymity has same security as the
l-diversity method; t-closeness is secure from l-diversity, probabilistic, homogeneity and,
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background knowledge attacks; the additive perturbation method has low security since
any additive data reconstruction attacks (SPF, MDMF, and BE-DR) are possible; data
microaggregation is secure from the disclosure control attack; the condensation method
is secure from any anonymization attacks; random rotation and random projection are
secure from SPF, MDMF, and BE-DR data reconstruction attacks; the hybrid method
is secure from SPF, MDMF, BE-DR, known input-output, KSA attacks; data swap-
ping is secure from anonymization attacks; randomized response protects data privacy
and avoiding answer bias; SMC is secure from any anonymization and perturbation at-
tacks; -diﬀerential privacy is secure from table linkage and probabilistic attacks; and
geometric method is secure from additive perturbation attacks. For possible attacks,
k-anonymity suﬀers from homogeneity and background knowledge attacks; l-diversity
suﬀers from skewness, similarity and attribute disclosure attacks; (α, k)-anonymity suf-
fers from identity disclosure attack; t-closeness suﬀers from an attribute disclosure attack;
additive perturbation method suﬀers from SPF, MDMF, and BE-DR attacks; data mi-
croaggregation suﬀers from clustering based attacks; condensation has the possibility of
disclosure attack and serious conﬂicts between preserving covariance information and
preserving privacy; random rotation suﬀers from known input-output, KSA and ICA at-
tacks; random projection suﬀers from the same attacks as random rotation; the hybrid
method has no possibility of additive and multiplicative perturbation data reconstruction
attacks; data swapping has the possibility of attack because there is no guarantee that
the swapped values will be very diﬀerent from the original values; randomized response
suﬀers from data privacy; SMC has no possibility of anonymization and data reconstruc-
tion attacks; -diﬀerential privacy suﬀers from the adversarial queries, timing, state, and
privacy budget attacks; geometric method suﬀers from as random rotation and random
projection attacks. For eﬃciency, by ‘low’ I mean that several minutes to one hour of
CPU time is needed for the privatization method to produce perturbed/anonymized data
from the original data. By ‘moderate’, I mean that CPU time taken for this procedure
is between several seconds and one minute; and I use ‘high’ if the CPU time takes less
than one second.
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2.2.5 Summary of the Section
Although much progress has been achieved in recent years on data privatization meth-
ods. We studied and analysed anonymization, perturbation, cryptographic based MPC
data privatization methods based on mainly privacy, utility, security and computation
complexity features and we summarize these methods in Tables 2.1, 2.2 and 2.3 respec-
tively.
In the next subsection, we discuss the methods of aggregating data with privacy
preserve manner. Privacy preserving data aggregation methods attracts much research
attention.
2.3 Privacy Preserving Data Aggregation Methods
In the literature we ﬁnd the privacy preserving data aggregation (PPDA) methods
are described in many areas, such as in the context of Wireless Sensor Network (WSN)
scenarios and sharing distributed data sets.
The ﬁrst survey paper on the PPDA methods is described by Li et al. [LZDT09].
In [LZDT09], the authors review privacy preserving techniques for protecting two types
of private information: data-oriented and context-oriented privacy. Bista et al., 2010
[BC10] provide survey on PPDA. This work diﬀers from the existing survey as follows.
First, the authors focus only on data privacy in order to provide detailed overviews of the
existing PPDA protocols. Secondly, they do not provide a comprehensive comparison of
the protocols in terms of such metrics as types of privacy. Finally, they do not cover the
most recent and important protocols in their survey, for example Conti et al. [CZR+09].
Bista et al., 2010 [BC10] illustrate the classiﬁcation of the existing PPDA protocols. The
PPDA protocols are broadly categorized into two categories: homogeneous protocols
and heterogeneous protocols. Homogeneous protocols are described as three kinds of
protocols; perturbation, shuﬄing and privacy homomorphism.
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2.3.1 Homogeneous Protocols
The homogeneous protocols are divided into three major methods; perturbation, shuf-
ﬂing and privacy homomorphism methods.
Perturbation-based protocols include Cluster-based Private Data Aggregation
(CPDA) [HLN+07], Conti et al.’s scheme [CZR+09], Data Aggregation Diﬀerent Privacy-
levels Protection (DADPP) [YW08] and Perturbed Histogram-based Aggregation (PHA)
[ZWF08]. The CPDA suﬀers from high communication and computation overheads. In
addition, the CPDA can only tolerate the collusion to a certain threshold. CONTI et
al.’s scheme [CZR+09] decreases the lifetime of the WSN, because all sensor nodes need
longer idle times until the BS receives the aggregated value from the cluster heads. The
DADPP suﬀers from the inherent high communication and computation overheads. Fur-
thermore, these overheads increase with increasing privacy level. Zhang et al. [ZWF08]
propose the PHA to preserve privacy for queries targeted at special sensor data or sensor
data distribution. It has the following disadvantages. First, the ﬁnal aggregated result is
an approximation value of the sensor data rather than the real data. Secondly, the PHA
requires a large size payload (message/data) because all sensor data need to be replaced
by an integer range. Moreover, the bandwidth consumption of this protocol increases
as the number of ranges increases. Finally, storing interval ranges to replace the orig-
inal data consumes a signiﬁcant amount of memory. Slice-Mix-AggRegaTe (SMART)
[HLN+07] and integrity-Protecting Private Data Aggregation (iPDA) [HNL+08] are
two shuﬄing-based protocols [BC10]. The SMART by He et al. [HLN+07] achieves
the PPDA by hiding original data before the data transmissions. The SMART can
tolerate only the collusion to a certain threshold. He et al. [HNL+08] propose a data
aggregation protocol called the iPDA. The iPDA has a high communication overhead.
Privacy Homomorphism (PH) technique has a special feature that allows arithmetic
operations to be performed on cipher-text without decryption. This technique is fast and
resource-eﬃcient, but it has a limitation that it performs only addition and multiplication
operations. There are several disadvantages of the PH based scheme, despite providing
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data privacy cheaply in terms of computational cost. First, the PH based scheme is not
scalable because the base station must know the keys of all aggregated packets in order
to decrypt the received result. This requires additional communication costs for the
transmission of all participated nodes’ IDs and corresponding security measures. None
of the known solutions can provide both data integrity and conﬁdentiality on the high
level of security. Second, the PH based scheme is vulnerable to malicious modiﬁcations
of data by adding natural numbers to the cipher text. Finally, the PH scheme does not
support data integrity.
2.3.2 Heterogeneous Protocols
Heterogeneous protocols are of two types; perturbation and hybrid. Perturbation
technique has the same meaning as what we deﬁned in the homogeneous protocols. The
work propose by Sheng et al. [SL08] is only the existing perturbation-based protocol.
Sheng et al. [SL08] propose a privacy preserving storage scheme which associates a tag
with each encrypted data in order to process a range query, by adopting the concept
of bucketing [HILM02] and indexing [HMT04]. The main problem of this scheme is the
transmission delay. In addition, this scheme does not consider the scenario of malicious
modiﬁcations of sensor data. Hybrid, when a protocol uses more than one technique to
achieve the PPDA for WSNs, it belongs to the hybrid sub-group. Privacy preserving
Integrity-assured data Aggregation (PIA) [TG09], is the hybrid-based protocol.
These homogeneous and heterogeneous protocols are proposed to achieve the PPDA
for WSNs. This thesis is not focused on the WSNs applications. So, we did not provide
detail of these protocols in the thesis.
2.3.3 Cryptography Based Data Aggregation Methods
Common Approaches
Several researchers have investigated secure data aggregation schemes using the most
common approach the MPC techniques to perform the collaborative computation of an
aggregation function based on private inputs which are not disclosed to the participants.
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In the existing works [KDK11], [LLL10] and [GJ11] propose aggregation protocols
based on the cryptographic solutions. Molina et al. [MSF09] study how to enable clinical
research without giving patient records to the researchers. In their solution, caregivers,
who have full access to patient records, use the MPC with public key homomorphic en-
cryption to answer researcher aggregation queries. However, none of the these mentioned
papers explicitly discusses the possibility to extend the proposed approaches to multiple
entities interested in collecting aggregated data. Cryptographic schemes also be combined
with diﬀerential privacy techniques in order to securely compute aggregate statistics: in
[DKM+06], a protocol for the distributed generation of random noise is proposed, aimed
at the distributed implementation of privacy preserving statistical databases. To do so,
the protocol relies on a veriﬁable secret sharing scheme. The other existing solutions
[BCOP04], [SWP00] use a symmetric and asymmetric searchable encryption scheme to
store users’ data in a third party. These schemes conceal users’ data from the third party
and enable the third party to match data with users’ searching requests and return the
matched data to users. To satisfy these two seemingly contradictory requirements, both
[BCOP04], [SWP00] introduce additional private information (i.e., a symmetric key in
[SWP00] and an asymmetric key in [BCOP04]) to manipulate the original data or its
hash values. Following [BCOP04], [SWP00], many improved approaches have been pro-
posed [BSNS06], [BW07], [SBC+07]. In [YY08] have focused on matching operations, the
repository can be easily extended to support SUM and AVG aggregate operations with
additive homomorphic encryption schemes, like the Paillier encryption scheme [Pai99].
Rastogi and Nath [RN10] use threshold Paillier cryptosystem [FPS00] to build such an
encryption scheme. To decrypt the sum, their scheme needs an extra round of interac-
tion between the aggregator and all users in every aggregation period, which means high
communication cost and long delay. Moreover, it requires all users to be online until
decryption is completed, which may not be practical in many mobile sensing scenarios
due to user mobility and the heterogeneity of user connectivity. Rieﬀel et al. [RBML11]
propose a construction that does not require bidirectional communications between the
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aggregator and the users, but it has a high computation and storage cost to deal with
collusions in a large system. Shi et al. [SCR+11] also propose a construction for sum
aggregation which does not need the extra round of interaction. However, the decryp-
tion in their construction needs to traverse the possible plaintext space of the aggregated
value, which is very expensive for a large system with large plaintext space.
There are many existing works [Gen09c], [CMT05], [YWZC08] on security and the
PPDA, but most of them assume a trusted aggregator and cannot protect user privacy
against untrusted aggregators. Yang et al. [YZW05] propose an encryption scheme
that allows an untrusted aggregator to obtain the sum of multiple users’s data without
knowing any speciﬁc user’s data. However, their scheme requires expensive re-keying
operations to support multiple time steps. Several researchers [CT89], [ASFM12] have
focused on cryptographic key assignment schemes aim to minimize the expense in storing
and managing secret keys for general cryptographic use. Guo et al. [GMCX08] built
IBE with key aggregation. Most importantly, their key-aggregation [GMCX08] comes at
the expense of O(n) sizes for both ciphertexts and the public parameter, where n is the
number of secret keys which can be aggregated into a constant size one. This greatly
increases the costs of storing and transmitting ciphertexts, which is impractical in many
situations such as shared cloud storage.
2.3.4 Recent Breakthroughs
Rottondi et al. [RVK13] allow the aggregation of the same data according to mul-
tiple rules specifying diﬀerent aggregation granularities, with a limited increase in the
volume of exchanged information. The authors propose a secure communication proto-
col in which privacy preserving aggregation is performed by means of a cryptographic
homomorphic scheme. Also this provides an optimal centralize algorithm, a heuristic cen-
tralized algorithm, and a distributed algorithm for the routing of the information ﬂows
based on the Shamir Secret Sharing encryption scheme. Jose et al. [JPJ13] propose pri-
vacy preserving protocol named EPSDA overcomes the problems in the existing scheme
by performing aggregation on encrypted data, based on privacy homomorphic property
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of the encryption algorithm however there is a chance of replying the old information to
the network. The EPSDA protocol prevents the replay attack by achieving data freshness
during aggregation, this increases the accuracy of the aggregated result by performing
the aggregation on encrypted data and reduced number of transmissions. It also guar-
antees the integrity of the aggregated result at base station and the authentication of
the data during non delayed aggregation. Benkaouz et al. [BE13] present a distributed
protocol for privacy preserving aggregation to enable computing a class of aggregation
functions that can be expressed as Abelian group. The proposed protocol is based on an
overlay structure that enables secret sharing without the need of any central authority
or heavyweight cryptography. Chu et al. [CCT+14] show that protecting users’ data
privacy is a central question of cloud storage. This paper considers how to “compress”
secret keys in public-key cryptosystems which support delegation of secret keys for dif-
ferent ciphertext classes in cloud storage, the delegatee can always get an aggregate key
of constant size. A limitation of this work is the predeﬁned bound of the number of
maximum ciphertext classes. In cloud storage, the number of ciphertexts usually grows
rapidly, so they have to reserve enough ciphertext classes. Zhou et al. [ZYH14] propose
a novel secure data aggregation scheme based on homomorphic primitives inWSNs (ab-
breviated as SDA-HP).The scheme adopts a symmetric-key homomorphic encryption to
protect data privacy and combines it with homomorphic MAC synchronically to check the
aggregation data integrity. Rieﬀel et al. [RBLM14] present an approach that enables the
collection of societally useful statistics while preserving the privacy of individual values.
They have deﬁned conditions for a protocol to achieve CollaPSE (Collaboration Presence
Sharing Encryption) security, and present a set of new security protocols that meet these
conditions: (i) an individual has full access to their own data; (ii) a third party performs
computation on the data without learning anything about the data values; (iii) people
with special privileges can learn statistical information about groups of individuals, but
nothing about the individual values contributing to the statistic other than what can
be deduced from the statistic. Kohlmayer et. al [KPEK13] present a ﬂexible solution
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for anonymizing distributed data in the semi-honest model. Prior to the anonymization
procedure, an encrypted global view of the data set is constructed by means of a secure
multi-party computing (SMC) protocol.
From recent literature work we ﬁnd the authors have mainly focused on cryptographic
methods to provide data aggregation, cryptographic methods have high computation and
communication costs which is not practical.
2.3.5 Summary of the Section
In this subsection we summarize the existing PPDA methods dealing with data aggre-
gation methods based on homogeneous protocols and heterogeneous protocols as well as
cryptography based data aggregation methods. We also present the recent breakthroughs
in the data aggregation methods. We discuss the strong points and weak points of each
method and ﬁnd that the authors of the existing work have mainly focused on crypto-
graphic methods to provide data aggregation, while such methods have high computation
and communication costs which are not practical.
In the next subsection, we discuss the data querying methods for individual and
server. Data querying is another booming research area.
2.4 Privacy Preserving Data Querying
This section reviews existing work on private query processing, including private
information retrieval, query anonymization using noisy queries, plausibly deniable search,
hybrid approaches B+ tree, Bucket based methods and keyword search methods.
2.4.1 Private Information Retrieval
Private information retrieval (PIR) [CKGS98] tries to fully preserve the privacy of
access pattern, while the data may not be encrypted. The PIR originates from a the-
oretical problem of privately retrieving a bit from a binary string stored on a remote
server such that the server does not learn which bit is retrieved. Solutions to the PIR
problem are usually cryptographic protocols in which queries and answers are all in ci-
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phertexts. Solutions proposed for protecting access and pattern conﬁdentiality when data
are stored in the clear are typically based on PIR techniques and provide access and pat-
tern conﬁdentiality at a high computational and communication cost [Gas04]. Chor et
al. [CKGS98] introduce the PIR problem and present the ﬁrst solutions using multiple
servers. Kushilevitz and Ostrovsky propose a single server, computational PIR solution
[KO97] which is usually referred to as cPIR. cPIR and its follow-up single-server PIR
proposals, however, are criticized as impractical for their expensive computation costs
[SC07]. Multi-server PIR solutions have been shown to be more eﬃcient than single-
server PIR solutions [OG12]. However, multi-server PIR does not work if more than
a certain percentage of servers collude, thus leaving only single-server PIR suitable to
be used for a public data service provider. Solutions based on alternative theoretical
foundations, i.e. based on linear algebra [MG08], are later proposed to attempt to make
single-server PIR practical. Unfortunately, the linear algebra based PIR scheme [MG08]
cannot guarantee that its security is as strong as previous PIR solutions, and it still
incurs signiﬁcant communication costs. Therefore, the PIR [CKGS98], [KO97] provides
users complete privacy in retrieving data via cryptographic protocols, but existing single-
server PIR protocols are too expensive in either computation [GR05], [KO97], [SC07] or
communication costs [MG08], while multi-server PIR protocols [CKGS98] do not allow
communication among all servers, which may be hard to enforce.
2.4.2 Query Anonymization Method
Instead of providing complete query privacy in the PIR, query anonymization bases
on k-anonymity [Sam01], [SS98] or its variants to mix plaintext noise into a user’s plain-
text query [MCA06]. It generalizes the values of data records such that each record is
indistinguishable among at least k records with close values in the released private data
[Sam01], [Swe02b]. For example in privacy preserving location based services [MCA06],
a user’s query point is anonymized with an enclosing region containing k−1 query points
of other users. Such anonymization is computationally eﬃcient compared to the PIR,
but does not provide strong privacy. k-Anonymity and its variants are subject to attacks
such as similarity attacks [LLV07] and composition attacks [GKS08].
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2.4.3 Plausibly Deniable Search
To avoid the vulnerabilities of random k-anonymous noise but to have query eﬃciency,
Plausibly Deniable Search (PDS) is proposed in [MC09], [PDX10] to generate meaningful
and disguising noise for private text search. The PDS relies on a topic model or an existing
taxonomy to ﬁnd words of diﬀerent topics to cover a query word. It protects the privacy
of a single query, but does not protect privacy for a sequence of queries. Generating
meaningful noise for query privacy protection has also been studied in private web search.
A popular private web search tool called TrackMeNot [HN09] generates additional noise
queries based on a list of popular queries and the user’s query history. Those popular
queries, however, can be easily classiﬁed as noise [PS10], while the noise generated based
on a user’s query history does not really help protect the user’s query privacy.
2.4.4 Hybrid Method
The Hybrid approaches have been proposed to apply expensive PIR protocols in an
anonymized data subset deﬁned by query anonymization [WAA14], thus achieving good
tradeoﬀ between processing eﬃciency and query privacy. However, the selection of an
anonymized subset in [OTGH10], [WAA14] follows the vulnerable k-Anonymity or its
variants, and does not have a detailed privacy measure to justify the selection.
2.4.5 B-Tree Method
An alternative approach is to build a B-tree over plaintext, but encrypt every record
and the B-tree at the node level using conventional encryption. The B-tree index is
maintained by the user to locate the data of interest [DVJ+03], [SWEG05], [GZ07b],
[WAA11]. In general, this approach does not provide access conﬁdentiality or pattern
conﬁdentiality because it could be observed that an access aims at a speciﬁc data and
two accesses aim at the same data.
2.4.6 Oblivious RAM Method
The proposals of oblivious RAM [GO96] and the PIR [CG97], [CKGS98], [SC07] aim
to address this issue. The idea is that each data read or write request will generate a com-
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pletely random sequence of data accesses from the server’s perspective and they proposed
several techniques, namely, cover searches, cached searches, and shuﬄing. But they incur
a heavy workload at the client, communication costs, high computational complexity, or
require special-purpose hardware, so they are not applicable to large databases of the
cloud scale.
2.4.7 B+-Tree Method
A secure B+ tree index is used in [WAA11] where a salted IDA encoding scheme and
column-access-via-proxy query processing the MONOMI’s design in [TKMZ13] takes an
approach of split client/server execution of queries and considers a larger class of SQL
queries. The idea is to execute as much of the query as possible over encrypted data
on the server, and execute the remaining components by shipping encrypted data to a
trusted client. Their approach relies on various encryption methods for the execution on
the server, rather than replacing encryption methods.
There are some methods are based on Keyword Based Search are as follows:
2.4.8 Keyword Based Search Methods
In [FLW91], a simple but eﬀective scheme has been proposed to encrypt a look-up di-
rectory consisting of (key, value) pairs. The goal is to allow the corresponding value to be
retrieved if and only if a valid key is provided. However, their idea is using an associated
one-way hash function mapping the original keys in a deterministic way and as a result it
could suﬀer from frequency analysis attacks if the attackers are armed with background
knowledge about the data distribution or frequency information. In [CWL+14], multi-
keyword similarity searches over encrypted documents are considered. Both documents
and queries are represented as vectors over keywords and the similarity between a doc-
ument and a query is measured by the inner product between their represented vectors.
The query answers are the set of documents that have a similarity score above a speciﬁed
threshold. They further introduce noises into the inner product to resist attacks speciﬁc
to their schemes while sacriﬁcing the accuracy of the results. We will later on show for
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our encryption scheme, we also introduce noises but in a way that does not aﬀect the
exact answers. In [SWP00], interesting searchable symmetric key encryption schemes are
proposed to support keyword searches over an encrypted text repository such as email
messages. However, only equality tests of a single keyword are considered in their work
and the time complexity is linear in its repository size per query. In [KIK12], an index
based on locality sensitive hashing is proposed to support similarity search for high di-
mensional data like text data. It is not clear how these techniques can be adapted for
range query search in relational databases. In theory, the FHE [Gen09b] could be used
to evaluate any function over encrypted data. In practice, this construction is prohibitive
for databases of the cloud scale, requiring slowdowns on the order of 109 times [GHS12].
We reviewed existing privacy preserving query methods which focused on maintain
level of privacy with minimum costs. In the below subsection we focus on rich query
functions.
2.4.9 Query Functions
There has been considerable interest in querying encrypted data, and various queries
are considered. Brieﬂy, the works include equality test [HILM02], [TKMZ13], range
query search [AKSX04], [PLZ13], [SBC+07], aggregation query computation [TKMZ13],
[HIM04] as well as keyword based query search or similarity query search [WCL+10],
[SWP00], [KIK12]. However, little work on secure processing of range query search
without preserving the order information has been reported. The line of research on
aggregation queries, [AF11], assumes that the aggregation attribute is sensitive but the
selection attribute is not, and employs the homomorphic encryption scheme to compute
the aggregation operation [HIM04]. This encryption scheme is not applicable to range
query search. In addition, as discussed in [WCKM09], the homomorphic encryption in
[HIM04] is not fully secure. In [WCKM09], secure computation of k-nearest neighbor
queries (kNN) were studied in an outsourced setting. Their technique is based on a
notion of distance between data points and the query point, and approximation of such
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distances. The comparison operation required by range query search does not have a
natural notion of distance or approximation.
In recent years, uncertain queries have received considerable attention in the database
community, due to the importance in various applications. There exist various uncertain
query types in the literatures, and the most popular uncertain queries are as follows:
1. Skyline query: The query retrieves the objects that are not dominated by other
objects in the data set, where the dominating relationship means that for any two
objects a and b, a dominates b if a is not worse than b in all dimensions, but better
than b in at least one dimension.
2. Top-k query: The top-k query is widely adopted in monitoring system, infor-
mation retrieval, sensor network, multimedia databases, P2P system, spatial data
analysis, and data stream management. Uncertain top-k query depends not only
on its score, but also on its membership probability.
3. Nearest-Neighbor (NN) query is a key technology in spatio-temporal database,
which is widely applied in many applications, such as intelligent navigation, mod-
ern communications, traﬃc control, weather forecasting, pattern recognition, and
geographic information system.
4. Aggregate query tries to determine the statistical aggregates, such as sum and
max from the queries, which are commonly used in traditional database system.
The aggregate query contains the traditional aggregate functions, such as MIN,
MAX, AVG, SUM, COUNT, DISTINCT COUNT, MEDIAN.
5. Join query aims to combine two data sets based on some query predicate into one
set such that the new set contains pairs of objects of the two original sets, which is
an essential primitive in relational database.
6. Range query is one of the most important queries over spatio-temporal objects.
Given a search region rq, a range query retrieves all the objects that fall in rq.
Two kinds of uncertain range queries fundamental to many analytical tasks have
received considerable attention in the database community: nonfuzzy probabilistic
range queries and fuzzy probabilistic range queries [TXC07].
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7. Threshold query is a fundamental query type, which retrieves the objects qual-
ifying a set of predicates with certain threshold guarantees. Since the predicates
can be randomly deﬁned by users for various applications, the threshold query can
be regarded as an essential tool for analyzing data.
Range query is the most frequently used query in online data analytics (OLAP)
that requires the service provider to quickly respond to concurrent user queries. To
eﬃciently process range queries, indexing is a necessary step. However, most existing
encryption approaches [SWP00], [BCOP04], [BW07], [SBC+07] require linear scan over
the entire database, thus, impractical for OLAP. The FHE [Gen09c] in theory allows any
operation on encrypted data that can be traced back to an equivalent operation on the
corresponding plaintexts. However, as the author of [Gen09c] mentioned, this is still too
expensive to be practical even for a simple application like encrypted keyword search.
2.4.10 Recent Breakthroughs
Recently, the problem of querying encrypted data has been thoroughly investigated
in both cryptography and database communities [dVFJ+11]. One of the widely studied
approaches is public key encryption with keyword search (PEKS) [BCOP04]. PEKS can
protect users’ data privacy and certain query privacy. However, most of PEKS schemes,
such as the Searchable Encryption Scheme for Auction (SESA) [WLL+14], only can be
applied for equality checks. Range query over the encrypted data with numeric attributes
is more diﬃcult, and most of the existing literatures cannot achieve data and query
privacy simultaneously. Broadly speaking, there are four categories of solutions that
have been developed for range queries: order preserving encryption (OPE), bucketization
(Bucket), HVE and special data structure traversal. OPE-based technique [BCO11] is
to ensure that the order of plaintext data is preserved in the ciphertext domain. This
allows direct translation of range predicate from the original domain to the domain of
the ciphertext. However, the coupling distribution of plaintext and ciphertext domains
might be exploited by attackers to guess the scope of the corresponding plaintext for a
ciphertext [AKSX04].
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Bucket-based Methods
Bucket-based technique [HMCK12] uses distributional properties of the data sets to
partition and index data for eﬃcient querying while trying to keep the information disclo-
sure to a minimum. Queries are evaluated in an approximate manner where the returned
set of records may contain some false positives. The speciﬁc technique of bucketizing
data to support range queries over encrypted tuples is described in [HILM02]. These
papers [HMT04], [CDV+05] analyze and estimate the loss of privacy due to bucketiza-
tion. Since statistical information is revealed, some degree of privacy is invariably lost,
but these results show that only very limited information can be deduced from the en-
crypted tuples and their corresponding bucket identiﬁers [CDV+05]. There are many
studies to execute query on encrypted data, which are Bucket based, B+ Tree index,
Privacy homomorphism, and Order Preserving Encryption Schema (OPES) methods.
The main idea is to use the additional index in order to search and get the wanted data
from encrypted data in the database eﬀectively. The ﬁrst proposal toward the solution
of this problem was the bucket based indexing method using a number of buckets on the
attribute domain [HILM02]. Bucket based indexing methods are used to partition the
attribute value range in a number of non overlapping subsets of values, called buckets,
containing contiguous values. The other major proposal is the B+ tree index method
[DVJ+03] where authors propose the storing of additional indexing information together
with the encrypted database. Such index information can be used to search for the right
information from the encrypted data in the database. The B+ tree structure is typically
used inside the database. Another method is using Privacy homomorphism. This has
also been proposed for allowing the execution of aggregation queries over the encrypted
data in the database system [HIM04]. There are many queries to ﬁnd the exact data in
the database such as equality query, range query, and aggregation query. Equality query
is to ﬁnd single matched data. Range query is to ﬁnd the data included within the given
range. Aggregation query is to ﬁnd the numerical sum or the average value. Originally
bucket based index algorithms were used to execute the numerical data search in a plain-
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text database. It is very useful to use a bucket index in order to search the encrypted
data on the encrypted database eﬀectively. Cryptoindex is also based on column-wise
bucketization. It assigns a random ID to each bucket; the values in the bucket are re-
placed with the bucket ID to generate the auxiliary data for indexing. To utilize the
index for query processing, a normal range query condition has to be transformed to a
set-based query on the bucket IDs. A bucket-diﬀusion scheme [HMT04] is proposed to
protect the access pattern, which, however, has to sacriﬁce the precision of query results,
and thus increase the client’s cost of ﬁltering the query result. The fatal drawback of
the bucket based index algorithm is the risk of the data exposure although it has good
eﬃciency.
Order Preserving Encryption Methods
Order preserving encryption (OPE) [AKSX04] preserves the order of data after en-
cryption. A well-known attack is based on attacker’s prior knowledge on the original
distributions of the attributes. If the attacker knows the original distributions and man-
ages to identify the mapping between the original attribute and its encrypted counterpart,
a bucket based distribution alignment can be performed to break the encryption for the
attribute [CKG11]. An OPES is presented to support equality and range queries over the
encrypted data [AKSX04]. Because the encrypted data has preserved order and equality,
range query can be operated on the encrypted data in the database.
Distance-Recoverable Encryption
Distance-recoverable encryption (DRE) is the most intuitive method for preserving
the nearest neighbor relationship. Because of the exactly preserved distances, many
attacks can be applied [WCKM09], [LGK06], [CSL07]. Wong et al. [WCKM09] suggest
preserving dot products instead of distances to ﬁnd kNN, which is more resilient to
distance-targeted attacks. One drawback is the search algorithm is limited to linear scan
and no indexing method can be applied.
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Other Recent work on Data Querying Methods
In 2013, [WAA14] the authors propose two protocols for private processing of database
queries, namely BHE and HHE. The two protocols provide strong query privacy by using
Paillier’s homomorphic encryption, and support common database queries such as range
and join queries by relying on the bucketization of public data. In contrast to traditional
PIR proposals, BHE and HHE only incur one round of client server communication for
processing a single query. BHE is a basic private query processing protocol that provides
complete query privacy but still incurs expensive computation and communication costs.
HHE is built upon BHE, but achieves practical query performance with quantiﬁable
privacy protection i.e. HHE can answer an arbitrary range or join query on one million
data tuples within two minutes with privacy risk 0.57. Although HHE is a hybrid protocol
that consumes computation and communication on a subset of the data, because the
subset includes frequent query patterns of other users, it is not subject to traditional
attacks on k-Anonymity and hybrid approaches built upon PIR and k-Anonymity that
exploit special data semantics in the anonymous subset. HHE also protects user privacy
for a sequence of queries in a query session by ensuring that the decoys appear as likely
as private data in multiple queries of the session. One advantage of this framework over
any other PIR protocols is that our framework can answer a query in only one round of
client server interaction, thus saving bandwidth for the server.
Wen et al., 2013 [WLZ+13] propose a privacy preserving range query scheme, named
PaRQ, for smart grid. An HVE based range query predicate is constructed to realize
the range query on encrypted metering data. The PaRQ allows users to store their data
on cloud servers in encrypted form, and range queries can be executed by using cloud
server’s computational capabilities.
Xu et al., 2014 [XGC14] propose the random space perturbation (RASP) data per-
turbation method to provide secure and eﬃcient range query and kNN query services
for protected data with the wide deployment of public cloud computing infrastructures,
using clouds to host data query services has become an appealing solution for the ad-
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vantages on scalability and cost-saving. However, some data might be sensitive that the
data owner does not want to move to the cloud unless the data conﬁdentiality and query
privacy are guaranteed. On the other hand, a secured query service should still provide
eﬃcient query processing and signiﬁcantly reduce the in-house workload to fully realize
the beneﬁts of cloud computing.
Vimercati et al. 2012 [VFS12b], provide the eﬃcient solutions for protecting the
privacy of the parties interacting in a cloud infrastructure as well as of the data stored
and processed are of paramount importance for enabling a widespread exploitation of
the cloud technology. Privacy is however far from being a trivial problem to address and
represents a big challenge for all parties that use and develop cloud technology. In this
paper, the authors discussed the main privacy risks that arise in a cloud scenario and
illustrated some solutions for addressing them. The solutions based on the deﬁnition
of privacy preserving indexing techniques successfully provide eﬀective protection to ac-
cess and pattern conﬁdentiality. Some other works are also done in the cloud database
scenario, the cloud server takes more responsibilities of indexing and query processing. Se-
cure keyword search on encrypted documents [CWL+14], [WCL+10] scan each encrypted
document in the database and ﬁnd the documents containing the keyword, which is more
like point search in database.
Kim et al. 2013 [KSK13] use the tuple level encryption algorithm with the bucket
based index and Bloom ﬁlter in order to query the database eﬀectively. They compared
the proposed method and the bucket based method using various kinds of queries. As
the number of buckets is increasing, the query response time decreases. The database
using the proposed method only shows encrypted data and Bloom ﬁlter.
We conclude that the literature mainly concentrates on to maintain the data conﬁden-
tiality, data and query privacy, data utility, low costs of computation and communication.
Also, authors focus on the rich query functions as deﬁned in Subsection 2.4.9. To the
best of our knowledge, there is no work on all of these features.
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2.4.11 Summary of the Section
In this section we comparatively analyse data querying methods in consideration of
privacy, utility, eﬃciency (in terms of computation and communication costs), and rich
query functions in sharing data environment.
In the next subsection, we describe security and privacy issues during delivering and
transmitting data in mobile communication network.
2.5 Security and Privacy issues on Mobile Commu-
nication
Chapter 5 presents the applications by developing the architecture for privatizing
aggregated data set and delivering it in a secure manner from a server to a remote
wireless device. So, we discuss recent development of methods on securing online data.
The relevant descriptions of related works are as follows:
2.5.1 Security and Privacy Issues on Sharing On-line Health
Data
In an online environment, the sharing and exchanging of large amounts of data can be
essential in responding eﬃciently and eﬀectively to critical situations such as bush ﬁres,
earthquakes or medical emergencies. However, privacy and security issues continue to be
major barriers, since revealing sensitive data over the Internet can present an additional
threat. For example, leaked information about an emergency response team in a war
zone, may lead to an attack on those providing aid to the victims.
The adoption of electronic health records has opened up new modes of patient treat-
ment. Their wide acceptance has been helped by the possibility of ubiquitous access, but
security and privacy concerns impose severe limitations. Controlling access to health-care
data has to strike a balance between utility and security/privacy. For patient treatment,
accurate data, as close as possible to the real records, has to be delivered in a secure
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manner to the medical practitioner. Such data needs to be published in such a way that
privacy is maintained.
Security and privacy are essential because leakage of medical data related to an in-
dividual’s health condition and medications can have both short term and long term
implications. If such information is maliciously altered when en route to a medical emer-
gency responder, the patient may die. If the information is collected by an insurer or by
the patient’s employer, the patient may subsequently ﬁnd that she is unable to obtain
insurance or has lost her job.
There is always a tradeoﬀ between privacy loss and information loss, and to preserve
the accuracy of results and to reduce loss of information, a number of techniques have
been developed. In the literature, the existing solutions to maintaining data privacy are
based on determining how to reduce the probability of an individual’s identity discovery
when a large amount of private data is shared in an online environment. However, such
solutions overlook the possibility of security breaches in which whole sets of (modiﬁed)
data may be intercepted in transmission and read or altered. Access to electronic medical
records has two major phases: ﬁrst, obtaining authorization and providing delivery to
the health care staﬀ in a secure, privacy preserving manner; second, delivering patient
data to a patient or health-care provider when required. This second phase presents a
valuable opportunity, for example, to save lives in emergency situations, with ubiquitous
broadband networks oﬀering infrastructure support. In order to maintain the security
of the data and database, access to both must be controlled; such control is often im-
plemented via encryption. To enable access to the records in a variety of situations,
the existing solutions provide more than one way of access. While registered health-care
workers use a standardized method which ensures privacy, an over-riding procedure has
to be available to people such as ambulance personnel responding on an ad-hoc basis in
emergency situations, or to those living in areas remote from a hospital service.
In an early cryptographic solution [KLC04] the patient owns an encryption key to
control access to the record, and the patient’s digital signature veriﬁes the integrity and
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authenticity of the health record. For encryption, authors use a forward secure method, in
which the symmetric (AES) encryption/decryption key is updated after a certain number
of uses. The authors recommend updating all signature and encryption keys after each
access. A conscious patient gives consent to access the record by providing the necessary
information; the authors propose the use of a smart card and a PIN for the purpose. When
the patient is unconscious, a master key is used. The authors assume that the emergency
provider staﬀ authenticate themselves to the mobile gateway in order to receive the master
key. In this case the patient’s health record is identiﬁed by using available information,
such as the smart card, but without the PIN. The method assumes that the data will be
deleted after use. As patients can have medical records at diﬀerent institutions, another
encryption method focuses on sharing these records [CLJ12]. The basic encryption and
access authorisation method is similar to that in [KLC04], but a separate mechanism is
presented for cross-domain access. For protection, the medical data is encrypted with
a symmetric key, and the medical record has an associated licence that contains access
rights and the symmetric key to decrypt the data. The licence is encrypted with both the
patient’s public key and the record-storing hospital key. When answering a local request,
after verifying the patient’s signature the hospital presents the record. The license can
be decrypted with the patient’s private key to obtain the symmetric key for accessing
the data. When the access request comes from a domain diﬀerent from that where
the medical record is stored, there is an additional step: a server-to-server authorization
protocol will ensure that only legitimate requests are served. An emergency license is also
attached to the record, which provides authorization with secure audit logging. While
these cryptographic solutions provide end-to-end security, no practical implementations
have been reported. Also, major concerns are that they do not provide protection against
unauthorized data dissemination and that the resource requirements may be excessive.
Therefore, we do not compare our system to these solutions.
Other solutions examine secure delivery of the medical record in various scenarios,
notably to mobile devices via public networks [VKM+12]. As mentioned in Weerasinghe
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et al. [WRR09] and [WR11], the authors consider the situation when the patient needs
critical emergency care and it is a local emergency response team that needs access to
the patient healthcare data. In both of these papers, there is a focus on authenticating
the emergency team and their request for information and on preserving the privacy of
the patient data sent to the team.
Mirkovic et al. [MBR11] also consider this situation in their work; their architecture
is similar to that of Weerasinghe et al. in that in both, separation of zones is used as
a security measure at the server end. However, in the latter, tokens are issued in order
to establish trust between the communicating parties while this is replaced by the use of
Public Key Infrastructure certiﬁcates in the former.
The next subsection illustrates detail work of delivering the medical record in emer-
gency case on mobile communication.
2.5.2 Data Transmission in Emergency Case on Mobile Com-
munication Network
The evolution of mobile technology has facilitated remote access to various databases.
There are established methods to protect the data while in transit, but protecting data on
the user device is still an issue [WRR09]. A major challenge is that mobile equipment can
easily fall into the wrong hands, while the often limited resources make data protection
diﬃcult. Health-related data frequently needs access from remote locations, such as
for out-of-hospital care or in emergency scenarios, and maintaining the privacy of data
downloaded to a mobile device is an essential requirement [MBR11], [WERR07] and
[WRER08]. The literature on the use of mobile phones in connection with patient medical
data falls broadly into three categories: there is the use for chronic care patient monitoring
(e.g. [YL05]) the use to provide services to patients (e.g. [WERR07] and [WRER08],
[VKM+12]) and the use to obtain patient information in an emergency setting (e.g.
[MBR11], [WR11]). We discuss these three applications here, but will emphasize the last
application as this is the area in which our work oﬀers something new.
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Chronic and Aftercare Patient Monitoring
In [YL05], the authors consider the situation of a patient whose vital signs must be
constantly monitored. The use of a mobile phone, in conjunction with Bluetooth and
GSM, to do this monitoring is promoted for this purpose because it permits the patient
ﬂexibility of movement and the ability to live at home. The system was tested on a small
group of heart patients and evaluated for reliability, performance and quality.
Providing Services to Patients
Whether hospitalized or not, many people need access to health care services to
access medical records, buy prescriptions, or send images to a medical professional for
advice. Weerasinghe et al. ([WERR07]) present a 3-phase protocol for providing secure
transmissions between patients and healthcare services over a mobile network. The phases
include authenticating connections between the mobile station and each of a health care
operator and a health care service provider, and the construction of data access levels
in the service provider to determine who deals with the request from the patient. They
explain how the security of the architecture of [WERR07] can be implemented by means
of a ‘security capsule’ embedded in the mobile device. In [VKM+12], the authors explain
their design of a “mobile-phone-based information display for emergency department
patients” and how they tested this on a group of twenty-ﬁve patients in an emergency
department along with the patients’ families. Their motivating argument is that the
emergency department environment would be improved if patients were kept informed of
their treatment and health status and were able to share this with their families. Medical
records were pulled from the hospital network and used to populate mobile phone displays
in real time. Since the patients’ own mobile phones were used, they had private access
to their personal health information regardless of their location. The authors concluded
that “this is a promising approach to improving patient awareness”.
Emergency Setting
The afore-mentioned papers [WRR09] and [WR11] also consider the situation when
the patient needs critical emergency care and it is a local emergency response team that
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needs access to the patient healthcare data. In both of these papers, there is a focus on
authenticating the emergency team and their request for information, and on preserving
the privacy of the patient data sent to the team.
Mirkovic et al. also consider this situation in their work in [MBR11]; their architecture
is similar to that of Weerasinghe et al. in that in both cases, separation of zones is used
as a security measure at the server end. However, in [WRR09] and [WR11], tokens
are issued in order to establish trust between the communicating parties while this is
replaced by the use of Public Key Infrastructure certiﬁcates in [MBR11]. The authors of
[MBR11] propose an architecture for securing mobile access to data from an electronic
health record system. A made-for-purpose application is installed in advance on the
mobile device but is independent of the device and mobile service provider. In their
implementation, a request from a user to the health service provider is forwarded to an
identity server to conﬁrm user identity, and subsequently, the user request is forwarded
to the authentication provider for authentication. While they indicate an SMS PIN
push, which the user uses to generate an encrypted challenge, the resulting one-time-
password generation at the authentication provider end was not actually implemented
in their scheme. Thus, the user is identiﬁed by means of an organization identiﬁer (for
example, the medical service in which the user works) and the mobile device is identiﬁed
by a subscription number to a GSM or UMTS mobile network. The user must also be
registered with the health service provider, the identity server and the authentication
provider. The communication protocol operation needs a user to communicate with
three diﬀerent servers in [MBR11]. The use of three servers rather than one increases the
opportunity available for slowing down the operation of the overall system. In addition
the architecture of [MBR11] lacks a mechanism for ﬁle processing after data has been
downloaded from the server to the mobile device. The authors of [MBR11] identify
their mobile device by means of a network subscription number and registration with the
identity server, in addition to such identiﬁcation. In the paper [WRR09] in which there
is a detailed description of a ‘security capsule’ embedded in the mobile device. In fact, it
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is the authentication service in their architecture that installs this capsule in the mobile
device. It is assumed that the capsule is secure, while the mobile device is susceptible to
attacks. A password is used to gain access to the mobile device. The security capsule can
store encrypted data and is also used to authenticate the device to other parties and to
encrypt communication channels between the device and other parties. Only encrypted
data is stored in the security capsule, and it is decrypted there on user request. The data
interface on the mobile device cannot be changed or saved.
Authentication of the mobile device and user to the healthcare operator is based
on a member ID, a OTP, some key material provided through a second channel and
a token which is encrypted and includes a time-stamp [WERR07]. This is similar to
the scheme of [MBR11] (although the authors of [MBR11] implemented it without their
equivalent of the key material). Weerasinghe et al [WERR07] point out that the use of
a time-stamp prevents a replay attack; this is also true with the use of a OTP. In their
architecture, the communications used in authenticating the mobile device are encrypted
using symmetric encryption. Once the authentication is given, the healthcare operator
provides a public/private key pair to the user and then any conﬁdential patient data
is sent using the private key of the patient; this is the fundamental privacy preserving
mechanism used in this architecture.
2.5.3 Summary of the Section
We summarize the existing solutions for maintaining data privacy and security when
a large amount of private data is shared in an online environment. We specify existing
solutions on delivering data and downloading data at the client side with consideration
of privacy and security. For example, health-related data frequently needs access from
remote locations, as is the case for out-of-hospital care or in emergency scenarios; in these
situations, maintaining the privacy of data downloaded to a mobile device is an essential
requirement. We extensively describe solutions during data transmission in a medical
emergency case based on mobile communication with the network. The literature on
the use of mobile phones in connection with patient medical data falls broadly into three
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categories: there is the use for chronic care patient monitoring, the use to provide services
to patients, and the use to obtain patient information in an emergency setting.
In the next subsection, we describe the research gap that we have identiﬁed.
2.6 Research Gaps
Combining all of the above points, participants should determine for themselves which
privatization techniques best meet their privacy needs, and then agreeing by consensus
on which one (or even two or three) to use across all data sets. A new privacy preserve
and secure framework is needed and should be designed for public available data sets. So
that institutions/researchers/individuals can use public data sets. The available public
data sets are available in diﬀerent locations and heterogeneous form. We should privately
aggregate the public data sets and develop methodology which ensure the aggregated data
set achieve good privacy, good utility, low computation cost, low time consumption, and
low storage cost. Data querying by individuals/clients should privately query the public
online aggregated data sets and satisfy the important dimension of data query that is
completeness, correctness and freshness.
The new architecture must be built on correct mathematical models, must be easy
to use and to learn, must be able to deliver accurate, easily interpreted and reproducible
results by spending a manageable amount of eﬀort.
2.7 Summary of the Chapter
Chapter 2 addresses the issue of sharing data, which reinforces open scientiﬁc inquiry,
encourages diversity of analysis and opinion, promotes new research, makes possible the
testing of new or alternative hypotheses and methods of analysis, supports studies on
data collection methods and measurement, facilitates the education of new researchers,
enables the exploration of topics not envisioned by the initial investigators, and permits
the creation of new data sets when data from multiple sources are aggregated. The ideal
principal reason for sharing data is to permit querying of the data by anyone who can
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use it to solve problems facing humanity, including medical, agricultural and resource
challenges.
We will develop an architecture by means of which several parties share sensitive
data in order to analyse it for research purposes. The architecture should be privacy
preserve, secure and eﬃcient which aggregates large medical data sets in order to supply
the necessary medical data (i) for research purposes and (ii) about a patient to a remote
region for emergency response. We will develop such a architecture in the following
chapters. In the next chapter, we will employ privatization techniques to provide an
architecture which enables sharing of sensitive data. Utilization of our architecture is
demonstrated by means of a case study based on four medical data sets.
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Chapter 3
Sharing Sensitive Medical Data Sets
for Research Purposes
The demand for researchers to share their data has increased dramatically in recent
years. Scientiﬁc research revolves around the production, analysis, storage, management,
and re-use of data. Data sharing oﬀers important beneﬁts for scientiﬁc progress and
advancement of knowledge. Data sharing has been a relevant topic since the 1980’s. In
1985 the authors of the paper [FMS85] is pointed out some of the beneﬁts, problems,
controversies, and other challenges of sharing research data in an extensive report about
the importance of data sharing for scientiﬁc development. However, patient data is
usually considered to be sensitive and access to it is restricted by law and regulation.
This chapter employs privatization techniques to provide an architecture which en-
ables sharing of sensitive data. Utilization of our architecture is demonstrated by means
of a case study based on four medical data sets.
The chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.1 gives background on privatization
techniques and discusses methods of measuring privacy and utility, and brieﬂy describes
the motivation for developing the architecture. Section 3.2 presents the basis for our
model which describes the importance of sharing health data in Subsection 3.2.1, types
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of health data in Subsection 3.2.2, sharing secondary data in Subsection 3.2.3, legal and
policy issues for sharing data in Subsection 3.2.4. Section 3.3 explains how we constructed
the two synthetic data sets and describes the features of these and of the Cleveland and
Hungarian sets which are identiﬁed as sensitive for the purposes of the research project
established as the case study. In Section 3.4, we explain how to choose appropriate
privatization techniques for the four data sets and describe the utility/privacy trade-oﬀ
used; this is followed by a discussion on which privatization techniques can be kept and
which should be discarded. Section 3.5 is divided into three subsections. Subsection 3.5.1
describes data preparation. Data privacy and utility metrics are presented in Subsections
3.5.2 and 3.5.3 respectively. Section 3.6 explains how to choose appropriate privatization
techniques using utility/privacy trade-oﬀs for the four data sets. Only those privatization
techniques with distributions similar to those of the original data are retained as possible
common privatization techniques. The outcomes of our architecture are discussed in
Section 3.8.1. Section 3.9 summarizes and presents conclusions.
3.1 Introduction
Data sharing allows medical researchers to expedite the translation of research results
into knowledge, products, and procedures to improve human health.
“Data sharing” has been deﬁned as the “voluntary provision of information from one
individual or institution to another for purposes of legitimate research” [FMS85] or simply
“the release of research data for use by others” [Bor12]. This general concept is grounded
in the assumption that data are a valuable long-term resource and that sharing them
and making them publicly-available is essential if their potential value is to be realized
[SB08]. Data sharing requires the systematic collection, curation and dissemination of
data.
We motivate the work in this chapter by considering the situation of several hospitals
involved in a multi-site medical study. Each hospital has its own database containing
patient health records. The patient health records contain sensitive information such
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as demographics, clinical, and genomic information. These distributed databases are
geographically dispersed. Sharing of existing heterogeneous databases to provide eﬀective
and eﬃcient knowledge discovery and good knowledge management in hospitals is one of
the most popular issues in healthcare informatics. These healthcare data are recognized
as an invaluable source for performing large-scale and low-cost biological, medical, and
healthcare analysis and decision making, which are essential for the discovery of new drugs
and therapies, and are a key step towards realizing the vision of personalized medicine.
The medical researchers are like to collaboratively conduct a task over the databases from
all of the hospitals with the goal of obtaining valuable information that would be obtained
via sharing, patient health records to provide complex medical treatments or new research
for medicines and therapies. Many countries have national or state-funded biobanks.
There are more than 40 state-governed biobanks in Europe [ZPB+10] and many others
in Asia and America [SSN07]. Thus, there is a huge potential for collaborative studies
between biobanks, hospitals and pharmaceutical companies. From the collaboration they
inﬂuence the eﬃcacy of treatments for asthma, inﬂammatory bowel disease, coronary
heart disease and cancer [GH07]. When investigating causes of disease or links between
disease and environmental factors, medical research teams often rely on patient data
accumulated by hospitals in order to analyse and draw statistically signiﬁcant conclusions
from this analysis. Since patients attend hospital with a variety of medical problems, a
research team that wants to focus on a speciﬁc medical problem may have insuﬃcient
data to test their hypotheses. In this case, a potential solution is to exchange data with
those of other research centres in order to enlarge the data set; large data sets can also
manage the problem of inconsistent or contradictory data as well as identiﬁcation of
outliers, and thus provide better statistical conclusions. As an example, medical research
groups may wish to determine the principal causes of heart disease in their region; having
access to many data sets from within their region and many from outside their region
provides the opportunity to test the ‘local’ against ‘non-local’ data in order to include
relevant causes and exclude irrelevant causes in their results.
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Unfortunately, the sharing of patient medical data is hampered by local laws and
regulations about data privacy. In order to overcome these, each group must ﬁrst identify
the sensitive components of their data set and privatize this sensitive data. The fact that
the data being queried are privatized has no impact on the outcomes of data querying as
we only expect to obtain statistical results as output (Agrawal and Srikant, 2000) [AS00].
3.1.1 Sharing a Privatized form of Data in a Trusted Manner
Current models of data collection for international emergencies focus on a single
‘trusted party’ which collects and analyses the (normally not de-sensitized) data; ex-
amples are the World Health Organization (www.who.int/en) for disease epidemics and
Paciﬁc Disaster Centre (www.pdc.org) for emergency weather and maritime situations in
the Paciﬁc area. These trusted parties use the data for the development of models which
assess the risk and predict which problems might become critical. Such an approach does
not allow access to the same data by parties who could use it to manage other crises or
research problems.
The beneﬁts of sharing and mining of data from multiple databases have been well
recognized [DYL+13]; a stumbling block to facilitation of such sharing is that many data
sets are considered to contain ‘sensitive’ data which is often subject to legal requirements
for privacy before it can be made available to other parties. While encrypting such data
solves the privacy problem, current methods for querying encrypted data have low utility
[YPB13].
The single alternate proposal in the literature for securing the privacy of shared data
sets is based on the k-anonymity technique, ﬁrst proposed by Samarati [Sam01] to re-
duce the risk of combining quasi-identiﬁers in a publicly-available privatized data set
with information obtained from other sources. Nowadays there are numerous and var-
ied algorithms for implementing a k-anonymity technique across several data sets; an
excellent survey of the state-of-the-art to 2010 is available in Fung et al. [FKWY10].
Around the same time, researchers began to consider additional requirements of privacy
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of the data contributor and also the query user [JX09], with much work on this topic
still needed today. In 2013, Ding et al. [DYL+13] propose the use of k-anonymity to
support sharing and mining of sensitive data in the following way. Each contributor
privatizes her data using k-anonymity for her choice of k based on the level of privacy
required, and then submits the privatized data set to a trusted third party (TTP) for
aggregation. This TTP then applies another layer of k-anonymization across the aggre-
gated data for some ﬁxed k and makes the resultant data set publicly available. Ding
et al. claim that their method provides better query utility than do similar methods of
Lefevre [LDR06] and Jurczyk [JX09] based on diﬀerent algorithms. However, as noted
by Zhang et al. [ZXC+14], several problems have recently been identiﬁed with the use
of k-anonymity. One such problem targets the basic premise of the method - restricting
the quasi-identiﬁers available; with easy access to data via the Internet, it is becoming
easier and easier for people to access additional, complementary data which can be used
to identify individuals. A second problem, speciﬁc to the shared k-anonymized data sce-
nario, is that updates to data sets can quickly reduce the level of privacy provided; thus
this approach is not suitable for dynamic or streaming data.
3.1.2 Contributions of This Chapter
In this chapter, I propose an entirely new approach to those mentioned above, permit-
ting participants to determine for themselves which privatization techniques best meet
their privacy needs, and then agreeing by consensus with the group on which one (or
even two or three) to use across all data sets. A cloud manager aggregates the data
and makes it available on a cloud to whomever the contributor group wishes to provide
access. Because we do not want to make the assumption that the manager is trusted,
it only sees privatized versions of each contributed data set. The fact that data sets are
privatized individually also allows for the addition of data sets to the scheme at diﬀerent
times.
Contribution 1: I propose an architecture by means of which several parties may
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share sensitive data in order to analyse it for research purposes. The architecture has
four steps:
STEP 1: An appropriate list of potential privatization techniques is chosen by all
initial participants, tailored to comply both with the format of the data and with local
legal requirements. (Section 3.4)
STEP 2: All participants apply each of these techniques to their data and choose
those which provide good privacy and good (querying) utility. A short list of potential
techniques usable by every party is selected. (Section 3.5)
STEP 3: Each party now focuses on privatized versions of their data based on
the short list selection from Step 2. These privatized versions are compared with the
original data set to determine the one with features closest to the original data using a
comparative analysis method of their choosing. (Section 3.6)
STEP 4: An agreed voting method is used by all parties to select a single privati-
zation method; participants are now able to send each other privatized versions of their
data. (Subection 3.7)
Thus, my work facilitates, for the ﬁrst time, sharing of sensitive data as well as
providing benchmark data against which analysts and researchers can compare results.
Contribution 2 I apply my data sharing architecture to four medical data sets
as a case study. Two of these data sets, named Cleveland and Hungarian, are from
the University of California at Urvine health data centre (archive.ics.uci.edu/ml/
datasets/Heart+Disease), and we constructed an additional two synthetic sets. All four
of these data sets contain medical information related to patients and heart disease and
thirteen features appearing in each set are identiﬁed as being sensitive. This case study is
used in experimental Section 3.7. From the results, I ﬁnd the proposed approach provides
a crucial solution for choosing a privatization method suitable for common privatization
of several data sets which are to be shared. I use the case study to analyse the proposed
architecture for sharing sensitive data in Chapter 4. The experimental results show that
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the proposed architecture of Chapter 4 is generic, preserves privacy, is practical and
consistent in data sharing.
Section 3.2 details the description of basis for our model. The basis for our model
includes the importance for sharing secondary type of medical data, legal and privacy
issues for sharing medical data.
3.2 Basis for Our Model
This section describes the basis for my model, and is divided into three Subsections
3.2.1, 3.2.2, 3.2.3 and 3.2.4 respectively. The ﬁrst Subsection 3.2.1 discusses the “the
importance of sharing health data”. In Subsection 3.2.2, I discuss the types of health
data which are known as ‘primary use of patient data’ and ‘secondary use of patient data’.
Subsection 3.2.3 discusses the reason for choosing secondary data for sharing. Subsection
3.2.4 presents the legal and policy issues for sharing data.
3.2.1 Why is Sharing Health Data Important?
Sharing health data has been described as one of the most ‘promising ways to im-
prove health outcomes and costs’ [PC10], [SP13]. Many funders require data sharing
plans as a condition of funding: since 2003, the National Institutes of Health (NIH)
in the USA has required a data sharing plan for all large funding grants (NIH, 2003)
(grants.nih.gov/grants/gu-ide/notice-files/NOT-OD-03-032.html) and has more
recently introduced stronger requirements for genome-wide association studies (NIH,
2007) (grants.nih.gov/grants/gui-de/notice-files/NOT-OD-08-013.html). Sev-
eral government white papers (www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK97158), (www.nap.
edu/catalog.php?record_id=2033) call for responsible data sharing and reuse. Large-
scale collaborative science is increasing the need to share data sets [GAI07], and many
guidelines, tools, standards, and databases are being developed and maintained to fa-
cilitate data sharing and reuse [BST+07]. Having access to such data, data in some
cases collected over a lifetime, researchers could creatively innovate from archival data
sets, promote new discoveries from old data sets, and derive new meaning from existing
research data sets [Nel09].
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3.2.2 Types of Uses of Health Data
The information about a given patient which is collected from local doctor, pharma-
cist, hospital, social care worker and so on, can provide a rich overview of her risk of
illness or death, as well as a need for any special care. This approach to the use of data
is labelled ‘primary use of patient data’.
On the other hand, analysis of the aggregation of health data from many patients
can:
• lead to the determination of which health factors are most likely to lead to diabetes
or heart disease,
• be used to assess the impact of speciﬁc health supports such as clinics, and
• assist governments in the prediction of future health care needs.
This use of data is referred to as ‘secondary use of patient data’.
3.2.3 Why is Secondary use of Data considered for Sharing?
Sharing and reusing research data sets has the potential to increase research eﬃciency
and quality. Sharing of patient data can be used to explore related or new hypotheses,
particularly when combined with other available data sets. Safran et al. (2007) [SBH+07]
document that secondary use of data can be deﬁned as “non-direct care use of personal
health information (PHI), including but not limited to use of such data for analysis,
research, quality/safety measurement, public health, payment, provider certiﬁcation or
accreditation, and marketing and other business including strictly commercial activities”
[SBH+07].
Secondary use of health data can be used to improve health not just of a single patient
but of many [SBH+07], [Her07]. As health information technology grows, secondary uses
of medical information oﬀer promise in advancing research, public health, and health care.
Secondary use of data can be utilised by health researchers to study patterns of disease
in the population, identify the causes of disease and their impact, develop and evaluate
health services and policies, and assess data quality (www.cihr-irsc.gc.ca/e/1475.
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html). Secondary use of healthcare data has been demonstrated to reduce the time,
budget, and skills needed to complete research [Rea10]. In addition it oﬀers business
and clinical collaboration opportunities. Among organisations in Australia already using
secondary data, 59% have experienced quality improvement, 42% have demonstrated cost
savings, and 36% have experienced improvement in patient satisfaction [Rea10].
It has been argued that, when gathering data, it is important to specify if it is to be
used for secondary purpose, across organisational boundaries, and whether the interested
party has access to the actual record, or to certain data extracted from the record (www.
nicpld.org/online/PMR/assets/Get_Involved_SRPG_final_QRG.pdf). The authors
of [Aus00] are of the opinion that any secondary uses of clinical data must pass the test
that they are in the public interest and that personal privacy is not compromised.
3.2.4 Legal and Policy Issues
In Australia, the framework for secondary uses of data depends on the rules laid out in
the Privacy Act following the Australian Law Reform Commission’s report [ALR13]. The
US Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act 1996 (US) (HIPAA) provides a
legislative test for de-identiﬁcation designed to provide certainty for researchers and ethics
committees. It allows for a small risk of de-identiﬁcation through reverse engineering or
multiple, complex queries [O’K08].
Legislation and policy can both enhance and inhibit data sharing. Researchers could
use the rigidity of policies and regulations as legitimate reasons for not sharing their
data under the pretext of conﬁdentiality or legal rights [SV09]. The liabilities asso-
ciated with the breach of privacy deter researchers from sharing their data sets pub-
licly [Tuc12] and appropriately “de-identifying” sensitive data could take many years
(link.springer.com/article/10.1186%2F1745-6215-7-15). Thus, there is a trade-oﬀ
between the imprecision of sharing policies and the implementation of sharing [Nel09].
On the other hand, lessons from inter-agency information sharing, legal regulation
and policy are necessary to enhance data sharing by ensuring proper and accountable use
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of data and information, considering that lack of policies does not guarantee a neutral
sharing environment [ZD06]. In fact, unresolved legal issues can deter or restrain the
development of collaboration, even if scientists are prepared to proceed [BZO+07]. Thus,
the legal and policy requirements could actually mitigate concerns of data being stolen,
misused or misinterpreted. Policies for data management and regulation to protect con-
ﬁdentiality and privacy have a crucial role in supporting data accessibility [ASB+13].
Next Section 3.3 demonstrates the description of considered four sets of medical data
which is shared between participants who have agreed. All four of these data sets contain
medical information related to patients and heart disease. For this case study, we chose
two data sets, Cleveland and Hungarian are described in Subsection 3.3.1, and have
constructed an additional two synthetic sets are described in Subsection 3.3.2.
3.3 The Data Sets
I developed my architecture for data sharing based on the four data sets mentioned in
Subsections 3.3.1 and 3.3.2. All four data sets deal with features related to heart disease.
The Cleveland and Hungarian data sets [NHBM98] are based on real data. We created
the two synthetic data sets using the method deﬁned in the paper [SMBMS13]; we refer
to them as the Melbourne and Darwin Data sets.
3.3.1 Real Data Sets
The Cleveland and Hungarian heart disease data sets are publicly available from the
Data Mining repository of the University of California, Irvine (UCI) [NHBM98]. Each of
them has 13 attributes which are listed in Table 3.1, along with a class label (for which
we use ‘num’ in Table 3.1) designating whether or not the patient has heart disease. The
heart disease designation is usually determined as a function of the ﬁrst 13 attributes;
however, this function is not given on the UCI site. In the data as it appears on the
above site, the data set values are separated by a comma and stored on a web page in
html format. For each data set, I captured the data set values and stored them in matrix
format using MATLAB [FP10]. I then copied the matrix entries manually into an excel
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sheet. This facilitates my ability to run tests on the data since MATLAB allows us to
call an excel sheet using a single command. A precise description of these real data sets
follows. The 14 attributes of the Cleveland and Hungarian data sets along with the values
and data types are given in Table 3.1.
Table 3.1. Attributes of Cleveland and Hungarian Data Sets
S.No. Attributes Descriptions
1. Age (numeric) age in years
2. Sex (nominal) male, female: 1 = male; 0 = female
3. Chest pain type (CP)
(nominal)
1= typical angina; 2= atypical angina; 3= non-
anginal pain; 4= asymptomatic
4. Trestbps (numeric) patient’s resting blood pressure in mm Hg at the time
of admission to the hospital
5. Chol (numeric) serum cholesterol in mg/dl
6. Fbs (nominal) indicates whether fasting blood sugar is greater than
> 120 mg/dl: 1 = true; 0 = false
7. Restecg (nominal) resting electrocardiographic results: 0= normal; 1=
having ST-T wave abnormality; 2=showing probable
or deﬁnite left ventricular hypertrophy
8. Thalach (numeric) maximum heart rate attained
9. Exang (nominal) exercise induced angina: 1 = yes; 0 = no
10. Oldpeak (numeric) ST depression brought about by exercise relative to
rest
11. Slope (nominal) the slope of the peak exercise ST segment: 1= up-
sloping; 2= ﬂat; 3= downsloping
12. Ca (nominal) number of major vessels (0 - 3) colored by ﬂuoroscopy
13. Thal (nominal): the heart status: 3 = normal; 6 = ﬁxed defect; 7 =
reversible defect
14. num (nominal) diagnosis of heart disease: 1 = yes; 0 = no. This
attribute is deﬁned as ‘class label’ attribute
Cleveland Data Set
The Cleveland data set has 303 records and 14 attributes (including ‘num’). A record
corresponds to a row of data in the matrix format of the data; an attribute corresponds
to a column of matrix data. Each row and column is labelled with a record and attribute
name respectively. The attribute names are given in this section. The record includes the
values of each corresponding attribute. In all, there are only 6 missing elements in the
data set. As we need numerical data in order to proceed with our testing, we completed
each gap with a number outside the range of any of those used for the attribute; this
number was ‘-1’. While the Cleveland data set has 5 values in the ‘num’ attribute, 0 =
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‘no’ and all of 1,2, 3 and 4 being variations on ‘yes’, we reduced them to 2 values (0 is
retained for ‘no’, while any ‘yes’ value is replaced by 1) in order to bring the values into
line with those of the Hungarian data set. In the Cleveland data set, 139 patients out of
303 are designated as having a heart disease problem.
Hungarian Data Set
The Hungarian data set has 294 records and 14 attributes; all 14 of these attributes
are the same as those in the Cleveland data set with the last of these attributes being the
‘num’ designation based on a formula not accessible to us. The Hungarian data set has
782 missing elements, and again, we ﬁll the gaps with the number ‘-1’. In the Hungarian
data set, 106 out of 294 patients are designated as having heart disease.
3.3.2 Synthetic Data Sets
In both of our synthetic data sets, Darwin and Melbourne, the range values of each
attribute are based on the Australian standard medicare system [AIH11] and so include,
for example, the Australian ‘medicare number’ attribute. The medicare number is a
numeric data type and consists of a maximum of 11 characters. Below we give more
details about each set.
Melbourne Data Set
In order to prepare the ‘age’ and ‘gender’ attributes for this data set, we
used the 2011 Australian Bureau of Statistics census report for the Melbourne re-
gion (www.censusdata.abs.gov.au/census_services/getproduct/census/2011/
quickstat/SSC20867?opendocument&navpos=220). The Melbourne data set has 303
records. In order to mimic a real data set in which there are normally some missing
records, we left 12 missing elements in the Melbourne data set and ﬁlled the gaps with
the number ‘-1’.
Darwin Data Set
Our Darwin data set is also based on Australian census data of 2011 from the Darwin
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region: (www.censusdata.abs.gov.au/census_services/getproduct/census/2011/
quickstat/SED70022?opendocument&navpos=220). The Darwin data set has 294
records with 25 ‘missing’ elements each replaced by ‘-1’. The locations of ‘missing’ values
in both synthetic data sets were randomly generated.
Table 3.2. Diﬀerences between Melbourne & Darwin and Table 3.1 Data Sets
S.No. Attributes Descriptions
5. Chol∗ (numeric) serum cholesterol in millimoles per litre of blood
(mmol/L)
6. Fbs∗ (numeric) fasting blood sugar in millimoles per litre of blood
(mmol/L)
7. Restecg∗ (nominal) resting electrocardiographic results: 0= Normal;
1= Damage to the heart such as heart’s arteries
is blocked/ Enlargement of the heart/ Abnormal
rhythm/ Poor blood supply to the heart/ Abnormal
position of the heart/ Heart inﬂammation; 2= inten-
sive care monitoring/ Disturbances of the heart’s con-
ducting system
The Melbourne and Darwin data sets include the 14 attributes of the Cleveland
and Hungarian data sets; however, in some cases the measures and data types used are
diﬀerent. These diﬀerences are shown in Table 3.2. In order to determine a value for the
‘num’ attribute, we developed the following rule for both synthetic data sets based on
the attribute values 7, 9, and 12. The number 12 attribute has four values: 0 = normal;
1 = having plaque; 2 = having angina, and 3 = having damaged intima.
Deﬁned Rule for Synthetic Data Sets
I deﬁne rules for our synthetic data sets as in the paper deﬁned [AS00]. These deﬁned
rules are based on the values of the attributes of Tables 3.1 and 3.2, as follows:
If (Restecg AND Exang are both 0) OR (Restecg AND Ca are both 0) OR
(Exang AND Ca are both 0) OR (Restecg is 0), then (num is 0); otherwise
(num is 1).
Based on the above formula, in the Melbourne data set, 196 patients have heart
disease and 107 do not have heart disease, while in the Darwin data set, 178 patients
have heart disease and 116 do not have heart disease. While we did not know the rule
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used to determine values of the 14th column for the real data sets, if we apply the rule
we used for the synthetic data sets, we in fact arrive at the same ‘num’ values in both
the Cleveland and Hungarian data sets. We summarise features of the four data sets in
Table 3.3. (In no case does a ‘-1’ appear in the ‘num’ column.)
Table 3.3. Summary of the Data Set Features
Data sets Records Attributes Value types
Cleveland 303 14 Numeric and Nominal
Hungarian 294 14 Numeric and Nominal
Melbourne 303 121 Numeric and Nominal
Darwin 294 121 Numeric and Nominal
As we proceed with our case study, the aim is to allow the four owners of the data
sets to share their privatized data with each other in order to test the combined data
sample for hypotheses which relate the ﬁrst 13 attributes to the last ‘target’ attribute -
the actual diagnosis of heart disease. In order to permit sharing, each owner participant
will privatize all of their data except for the last attribute - that in the ‘num’ column.
This permits statistical investigation of the data while permitting the querier to know
whether or not patients have heart disease.
Section 3.4 gives background on privatization techniques. An appropriate list of
potential privatization techniques is chosen by all initial participants, tailored to comply
both with the format of the data and with local legal requirements. All participants
apply each of these techniques to their data and choose those which provide good privacy
and good utility.
3.4 Data Privatization Methods
At this point in the case study, the four data sets containing patient heart records
need to be privatized before they can be shared with the other participants as privacy of
the patient is a main concern. In order to permit appropriate data querying by all the
participants, applying the same privatization method produces the best privacy results
along with good statistical utility of the data [CLT11], [DYL+13].
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In this section, we examine the privatization methods available to the data owners
and discuss how to choose, where possible, a method appropriate for common use to
the participants. The privatization methods required are known as privacy preserving
data mining (PPDM) methods, which enable both data integration and data querying
[YKTZ11], [KRS14]. PPDM requires data modiﬁcation with limited information loss and
involves two tasks: data utility and data privacy, as deﬁned in Section 2.1 of Chapter 2.
The main categories of PPDM methods are described in the literature surveys
[FKWY10] and [VCV13] which reveal four broad categories of PPDM methods:
Anonymization, -diﬀerential privacy, Cryptographic, and Perturbation. We consider
each of these categories in the subsections, investigating their suitability in our context.
3.4.1 Anonymization Method
The k-anonymity [Swe02b] method is proposed to prevent the data linkage attack
[FKWY10] and laid a foundation for measuring privacy. This method fails to preserve
privacy against background knowledge and homogeneity attacks. In order to overcome
the drawbacks of the k-anonymity method Machanavajjhala et al. [MKGV07] propose
l-diversity; however, this method is susceptible to skewness and similarity attacks. Gen-
eralizations of both methods are discussed in [FKWY10].
A general drawback of existing anonymization methods is that they are NP-hard
in nature [MW04], have excessive information loss [LGDS13] and high computational
overhead [FKWY10]. Thus, these techniques are not suitable for our purposes.
3.4.2 -Diﬀerential Privacy Method
The -diﬀerential privacy method is based on the idea that it should not be possible
to detect the diﬀerence between query answers whether an individual is in the data set
or not. Refer to [Dwo08] for a good survey on recent developments on this method.
Diﬀerential privacy makes no assumptions about an attacker’s background knowledge
and does not prevent all known attacks [LGDS13]. Furthermore, both deterministic and
randomized algorithms for the method regularly produce anonymized data sets that are
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unrepresentative of the original data set [LGDS13], and so the utility of this method is
low.
3.4.3 Cryptography-based Method
A rich body of work on the cryptography-based Secure Multi-Party Computation
(SMC) method [LP00] exists in the literature. Secure two-party computation is ﬁrst in-
vestigated in [Yao86], and later extended to multi-party computation in [GMW87]. For
most SMC-based methods, the cost of communication is very high and the encryption
operations are expensive; therefore, SMC is not practical in large-scale distributed appli-
cations due to its complexity. We thus eliminate this method also from consideration.
3.4.4 Data Perturbation Method
In contrast to the above three methods, data perturbation methods have been shown
to be eﬃcient and to manage the intrinsic trade-oﬀ between data privacy and data util-
ity well [XGC14]. The main premise of the perturbation method is that addition or
multiplication of an original data set by the perturbed data set does not reveal private
information, and thus is “safe” to use for data mining. In the literature, perturba-
tion methods are of two main types: Additive [AS00] and Multiplicative [Liu07]. Both
have low computation cost, with acceptable privacy and utility. Multiplicative pertur-
bation methods are further sub-classiﬁed into two methods: Random Rotation [Liu07]
and Geometric [Che06], [CL09] [CL11]. In the former, the original data in matrix form is
multiplied by a randomly generated matrix. The authors of [OZ04] and [CL05a] observe
that the distance preserving nature of random rotation results in exactly the same data
mining outcomes on the perturbed data set as on the original data set. The geometric
perturbation method is a multidimensional data perturbation method which is slightly
more complex than the random rotation method.
As a consequence of the above analysis, and because the participants want to compare
results of several privatization methods on their data sets to discover if a single one
might provide good privacy as well as good utility for all data sets, they choose the three
perturbation methods: Additive, Random Rotation and Geometric.
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3.4.5 General Descriptions of Additive, Random Rotation and
Geometric Methods
In implementing these methods, the data is assumed to be in matrix form. Symbols
and notation are listed in Table 3.4.
Additive Perturbation Method
Agrawal et al. [AS00] proposed a scheme for PPDM using random perturbation in
which a random number is added to the value of each sensitive attribute; this has become
known as the additive perturbation method. The random number used is generally drawn
from two types of random distributions: Uniform or Gaussian; however, since according
to [AS00] the Gaussian distribution provides more privacy than the Uniform distribution,
we choose the former:
Gaussian: The random matrix has normal distribution, with mean μ = 0 and stan-
dard deviation σ. Using this distribution, we generate a noise matrix N which is then
added to the original data matrix O. The result is a perturbed matrix P .
P = O +N (3.4.1)
Random Rotation Perturbation Method
Oliveira et al. [OZ04] and Chen et al. [CL05a], [CL05b] discussed the use of a random
rotation method in which an original data matrix O is multiplied by a randomly generated
rotation matrix R; the rationale is that multiplication by such a matrix maintains data
utility [Liu07]. The rotation matrix we use is generated from a Gaussian distribution
with pre-determined mean 0; in choosing a standard deviation for R, in our algorithm,
we choose from 20 options in order to use the one that best balances privacy and utility.
R has the properties that its rows and columns are orthonormal to each other; in
addition if RT represents the transpose of R and I is the identity matrix, then RT × R
= R×RT = I. The perturbed matrix P produced by this method is then given by:
P = R×O (3.4.2)
To generate rotation matrices for both Algorithms 2 and 3, we use the method June
1980 of Stewart which is still a popular method today [CL11]. We make use of the code
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supplied by Chen at (cecs.wright.edu/~keke.chen) which is essentially the code used
in MATLAB.
Geometric Perturbation Method
Chen et al. [CL11] developed the geometric data perturbation method for privacy
preserving data mining. This method is deﬁned by Equation 3.4.3, where O is multi-
plied by a rotation matrix R (as deﬁned above) and the result added to a translation
transformation matrix and a distance perturbation matrix.
P = R×O + ψ +Δ (3.4.3)
We brieﬂy deﬁne these transformations and describe their properties. The translation
transformation matrix ψ is deﬁned as:
ψm×n = tm×1 × ITn×1 (3.4.4)
where I is an identity matrix and t is a randomly generated column matrix with
Gaussian distribution having predetermined mean and standard deviation.
The distance perturbation matrix Δm×n denotes the perturbation matrix with Gaus-
sian distribution in which each entry is independent and with predetermined mean and
standard deviation.
Next Section 3.5 describes the notations, summary of symbols and deﬁnitions for data
preparation and discusses methods for measuring privacy and utility.
3.5 Measuring Data Privacy and Data Utility
This section is divided into three Subsections 3.5.1, 3.5.2, and 3.5.3. The ﬁrst Sub-
section 3.5.1 brieﬂy describes the deﬁnitions and notations for subsequent parts of the
chapter; the second Subsection 3.5.2 and third 3.5.3 present metrics for measuring data
privacy and data utility respectively.
3.5.1 Data Preparation
Notations: Let X = [xij], i = 1;m, j = 1;n be a matrix with elements xij, where
i = 1, 2, 3, ....,m and j = 1, 2, 3, ....., n. We use the notation xj to refer to a column of X
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and xˆj to refer to a normalized version of xj:
xˆj =
xj − μxj
σxj
(3.5.1)
where μxj , the mean value of column xj, and σxj , the standard deviation of column
xj are deﬁned as follows:
μxj =
(
∑m
i=1 xij)
m
(3.5.2)
σxj =
√√√√ 1
m
m∑
i=1
(
xij −
∑m
i=1 xij
m
)2
(3.5.3)
In Table 3.4, I use O, P , N and R to stand for original, perturbed, noise and rotation
data matrices respectively, whereas X represents a general data set matrix. Unless oth-
erwise noted, these all have dimension mxn. Since I am dealing with multi-dimensional
attributes of diﬀerent units and scales I normalize all attributes to produce the same
scale for a fair comparison between them. In practice, we normalize a matrix column by
column using Equation 3.5.1 and scaling all numeric values to the interval [0, 1].
Table 3.4. Summary of Symbols and Deﬁnitions
Symbols Deﬁnitions
O, Oˆ original data set matrix and normalized version
P , Pˆ perturbed data set matrix and normalized version
N noise matrix
R rotation matrix
I identity matrix
ψ translation transformation matrix
Δ distance perturbation matrix
μX , μxj mean value of a matrix X and of its j
th column, where j =
1, 2, 3, ...., n
σX , σ
2
X standard deviation and variance of a matrix X
σxj standard deviation of the j
th column of a matrix X, where
j = 1, 2, 3, ...., n
r(Oˆ, Pˆ ), r(oˆj, pˆj) root mean square error value of two normalized matrices Oˆ,
Pˆ and of two normalized jth column matrices oˆj, pˆj
f(Xˆ), f(xˆj) F-Measure value of normalized matrix Xˆ and of normalized
jth column matrix xˆj
The next subsections discuss my choices for measuring data privacy and data utility.
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3.5.2 Measuring Data Privacy
The research literature has not settled on a single, common, benchmark measure of
data privacy. However, a small set of options has survived analysis: Mutual Information
[DXKM12], Information Gain [VCV13], Relative Information Gain [VCV13], and Root
Mean Square Error (RMSE) [CL11]. For the case study presented in this chapter, we
choose the last of these because RMSE is a widely-used metric [ZD14] and it take its
values in the same range as the error being estimated, so can be easily understood by the
user (ceur-ws.org/Vol-910). Root Mean-Square-Error In order to measure data
privacy, I compare the normalized forms of the columns of the original data set matrix
Oˆ and the perturbed data set matrix Pˆ , to determine the uncertainty brought by the
perturbation. Thus, we deﬁne the RMSE of oˆj privatized to pˆj as:
r(oˆj, pˆj) =
√√√√ 1
m
×
m∑
i=1
(oˆij − pˆij)2 (3.5.4)
The RMSE values lie in the range [0, 1].
3.5.3 Measuring Data Utility
In the research literature, the principal measure of utility is the dissimilarity func-
tion [LM09]. However, the dissimilarity function computation utility may not be eﬀec-
tive on classiﬁcation tasks for data querying which is a main reason for sharing data
[YNN+11]. Therefore, the participants compute data utility based on several well-known
classiﬁcation techniques appropriate for a range of querying methods. We used the
six classiﬁcation methods: J48, Random Forest, Naive Bayes, AdaBoostM1, Bagging
and SMO implemented by WEKA 3.6 [HFH+09]. Each classiﬁcation method was ap-
plied on each original data set, and privatized data set with 10-fold cross validation
(en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cross-validation_(statistics)) implemented during the
classiﬁcation with resulting F-measure [Chr12] values.
Based on a general matrix X, the F-measure of a normalized column xˆj of X is deﬁned
as:
f(xˆj) =
2× precxˆj × recxˆj
precxˆj + recxˆj
(3.5.5)
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where, precxˆj =
|TPxˆj |
|TP |xˆj+|FPxˆj |
, recxˆj =
|TP |xˆj
|TPxˆj+|FN |xˆj |
and TP: number of True positives,
FP: number of False positives, TN: number of True negatives, FN: number of False
negatives are deﬁned in the paper [Chr12].
The adjacent Section 3.6 explains how to choose appropriate privatization techniques
for the four data sets and describe the utility/privacy trade-oﬀ used; this is followed by a
discussion on which privatization techniques can be kept and which should be discarded.
The privatization techniques are divided into three parts: Additive, Random Rotation
and Geometric perturbation.
3.6 Algorithms
This section illustrates algorithms for the three data privatization methods: Additive,
Random Rotation, and Geometric. The algorithms are based on the methods but were
written by this author. Their detailed descriptions are given in Subsections 3.6.1, 3.6.2
and 3.6.3 respectively. Because the measures of data privacy and data utility described in
Subsections 3.5.2 and 3.5.3 take on values in the interval [0, 1], in each of the algorithms
presented here, the ﬁrst step is to normalize the data, putting the entries into this range.
In addition, in each algorithm we generate a random matrix which is used to perturb
the original data and so changes it from integer to decimal point form. The following
MATLAB function [FP10] can be used to produce each column of the randomly generated
matrix: nkj = ‘normrnd(μnjk , σnjk , number of rows required, 1 (the number of columns
required))’. Once the algorithm completes, the values are restored to integers using a
standard round-oﬀ function deﬁned as follows:
(i) Where a matrix entry is positive or zero and has the decimal form a.b
• If b < 5, replace the entry by the integer a
• If b ≥ 5, replace the entry by the integer a+ 1.
(ii) Where a matrix entry is negative and has the decimal form −a.b
• If b < 5, replace the entry by −a
• If b ≥ 5, replace the entry by −(a+ 1).
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3.6.1 Additive Perturbation Method
While the addition perturbation method has been described in the literature [AS00],
I use its general description as presented in Subsection 3.4.5 to develop the Algorithm 1.
I include the authors’ proposed additive perturbation [AS00] equation and properties to
privatize data sets in my Algorithm 1, and present the pseudo-code here.
Data: A matrix O = [oij ]i=1,m
j=1,n
with elements oij and columns oj
Result: A privatized matrix P
for j=1; j<=n; j+1 do
Normalize the column oj using Equation 3.5.1 and get oˆj;
/* Generate 20 random noise column matrices to be tested for ‘best’ choice of
standard deviation */
for k=0.05; k<=1; k+0.05 do
nkj = normrnd(0, k,m, 1);
pˆkj = oˆj + n
k
j /* Privatize normalized column oˆj */;
Calculate value of data privacy for each k using Equation 3.5.4 and get rk = r(oˆj, pˆkj );
Calculate value of data utility for each k using Equation 3.5.5 and get fk = f(pˆkj );
Let zk = | (rk − fk) |;
/* Calculate the minimum value of zk for the 20 values of k, and collect the
corresponding indices k into a set K. From K choose the smallest value
min(K) */
Let σ(j) = min(K);
Choose the corresponding privatized column using:
ˆ
p
σ(j)
j = oˆj + n
σ(j)
j (3.6.1)
and denormalize it using:
p
σ(j)
j =
ˆ
p
σ(j)
j × σoj + μoj (3.6.2)
Aggregate columns p
σ(j)
j into an mxn matrix and convert into an integer data type matrix P
using round-oﬀ function in Section 3.6;
Algorithm 1: Additive Perturbation Method
I ﬁrst normalize O, column by column based on Equation 3.5.1, and then generate a
noise matrixN based on a Gaussian distribution with μ = 0 and some mean σ which needs
to be determined based on a value which gives both acceptable privacy and acceptable
utility. I produce N column by column, and for each column, test twenty values of
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σ beginning at 0.05, in steps of 0.05 ending at 1. The ‘best’ choice occurs when the
diﬀerence between privacy and utility is lowest, which may occur at more than one value
of σ, in which case, the smallest such value of σ is chosen. Finally, I take the sum of a
normalized column of O and the corresponding random column, denormalize and convert
the entries in the resulting column to integer form before using it as a column in the
privatized version P of O.
3.6.2 Random Rotation Perturbation Method
Data: A matrix O = [oij ]i=1,m
j=1,n
with elements oij and columns oj
Result: A privatized matrix P
for j=1; j<=n; j+1 do
Normalize the column oj using Equation 3.5.1 and get oˆj;
/* Generate 20 random rotation matrices to be tested for ‘best’ choice of
standard deviation */
for k=0.05; k<=1; k+0.05 do
Rku = normrnd(0, k,m,m) ;
Orthogonalize Rku:
Rk = orthogonal(Rku) (3.6.3)
pˆkj = R
k × oˆj /* Privatize normalized column oˆj */;
Calculate value of data privacy for each k using Equation 3.5.4 and get rk = r(oˆj, pˆkj );
Calculate value of data utility for each k using Equation 3.5.5 and get fk = f(pˆkj );
Let zk = | (rk − fk) |;
/* Calculate the minimum value of zk for the 20 values of k, and collect the
corresponding indices k into a set K. From K choose the smallest value
min(K) */
Let σ(j) = min(K);
Choose the corresponding privatized column using Equation 3.6.1 in Algorithm 1 and get
ˆ
p
σ(j)
j ;
Denormalize
ˆ
p
σ(j)
j using Equation 3.6.2 in Algorithm 1 and get p
σ(j)
j ;
Aggregate columns p
σ(j)
j into an mxn matrix and convert into an integer data type matrix P
using round-oﬀ function in Section 3.6 ;
Algorithm 2: Random Rotation Perturbation Method
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I use the general description of the random rotation perturbation method described
in Subsection 3.4.5, to develop my pseudo-code for Algorithm 2. The random rotation
perturbation method is described by Oliveira et al. in [OZ04], and by Chen et al. in
[CL05a] and [CL05b]. I use the authors’ proposed random rotation perturbation equa-
tion and properties to privatize data sets in my Algorithm 2. The pseudo-code for this
algorithm is presented in Algorithm 2.
First O is normalized, and then the Gaussian distribution is used to generate a random
rotation matrix Rk = [rij]
k
i=1,m
j=1,m
with elements rij for each i
′th row, j
′th column with k
′th
standard deviation, using the same 20 standard deviation values k = 0.05, 0.1, 0.15, ..., 1 as
in the additive perturbation method. I produce R as in the additive perturbation method
but I take the product instead of sum of a normalized column of O and the corresponding
random column, denormalize and convert the entries in the resulting column to integer
form before using it as a column in the privatized version P of O. The pseudo-code is
presented in Algorithm 2.
3.6.3 Geometric Perturbation Method
I use the general description of the geometric perturbation method described in Sub-
section 3.4.5 to develop Algorithm 3. The geometric perturbation method was developed
by Chen et al. [CL11] in the literature. Rotation perturbation is one of the major
components in the geometric perturbation method [CL11]. I use the authors’ proposed
geometric perturbation equation and properties to privatize data sets as illustrated by
my pseudo-code for this algorithm.
First O is normalized, then a rotation matrix R, translation transformation matrix
ψ, and distance perturbation matrix Δ are generated. R is generated as for Algorithm
2. The translation transformation matrix ψk and distance perturbation matrix Δk are
as deﬁned in the Subsection 3.4.5 with same k
′th standard deviation. The pseudo-code is
presented in Algorithm 3.
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Data: A matrix O = [oij ]i=1,m
j=1,n
with elements oij and columns oj
Result: A privatized matrix P
for j=1; j<=n; j+1 do
Normalize the column oj using Equation 3.5.1 and get oˆj;
/* Generate 20 random rotation matrices, ψkj , and Δ
k
j to be tested for ‘best’
choice of standard deviation */
for k=0.05; k<=1; k+0.05 do
Generate random mxm rotation matrices Rk using Equation 3.6.3 ;
Generate ψkj using: t
k
j = normrnd(0, k,m, 1) and set;
ψkj = t
k
j × IT1 (3.6.4)
Generate Δkj using: Δ
k
j = normrnd(0, k,m, 1) and set;
pˆkj = R
k × oˆj + ψkj +Δkj (3.6.5)
Calculate value of data privacy for each k using Equation 3.5.4 and get rk = r(oˆj, pˆkj );
Calculate value of data utility for each k using Equation 3.5.5 and get fk = f(pˆkj );
Let zk = | (rk − fk) |;
/* Calculate the minimum value of zk for the 20 values of k, and collect the
corresponding indices k into a set K. From K choose the smallest value
min(K) */
Let σ(j) = min(K);
Choose the corresponding privatized column using Equation 3.6.1 and get
ˆ
p
σ(j)
j ;
Denormalize
ˆ
p
σ(j)
j using Equation 3.6.2 in and get p
σ(j)
j ;
Aggregate columns p
σ(j)
j into an mxn matrix and convert into an integer data type matrix P
using round-oﬀ function in Section 3.6;
Algorithm 3: Geometric Perturbation Method
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Section 3.7 illustrates experimental analysis of algorithms described in Section 3.6,
and implements the three above described algorithms on the four medical data sets and
measured data privacy and data utility. RMSE is used to measure data privacy and the
classiﬁcations for data utility.
3.7 Data Privacy and Data Utility Calculations
In this section I implemented and tested the above three algorithms (described in
Section 3.6) on the four medical data sets and measured data privacy and data utility. I
use RMSE to measure data privacy and F-measure based on the classiﬁcations for data
utility as in Section 3.5.
For each algorithm and each data set I computed the privacy and utility of the output
perturbed matrix P as the average of privacy and utility over all columns using Equations
3.5.4 and 3.5.5 respectively. In order to work with a single ﬁnal measure of utility from
the F-measure method, I used the average score of all six classiﬁcation methods on each
data set. This data is presented in Table 3.5 and the results of data privacy and data
utility are listed in Table 3.6.
We now turn to the decision which needs to be made by each data set owner on its
choice of privatization method. Based on the results in Table 3.6, each data set owner
would ﬁrst eliminate methods which give least data privacy, as privacy is their major
concern. This method is the Additive one for each of the four medical data sets which is
at least 0.02 points lower than each of the other methods, while the privacy results for
Random Rotation and Geometric are reasonably close to each other (in fact there is a zero
diﬀerence to two decimal places). So choosing between the latter two methods would be
based on the data utility provided. Each data set owner chooses either Random Rotation
or Geometric based on which gives the higher utility. In each case, the Geometric method
would be chosen.
In a sense, this is a disappointing outcome as the Additive method utility is always
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Table 3.5. F-measure of Original and Perturbed Data Sets using Classiﬁcation Methods
Classiﬁcation
Methods J48
Rand-
om
Forest
Ada-
Boost-
M1
SMO
Bagg-
ing
Naive
Bayes
Data sets
Original and
Perturbed
Data Sets
Cleveland
Original 0.768 0.804 0.822 0.857 0.787 0.835
Additive 0.672 0.711 0.705 0.752 0.714 0.775
Random Rotation 0.542 0.578 0.564 0.599 0.575 0.598
Geometric 0.658 0.673 0.668 0.695 0.674 0.683
Hungarian
Original 0.782 0.807 0.768 0.82 0.819 0.828
Additive 0.706 0.715 0.749 0.764 0.736 0.776
Random Rotation 0.579 0.589 0.603 0.629 0.599 0.633
Geometric 0.662 0.671 0.694 0.727 0.675 0.738
Darwin
Original 0.993 0.949 0.993 0.993 0.976 0.945
Additive 0.771 0.67 0.757 0.753 0.731 0.752
Random Rotation 0.612 0.559 0.587 0.584 0.578 0.581
Geometric 0.697 0.665 0.685 0.679 0.661 0.675
Melbourne
Original 0.993 0.937 0.997 0.997 0.987 0.939
Additive 0.735 0.604 0.683 0.66 0.693 0.68
Random Rotation 0.619 0.541 0.598 0.578 0.603 0.594
Geometric 0.682 0.592 0.662 0.659 0.673 0.668
Table 3.6. Data Privacy and Data Utility
Data sets
Cleveland Hungarian Darwin
Melbo-
urnePerturbation Methods
Additive
Data Privacy 0.7118 0.7073 0.6943 0.6980
Data Utility 0.7215 0.7410 0.7390 0.6758
Random
Rotation
Data Privacy 0.9961 0.9961 0.9973 0.9978
Data Utility 0.5760 0.6053 0.5835 0.5888
Geometric
Data Privacy 0.9999 0.9997 0.9993 0.9995
Data Utility 0.6752 0.6945 0.6770 0.6560
better than utility with Random Rotation and Geometric. However, the classiﬁcation
method is necessary to obtain good querying results from the shared data.
I discuss the summary of experiments, important ﬁndings and limitations of my work
in Section 4.18.
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3.8 Discussion
This section provides the outcome of my work which is divided into three Subsections.
The ﬁrst Subsection 3.8.1 presents the summary of the algorithm analysis, Subsection
3.8.2 presents the important ﬁndings of my work and Subsection 3.8.3 presents the limi-
tations of my work.
3.8.1 Summary of the Experiments
I observe the following points from the analysis of discussed algorithms in Section 3.7:
• I tested and analyzed three relevant privatization methods, Additive, Random Ro-
tation and Geometric, using privacy and utility metrics based on four medical data
sets with common attributes.
• The Additive method (refers to Algorithm 1 described in Subsection 3.6.1) applied
to each of the four medical data sets has at least 0.02 points lower data privacy
than each of the other methods.
• The privacy results for Random Rotation (refers to Algorithm 2 described in Sub-
section 3.6.2) and Geometric (refers to Algorithm 3 described in Subsection 3.6.3)
are reasonably close to each other (In fact there is a zero diﬀerence to two decimal
places).
• Data utility is then used to choose between the Random Rotation and Geometric
methods. Each data set owner chooses either Random Rotation or Geometric based
on which gives the higher utility. In each case, the Geometric method would be
chosen.
• From the consideration of privacy and utility of the resultant perturbed data, the
participants are able to choose a common privatization method for all four data
sets.
3.8.2 Important Findings
I obtained the following important major improvements to existing architectures:
1. The proposed approach provides a method for choosing a privatization technique
suitable for common privatization of several data sets which are to be shared.
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2. A single privatization method is clearly not always the most appropriate for all
data sets; in this case the participants may agree to choose more than one method
and make available a set of shared data, privatized using these diﬀerent methods.
3.8.3 Limitations
My proposed architectures has the following limitations.
1. I did not examine cases in which a single common privatization method cannot be
agreed on.
2. I chose a small group of data sets for sharing and did not use privatization methods
on large public data sets.
3. I considered only numeric and nominal data type.
The next section summarises the work of this chapter.
3.9 Summary of the Chapter
This chapter presented an entirely new approach to choosing a privatization method
suitable for common privatization of several data sets which are to be shared. In order to
demonstrate the method, I presented a case study based on four medical data sets with
common attributes, privatized each using three relevant privatization methods (Additive,
Random Rotation and Geometric) and then analyzed the privacy and utility of the re-
sultant perturbed data sets. As a result, the participants were able to choose a common
privatization method for all four data sets. In the case that a single privatization method
is clearly not the most appropriate for all data sets, the participants may agree to choose
more than one method and make available a set of shared data, privatized using these
diﬀerent methods.
The next chapter will provide a solution for aggregating shared public data across the
diﬀerent geographically locations including international collaborators. Also, I present a
solution for privately querying the shared public data by individuals.
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Chapter 4
Aggregation and Querying of
Privatized Sensitive Data
In the previous Chapter 3, Section 3.2 described the advantages of data sharing. That
chapter presented a solution for sharing of sensitive data sets in a closed environment
between a small group of researchers and in a privacy preserving manner.
In this chapter I consider a diﬀerent setting, in which a large number of data con-
tributors want to publish their privatized data sets on the cloud so that all the data sets
can be made available to anyone who wants access, for any purpose. Those who want
access to such publicly available data sets include researchers, educators, policymakers,
and even the general public. Making evidence-based data sets broadly available can
promote public understanding of science, advocacy, educational uses and citizen-science
initiatives [KS13]. With the increase of collaborative computation, the subject of the
data aggregation has become progressively important and techniques that combine and
analyse data sets collected from the multiple data managers are very useful for collab-
orative applications. As a result, privacy has become one of the top priorities for those
contributing and querying data sets.
The objective of this chapter is two-fold, ﬁrst, to deal with aggregation and pub-
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lishing of privatized data sets, and second, to determine how it can be eﬃciently and
eﬀectively queried, while retaining privacy not only of the data sets, but also of the orig-
inal data owner and of both the query and person querying. A detailed discussion of
these objectives is given in Subsection 4.6.3.
The chapter is constructed as follows. Sections 4.1 - 4.3 brieﬂy describe the motivation
for the architecture, which I develop to satisfy the above objectives. I determine the
challenges for aggregation and querying of shared data sets in Section 4.4. Section 4.5
provides existing solutions on privacy preserving data aggregation and privacy preserving
data querying methods. Section 4.6 identiﬁes research gaps of existing privacy preserving
data aggregation and privacy preserving data querying methods, and determines the
research gaps that I aim to address in my proposed architecture. Section 4.7 recognises
the role and limitations of the service manager in existing solutions, and indicates the
role of my proposed service manager. Section 4.8 presents my proposed architecture and
describes the three components: Data contributors, Cloud server, and Data requesters.
Data Service Manager (DSM) is a main function of a cloud server which handles each
send/receive process on a cloud server. I demonstrate components of a data contributor
in Section 4.9. Sections 4.10, 4.11, and 4.12 demonstrate detailed descriptions of each
component of the DSM. Section 4.10 provides online registration process management for
a data contributor, and demonstrates the use of a data object identiﬁer to maintain data
sets. Section 4.11 provides descriptions of data format, data organisations, and presents
my proposed diagonal data aggregation method. Section 4.12 explains processing steps of
data querying and descriptions of types of queries. Section 4.13 provides a description of
the data repository components. I present the interaction between a data contributor and
the cloud server in Section 4.14. Section 4.15 illustrates components of a data requester.
The interaction between a data requester and the cloud server is illustrated in Section
4.16. To validate my architecture, experimental analysis is presented and introduced in
Section 4.17. The testing results and my ﬁndings are discussed in Section 4.18. Finally,
this chapter is summarized in Section 4.19.
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4.1 Introduction
Productivity today depends on the sharing of public data sets in any loca-
tion, and its use to collaborate with researchers, institutions and individuals any-
where in the world. There is a need to access and share public data sets across
locations and organizational boundaries to improve data sets outcomes and costs
[SP13]. The importance of data sharing in the context of global issues, such as
health, environmental change, and food production, with particular challenges for
data sets and researchers in developing countries [OEC03] is ampliﬁed by interna-
tional projects such as the International cancer genome consortium (ICGC) with its
goal to “make the data sets available to the entire research community” (https://
icgc.org/icgc/goals-structure-policies-guidelines/b-consortium-goals), and
BBMRI-LPC aiming “to help scientists to have better access to large European studies
on health” [PO13]. Also, from the perspective of public funders in some locations, shar-
ing of research data sets have become a requirement, and principles of sharing have been
formulated [WT], [OEC]. Besides the international projects mentioned above, there are
many research projects at national, regional, and institutional levels, which collect, in-
tegrate, and share data sets. Increasingly, it is not just researchers who reuse data sets,
but also educators, policymakers, and even the general public. Given the sensitive nature
of shared data sets and the social and legal implications for its disclosure, privacy is a
major concern for data sharing [Rin97], [KBH02]. For preventing disclosure of individ-
ually identiﬁable information, usually de-identiﬁed or perturbed data sets are shared. I
discussed privacy preserving data mining methods in Chapter 3 for privatizing data sets
before sharing. These data sets may be retrieved from multiple sites with diﬀerent regu-
lations on the disclosure of data sets. The aggregation of data sets on an individual basis
in a privacy preserving manner is a challenging issue as I discussed in literature work on
data aggregation in Subsection 4.5.1.
As an example, consider the following queries related to a research study of anti-
depressant drugs: Query 1: What percentage of HIV infected patients taking any pre-
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scribed anti-depressant medication are diagnosed with an acute psychiatric disorder?
Query 2: For each HIV infected patient diagnosed with acute psychiatric disorder ﬁnd
all the prescribed drugs the patient took after being diagnosed with HIV.
The above queries require aggregating data sets from multiple sources, including the
state health department managing HIV test records, pharmacy databases storing patient
records related to prescription drugs, and mental health clinics treating patients with
a psychiatric disorder. For preserving the privacy of individual records, we need to
ensure that the query results do not reveal any individually identiﬁable information to the
querying party. Additionally, during the process of aggregating data sets from multiple
sources, none of the sources should be able to infer any information about any of the
patients beyond what these sources already know. For instance, the pharmacist should
not be able to learn which patients have tested positive for HIV or which patients are
receiving treatment for a severe psychiatric disorder.
The goal of this chapter is to identify potential research directions and challenges that
need to be addressed to perform privacy preserving data aggregation and data querying.
I brieﬂy give an introduction on the use of data aggregation, and the importance of
privacy preserving data aggregation method in Section 4.2. Then, I acquaint the reader
with the data querying on cloud, discuss the requirements of privacy preserving querying
methods, and present the use of privacy preserving data querying methods in Section 4.3.
4.2 Data Aggregation
This section discusses the use of data aggregation in data sharing and additionally,
presents the signiﬁcance of privacy preserving data aggregation methods.
4.2.1 Why is Data Aggregation Important?
The prodigious amount of data sets accumulated by science and business needs to
be brought together and aggregated in order to extract information and gain knowledge.
These data sets are a result of the systematic collection of published data sets from
multiple sources and are eventually transmitted to the cloud server for processing. These
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data sets are often collected from distributed sources, involving diﬀerent types of data,
diﬀerent information systems, and diﬀerent organizational units. The amount of data sets
published in large networks is usually too large for the cloud server to process eﬃciently.
Hence, we need methods for combining data sets into high-quality information at the
cloud server. This can be accomplished by data aggregation methods. Data aggregation
has long been an area of active database research [DH84], [HMN+99], [Wie93]. Data
aggregation aims to answer complex questions, for example, how a genetic background
or exposure to some environmental factors can inﬂuence development of certain diseases.
“Data aggregation is deﬁned as the process of aggregating the data sets from multiple
sources to eliminate redundant transmission and provide fused information to the cloud
server [SPMN13]”.
Many important data-analysis applications must aggregate data sets collected by mul-
tiple participants; ISPs and enterprise networks may seek to share traﬃc mix information
to more accurately detect and localize anomalies. Similarly, collaboration can help iden-
tify popular web content by having web users or proxies monitoring traﬃc for an entire
organization combine their access logs to determine the most frequently accessed URLs
(http://www.alexa.com/).
4.2.2 The Importance of Privacy Preserving Data Aggregation
Methods
Privacy is an important issue in today’s context of extreme penetration of internet
and mobile technologies. Privacy concerns can be a major barrier to collecting aggregate
data sets from the public, and large-scale data sets collection and aggregation eﬀorts
usually increase privacy concerns. There are numerous real-world applications which
require data sets integration while meeting speciﬁc privacy constraints [CKD+04]. In the
literature, many papers consider the data privacy problem in data aggregation methods
[BC10], [RVK13], [CCT+14], [ZYH14], [RBLM14]. I present recent literature work in
detail on privacy preserving data aggregation methods in Subsection 4.5.1, where I also
discuss a trade-oﬀ between privacy, utility and eﬃciency of such methods.
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4.3 Data Querying
This section presents the important use of a cloud server to store and aggregate pub-
lished data sets, discusses the need of querying services to operate in a privacy preserving
manner, and presents the uses of privacy preserving data querying methods.
4.3.1 Why is Cloud Considered for Querying Services?
With the wide deployment of public cloud computing infrastructures, using the cloud
to host data querying services has become an appealing solution for its advantages of
scalability and cost-saving. This innovative paradigm has generated signiﬁcant interest
in both the marketplace and the academic world, resulting in a number of notable com-
mercial and individual cloud computing services, for example, from Amazon, Google,
Salesforce. Recent years have witnessed an ever increasing reliance on external services
for data storage and management, towards the emerging cloud scenario, characterized by
a rich and diverse availability of providers oﬀering storage and computational functionali-
ties [VFP+13]. Together with data management functionality, the research and industrial
communities have been investigating diﬀerent solutions to ensure conﬁdentiality of data
whose management is outsourced to the cloud [VFS13].
4.3.2 Requirements of Privacy Preserving Querying Services
People query public online data services such as search engines, social network
sites, news portals, and various specialized information services, on a daily basis.
Users need these public data set services, but are concerned that their personal in-
formation might be disclosed or compromised. User queries can be revealed in-
tentionally to advertisers such as in some of the Google and Facebook applications
(http://news.cnet.com/2702-1009_3-986.html) or even to the general public such
as in the AOL log release incident in 2006 (http://www.techcrunch.com/2006/08/06/
aol-proudly-releases-massive-amounts-of-user-search-data). User queries can
also be leaked unintentionally, such as to the attackers who hacked the back-end database
of Twitter in 2008 [Sch11]. The privacy of millions of people has been jeopardized in nu-
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merous user data leakage incidents in many popular online applications. To address the
critical problem of personal data leakage through queries, I wish to enable private query-
ing on public data services so that the contents of user queries and any user data are
hidden and therefore not revealed to the online service providers, but still allows the user
to obtain answers to her query. Nonetheless, in empowering such private questioning ser-
vices, it is extremely hard to attain both strong privacy protection and practical query
performance. Another challenge is the ability to support diﬀerent types of queries such
as the above-mentioned database queries, beyond simple data retrieval.
4.3.3 The Uses of Privacy Preserving Data Querying Methods
A great deal of work has been done in the area of private query processing [Kos00]. I
review existing privacy preserving data querying methods in Subsection 4.5.2.
Query processing that preserves both the data privacy of the data providers and the
query privacy of the data requester is a new research problem. The data providers should
protect their data privacy, and not reveal any information beyond what the query result
can imply. In addition, the data requesters should protect their query privacy so that the
data providers and the cloud know nothing about the query, and are, therefore, unable to
infer any information about a data requester. As public data sets are not under the data
provider’s control, data conﬁdentiality and integrity are of more concern in outsourced
databases. In order to protect these data sets, the primary way to make these secure is
to privatize the sensitive data sets in the database before sharing [DVJ+03], [AKSX04],
[TCN+14], [TKMZ13], [DYL+13]. So, data providers ﬁrst encrypt their data sets and
then share with server [HILM02], [TKMZ13], [HMT04], [HILM02], [WAA14]. Generally,
encryption based solutions suﬀer from key management overheads and either ineﬃciency
or vulnerability to statistical inferences over encrypted values [DVJ+03], [LO05].
Query processing over the encrypted data set has attracted signiﬁcant attention since
there has been growing interest in the usage of database service outsourcing in the research
as well as industry. The query processing problem should reveal the query output only
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to the authorized user who initiated the query. During this process, nothing should
be revealed to the cloud server nor to any adversaries [AAW12]. Along this direction,
researchers from both academia and industry have been working on developing various
query processing protocols over the encrypted data sets [HILM02], [BW07], [SBC+07],
[TKMZ13], [HIM04]. Additionally, query processing protocols on encrypted data sets
stored on a cloud have been extensively studied [CWL+14], [HXRC11], [LYCL11]. Much
research has been done on the design of eﬃcient privacy preserving query processing
techniques [AKSX04], [BBO07], [GZ07a], [LP00], [SFBE07], [XCL07].
Data requesters send data query requests to access these shared data sets to cloud
server, but at the same time they want to preserve the privacy of the data query. To
protect data requesters privacy when querying a public online data services, it is desir-
able to enable private query processing over public data sets such that a user query is not
revealed to the public DSM, but still allows the user to obtain answers to their query.
However, in empowering such private querying services, it is exceptionally hard to attain
both strong privacy protection and practical query performance. I summarize the require-
ments for constructing a practical query service in the cloud as the data conﬁdentiality,
query privacy, eﬃcient query processing, and low processing cost.
In this line of work several authors have focused on privately processing the data query
by server [TKMZ13], [DYL+13], [WAA14], [HMCK12], [XGC14], [HDJ+13], [WLZ+13].
I list recent work on privately data querying methods in Subsection 4.5.2.
4.4 The Challenges Involved in Aggregating and
Querying Data
This section exhibits the challenges on data aggregation and data querying.
One challenge is to privately aggregate published data sets across a distributed
environment. We need to develop a methodology which ensures the aggregated data
sets achieve acceptable privacy, acceptable utility, practical computation cost, and low
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storage cost. The second part of this chapter deals with individuals privately querying
the public online aggregated data sets. These queries include user interests and even
sensitive user data (e.g. personal addresses, medical conditions) in the query predicates.
The problem of querying public data set is primarily motivated by data outsourcing
applications. In a typical setup, the service manager hosts the data of its clients and
provides a variety of data management functionalities, like queries, modiﬁcations. While
the server is expected to implement the various operations correctly, the client may
not trust the server side with complete access to its sensitive data sets. So, there is
a need to develop query authentication processes, which is another challenge in
this area. The query authentication process includes three important dimensions which
are correctness [VFS12a], [LHKR06], [GNH+12], completeness [VFS12a], [HMCK12] and
freshness [VFS12a], [LHKR06], [CAH13].
1. Correctness means that the client must be able to validate that the returned records
do exist in the owner’s database and have not been modiﬁed in any way.
2. Completeness means that no answers have been omitted from the result.
3. Freshness means that the results are based on the most current version of the
database that incorporates the latest owner updates. It should be stressed here that
query freshness is an important dimension of query authentication that has not been
extensively explored in the past, since it is a requirement arising from updates to the
outsourced database systems, an aspect that has not been suﬃciently studied yet.
To protect an individual’s privacy when querying the public online data services,
it is desirable to enable private query processing over public data sets. However,
in enabling such private querying services, it is very diﬃcult to achieve both strong
privacy protection and practical query performance. So, the next challenge is
to develop a method which provides private query processing over public data sets and
achieves acceptable data privacy and query privacy with practical query performance.
Another challenge is the ability to support types of queries beyond simple data
retrieval.
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In Section 4.5, I review the literature concerning privacy preserving data aggregation
and privacy preserving data querying to determine solutions for the above-mentioned
challenges.
4.5 Current Solutions on Privacy Preserving Data
Aggregation and Data Querying
This section presents previous work on sharing public data sets, which is divided
in two subsections. The ﬁrst subsection presents the literature on privacy preserving
data aggregation methods on distributed data sets. The second subsection provides the
existing work on privately data querying on public data sets. I discuss in detail the
literature work on privacy preserving data aggregation and querying methods in Sections
2.3, 2.4 of Chapter 2 respectively.
4.5.1 Privacy Preserving Data Aggregation
This subsection describes the recent work on aggregation methods on distributed data
sets as discuss in detail in Section 2.3 of Chapter 2.
From literature in Section 2.3 of Chapter 2, I ﬁnd the existing data aggregation meth-
ods have low accuracy of the aggregated data sets and the data privacy can be broken
by the data aggregator. In 2013, Dhasian et al. [DB13] present an up-to-date survey on
existing data aggregation techniques. This paper proposes [DB13] data aggregation meth-
ods based on cryptography. These papers [LLL10], [GJ11], [DKM+06], [DB13] propose
aggregation protocols based on the homomorphic Paillier’s cryptosystem, Cramer-Shoup
encryption, identity-based proxy re-encryption, symmetric searchable encryption scheme
and an asymmetric searchable encryption scheme following [BCOP04], [SWP00], many
improved approaches have been proposed [RVK13], [YKC13], [JPJ13], [BE13], [CCT+14],
[ZYH14], [RBLM14]. Due to high communication costs, long delays, and high computa-
tion and storage costs, these solutions are impractical. This greatly increases the costs
of storing and transmitting ciphertexts, which is impractical in many situations such as
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shared cloud storage. In [YY08], authors focus on matching operations and support SUM
and AVG aggregate operations with additive homomorphic encryption schemes. There
are a lot of existing works (e.g., [BGN05], [Gen09c], [Gen09c], [CCMT09], [YWZC08])
which focus on security and privacy preserving data aggregation, but most of them assume
a trusted aggregator and cannot protect user privacy against untrusted aggregators. Most
of the work focus on the partitioning of a table, vertically [VCKP08], [YW06], [ABG+05],
[CVF+09] or horizontally [MFHL10], [JX09], [KC04a], [KC04b], [Wie10], [SHJ12], into
several parts for aggregation. These methods are used in the current literature work.
In the existing work, no single work is done on the diagonally partitioning method.
I focus on this work and implemented a diagonal data aggregation method. I experi-
mentally and comparatively analysed my proposed diagonal data aggregation with the
most popular horizontal and vertical method in Section 4.17, and I ﬁnd that my pro-
posed method provides better eﬃciency in terms of data modiﬁcation operations with
acceptable data privacy and acceptable data utility.
In summary, we need to provide data aggregation methods which can maintain pri-
vacy, utility, computation and communication cost eﬃciently in distributed systems with-
out considering whether the service manager is trusted.
4.5.2 Privacy Preserving Data Querying
This subsection reviews existing work on private query processing over public data
sets as discussed in detail in Section 2.4 of Chapter 2, including private information
retrieval, private block retrieval, query anonymization using noisy queries, plausibly de-
niable search, hybrid approaches, B+ tree, Bucket based methods and keyword search
methods.
The problem of private query processing addresses by private information retrieval
(PIR) [YPB13], [KO97], [CKGS98] is to provide a user with the means to retrieve data
set from a database without the database learning any information about the particular
item that is retrieved. The existing PIR methods (discuss in detail in Section 2.4 of
101
Chapter 2) are criticized as impractical for their expensive computation [GR05], [KO97],
[SC07] and communication costs [MG08]. After PIR methods, several other methods are
proposed in the literature to execute data query privately such as query anonymization
based on k-Anonymity [Sam01], [SS98] [MCA06], Plausibly Deniable Search [MC09],
[PDX10], and Hybrid approaches [OG12], [WAA10]. Recently Wang et al. [WAA14]
propose two protocols for private processing of database queries, namely BHE and HHE.
The authors are not concerned with protecting access pattern privacy [Dau14] in a data
sets outsourcing scenario.
In summary, the above mentioned privacy preserving data querying methods do not
provide acceptable data privacy and practical performance together of data querying.
Private Block Retrieval (PBR) is a natural and practical extension of PIR in which,
instead of retrieving only a single bit, the user retrieves a block of bits from a single
database. In [CKGS98], Chor et al. have shown that if only a single database is used,
then n bits must be communicated in the information-theoretic sense, that is, the user’s
query gives absolutely no information about particular index. They have also shown that
any PIR protocol can be converted to a PBR protocol. Several authors focus on single-
database PIR [KO97], [CMS99], [KO00]. In 2005, Gentry and Ramzan [GR05] extend
the single-database PIR of Cachin et al. [CMS99] to a PBR. These single-database PIR
protocols provide almost optimal communication cost, but require the database to use an
enormous amount of computational power. Homomorphic encryption techniques are often
very natural ways to construct a variety of privacy preserving protocols. For example,
the PIR protocol of Kushilevitz and Ostrovsky [KO97] is based on the Goldwasser-Micali
homomorphic encryption [GM84]. A generic method to construct a single-database PIR
from a homomorphic encryption scheme is given by Ostrovsky and Skeith [OI07]. These
underlying encryption schemes allow homomorphic computation of only one operation
(either addition or multiplication) on plaintexts. I present detailed literature work on
homomorphic encryption in Subsection 2.2.4 of Chapter 2. These existing single-database
PIR and PBR methods have high computation and communication cost.
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I summarize the weakness in previous proposals: (i) The computation overhead for
the data provider; (ii) The data provider-data service manager communication cost; (iii)
The storage overhead for the data service manager; (iv) The computation overhead for the
data service manager; (v) The data requester-data service manager communication cost;
(vi) The computation cost for the data requester (for veriﬁcation), and (vii) Improper
data privacy and query privacy protection.
The bucket based methods [HILM02], [KSK13] are proposed for eﬃcient processing
of the requested data set from encrypted data sets in the database. The fatal drawback
of the bucket based index algorithm is the risk of data exposure, which is analyzed in
the [HMT04], [CDV+05] and which estimate the loss of privacy due to bucketization.
Public key encryption with keyword search [BCOP04] can protect users’ data privacy
and certain query privacy, but can only be applied for equality checks. Range query is
diﬃcult over the encrypted data sets with numeric attributes and therefore, they were
unable to achieve rich query functions.
(viii) Inability to support rich database queries beyond simple selection queries and
retrievals.
Some of the recent papers [WLZ+13], [XGC14], [VFS12b], [KSK13] are pro-
posed to provide query privacy and data conﬁdentiality, but none of these meth-
ods focused on query freshness [LHKR06], [CAH13], query correctness [LHKR06],
[GNH+12] and data updation (http://docs.oracle.com/cd/B28359_01/server.111/
b28313/concept.htm).
(ix) Inability to support query freshness, query correctness and data modiﬁcation.
Therefore, we need to propose methods which provide data privacy, query privacy
with low communication and computation cost and also supports the rich query function
such as equality test (e.g., [HILM02], [TKMZ13]), range query search (e.g., [AKSX04],
[PLZ13], [SBC+07]), aggregation query computation (e.g., [TKMZ13], [HIM04], [AF11]])
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as well as keyword based query search or similarity query search (e.g., [WCL+10],
[SWP00], [KIK12]).
From the presented literature on data aggregation and data querying, I identiﬁed
research gaps for my work, which are described in Section 4.6.
4.6 Identiﬁcation of Gaps
This section illustrates the shortcomings of existing solutions on data aggregation
and data querying methods in Subsections 4.6.1 and 4.6.2 respectively. Then, I list the
research opportunities presented by these gaps in Subsection 4.6.3.
4.6.1 Shortcomings of Data Aggregation Methods from Exist-
ing Solutions
I observe limitations on data aggregation methods from the existing solutions which
are presented in Subsection 4.5.1. I ﬁnd that the data modiﬁcation operations are not
eﬃciently performed in the existing data aggregation methods. The computation cost
of existing data aggregation methods are ineﬃcient. Most of the existing solutions have
assumed a trusted aggregator and cannot protect data privacy against untrusted aggre-
gators.
4.6.2 Shortcomings of Privacy Preserving Querying Methods
from Existing Solutions
After the data aggregation methods, I have mentioned the existing work on private
query processing methods in Subsection 4.5.2. I identiﬁed several problems in the ex-
isting solutions on data querying methods. Most of the papers have focused on data
privacy, but are unable to achieve access and pattern [Dau14] data conﬁdentiality. Most
existing solutions used cryptographic solutions to process data querying privately. Due
to cryptographic solutions computational and communication costs, these solutions are
impractical and also result in unsatisfactory query privacy. The existing solutions do not
support rich query functions, and do not provide query correctness, query freshness and
data modiﬁcation functions.
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4.6.3 Identiﬁed Gaps for my Work
I determine the possible research direction for my work from the identiﬁed shortcom-
ings on data aggregation and data querying in Subsections 4.6.1 and 4.6.2 respectively
and I propose solutions for the observed problems. I propose to maintain privacy and
utility of aggregated privatized data sets with acceptable cost. I will show that the pro-
posed solution provides privacy preserving data querying processes with low computation
and communication cost. My solution also supports the data modiﬁcation, credential re-
vocation process and several types of queries. Data modiﬁcation includes data insertion,
data deletion and data updation.
I begin the description of my architecture Section 4.7 where I describe the role of the
Service Manager in other architectures followed by my own.
4.7 The Role of the Service Manager
This section delineates the role of the service manager from the existing solutions,
then presents the shortcomings of the job descriptions of service managers in existing
solutions. I mention the role of my service manager in Subsection 4.7.3, where I overcome
the inadequacy of the existing role of service manager.
4.7.1 The Role of Service Manager in the Existing Solutions
Many recent approaches use the concept of privacy preserving data querying by a
service manager [WAA14], [HMCK12], [XGC14]. In each mentioned work, the data sets
are stored in an encrypted form on the server. I summarize the role of service manager
from some of the relevant recent works, as follows:
In the paper [WAA14], the service manager employs public data bucketization method
to manage data sets and sends bucketization summary to query requester. On receiv-
ing a query request from an individual, the service manager provides private processing
of database queries using two protocols. These protocols provide strong query privacy,
and support common database queries such as range and join queries by relying on the
bucketization. The protocol provides complete query privacy, but still incurs expensive
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computation and communication costs. In [HMCK12], the service manager stores data
sets in table format and partitions data sets using bucketization-based methods for gen-
erating indexes. The authors assume the service manager is untrusted. The service
manager evaluates a data query privately by computing a secure indexing tag of the data
sets using bucketization which prevents the service manager from learning exact values,
but still allows it to check if a record satisﬁes the query predicate. While the service
manager provides query result completeness, the key management issues are outside the
scope of this paper. In [TKMZ13], the authors implement a system for securely executing
analytical workloads over sensitive data sets on an untrusted service manager. The ser-
vice manager stores encrypted data sets and provides data conﬁdentiality by executing
most query operations over encrypted data sets. This work performs queries that cannot
be eﬃciently computed over encrypted data sets. In [WLZ+13], and [KSK13] the service
manager stores the data sets in encrypted form and provides data conﬁdentiality, data
privacy and query privacy. In [XGC14], service manager provides data conﬁdentiality,
query privacy and also provides speedup query processing. In [HDJ+13], service manager
provides data conﬁdentiality, diﬀerent kinds of queries, and security.
These existing solutions could be used for private query processing over public data
sets, but these solutions are not satisfactory. Some of these existing solutions [HMCK12],
[TKMZ13] assume the server is untrusted, but can not achieve data and query privacy
compared to other existing work such as [WAA14]. However, this paper [WAA14] is not
concerned with protecting access pattern privacy in a data outsourcing scenario, and
does not try to compare techniques for private query processing over public data sets
with speciﬁc techniques for protecting access pattern privacy over encrypted data sets.
In summary, I observe from the above-mentioned existing solutions, service man-
ager privately processes the data query while ensuring adequate privacy levels. Service
manager stores encrypted data sets and provides data conﬁdentiality. Service manager
provides a query result completeness function. Mostly solutions consider execution of
query operations on encrypted data.
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4.7.2 Shortcomings of the Role of Service Manager in the Ex-
isting Solutions
None of the reviewed solutions mention the query result correctness and freshness.
The existing solutions do not focus on how the service manager can update stored data
sets eﬃciently in a privacy preserving manner. I also note that these solutions use data
sets storage in encrypted form on a server, so, key management is a major challenge
which remains unresolved. Therefore, I propose data privatization methods to privatize
the stored data sets on a cloud server.
4.7.3 The Role of My Service Manager
I assume my service manager is untrusted. The service manager advertises type(s) of
data for data storage and transmission, advertises encryption method, types of queries
formats to make query by the data requester. The service manager accepts data sets
from registered data contributors, stores and aggregates data sets. The service manager
keeps data sets in signiﬁcant order, up-to-date, performs data updation and determines
the types of query that can be made. Also, keep metadata about queries being made as
well as data sets contributed, privately process queries, give ‘private’ feedback to data
querier, and maintains the credential revocation. The service manager provides online
registration process for each data contributor to publish the data set.
The intent of this chapter is to propose a solution for processing private data queries
over public aggregated data set with acceptable computation and communication costs
and satisfactory privacy protection for data contributor’s private data set and data re-
quester’s private queries. Also, my proposed solution performs data updation and cre-
dential revocation, as well as supporting several types of queries over public data sets.
4.8 The Approach: A General Overview
In my architecture, I use three entities Data Contributors (DCs), Cloud Server (CS),
and Data Requesters (DRs). The full architecture includes several DCs and several
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DRs, all accessing the one CS. To simplify the explanations, in the system model here
I present only one DC and one DR, as shown in Figure 4.1. I consider an untrusted
Figure 4.1. The Proposed Architecture
CS such as Amazon web services (http://aws.amazon.com), Google cloud platform
(http://cloud.google.com), and salesforce (https://www.salesforce.com/au/form/
signup/freetrial-lb.jsp?d=70130000000tT0K) for data storage and query processing.
I describe the value and applicability of a CS in Subsection 4.3.1. The DC contributes
privatized data set to a CS using an advertised data format on a website by the DSM.
The DSM manages each contributed data set (CDS) in a data repository, details of the
DC components are illustrated in Section 4.9. In my proposed architecture, I assume
that the CS has a management function, which I call the data service manager (DSM).
The DSM is responsible for each send and receive process on the CS. I illustrate the job
descriptions of the DSM in Sections 4.10, 4.11, and 4.12. The data sets are stored and
managed on a data repository. The components of a data repository are described in Sec-
tion 4.13. The DR requests data query to access the CDSs from the DSM using privacy
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preserving data querying method, which is presented in Section 4.15. My architecture is
depicted in Figure 4.1, which shows an interaction between a DC, a DR, and the CS.
I give a general introduction of modules of my architecture in the following subsec-
tions.
4.8.1 The DC
The DC organizes the registration account by choosing the user id and password. I
assume that each DC has an online registration account on the CS. The DC uses user
id and password to access an account for publishing data set, and modifying the CDS.
Additionally, the DC uses a user id and password to observe a summary report of a CDS
for example, how many times a DR used a CDS, the last time a CDS was accessed by a
DR, and the last time when the DC modiﬁed a CDS. The DC publishes privatized data
set on the CS using an advertised data format by the DSM on a website. Descriptions of
an advertised data format are presented in Subsection 4.11.1. I use xml format for data
contributing on the CS’s data repository, as discussed in detail in Subsection 4.11.1. I
illustrate each component of the DC in Section 4.9. To be published in the data repository
of the CS, a CDS on the CS undergoes an oﬃcial review process and, when accepted, is
granted a unique identiﬁer (DOI) which is made publicly available. I deﬁne the DOI in
Subsection 4.10.2. I characterize each component of an interaction between the CS and
a DC in Section 4.14.
4.8.2 The CS
Cloud computing provides massive computation power and storage capacity which
enables a user to deploy applications without infrastructure investment [ZLNC13]. As a
global phenomenon, cloud computing enables the cross-border transfer of data sets where
diﬀerent national jurisdictions governing citizens’ rights come into play [CS]. So, I use the
CS for storage management and data querying process in my proposed architecture. The
DSM advertises the data format for publishing data sets, described in detail in Subsection
4.11.1. The DSM manages the data storage on a data repository, which is described in
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Section 4.11, and addresses the query processing in Section 4.12. The DSM provides
the privately process of data query requested by a DR also provides the data sharing
capability to a DC.
The DSM
The components of the DSM are described in Sections 4.10, 4.11, and 4.12. I present
the description of authentication check module for the DC (Subsection 4.10.1) and de-
scribe the use of DOI for data storage management (Subsection 4.10.2). I describe next
component of the DSM data formats for storing CDSs in Subsection 4.11.1, data adver-
tisement for the DC to manage data sets, CDS informations, encryption methods, and
query formats for the DR to make data query in Subsection 4.11.2, and data storage or-
ganisation in Subsection 4.11.3. I present my proposed diagonal data aggregation method
for data aggregation in Subsection 4.11.4. I present a B+-tree index generation algorithm
in Subsection 4.11.5. I describe query processing, and types of queries, in Section 4.12.
The Data Repository
An extensive component of the CS is the data repository, which is used for all kinds
of data storage in my architecture. A data repository stores registered CDS during an
online registration process of the DC. Additionally, the data repository stores an indexed,
a partitioned and diagonally aggregated CDS managed by the DSM. The DSM accesses
and manages a data repository for storing, aggregating, querying, and modifying CDSs.
Detailed descriptions of the data repository components are in Section 4.13.
4.8.3 The DR
The DR accesses the CDSs using data querying process. The steps of data querying
are processed on the CS privately in an eﬃcient manner. The DR uses selective approach
to execute data querying process eﬃciently, presented in Subsection 4.15.1. The DR uses
PBR method for privately executing querying results, described in Subsection 4.15.3.
The components of the DR are delineated in Subsection 4.15. The processing steps of an
interaction between the CS and a DR are illustrated in Subsection 4.16.
Section 4.9 elaborates each component of the DC.
110
4.9 The DC Components
This section presents the detail work on each component of the DC. I mention the
components of the DC in Figure 4.2:
Figure 4.2. The DC Components
4.9.1 Online Registration of the DC
In registration phase, the DC registers to a CS as deﬁned an oﬃcial process in Sub-
section 4.10.1. I assume that the DC should use working e-mail id during registration
process. So, the CS can send the notiﬁcation about the CDSs if necessary. For example,
if CDSs are too old, for example, more than 10 years then the CS notiﬁes to the DC to
update the CDSs. If no one DR accesses the CDSs for more than six months and the CS
wants to delete those CDSs then the CS can send notiﬁcation mail to a DC.
4.9.2 Use Data Format and Share Data Set to the CS
Now, the DC is a registered user. The DC wants to contribute data set to a CS.
I assume that the data repository has numeric and nominal data types. The DSM
advertises acceptable XML data format for publishing data sets on the website. The DC
prepares a data set according to the deﬁned XML data format sends to the DSM. XML
provides the integrating heterogeneous data sources for organizing data set into a common
syntax [BF01]. The DC uses SQL syntax to modify the CDS using INSERT, DELETE,
and UPDATE SQL syntax http://www.w3schools.com/sql/sql_intro.asp.
I consider an example 4.9.1 to publish two real privatized CDSs, which are contributed
by the two DCs to the CS as follows:
Example 4.9.1. I consider an example of two CDSs, which are contributed by the two
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DCs to the CS to publish on a data repository. The ﬁrst CDS (Cleveland) has 303 rows
and 14 columns. The second CDS (Hungarian) has 294 rows and 14 columns. I describe
these real data sets in Subsection 3.3.1 of Chapter 3. I privatize these real data sets
using geometric perturbation method as presented in Subsection 3.6.3 of Chapter 3. I
use a geometric perturbation method because, from Section 3.7 of Chapter 3 this method
provides better data privacy and acceptable data utility compared to other methods (See
details in Section 3.7 of Chapter 3).
I use this example in the data bucketization technique and the diagonal data aggre-
gation method in Subsections 4.11.3, and 4.11.4 respectively.
Section 4.10 presents an online registration process, and the DOI components of the
DSM.
4.10 The DSM Components
This section illustrates the description of an online registration and the DOI com-
ponents of the DSM. These components are an online registration component for the
DC presented in Subsection 4.10.1, and use of the DOI component discuss in detail in
Subsection 4.10.2. The components of the DSM are depicted in Figure 4.3:
Figure 4.3. The DSM Components
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4.10.1 Online Registration
This subsection aims to help researchers, partners and liaison oﬃcers understand the
requirements and procedures for setting up a registration or getting access to the online
services. The DSM prepares authorized registration process for the DC. The DC can
be an individual or an organization. I assume that a liaison oﬃcer (as an individual)
represents an organisation. The procedures of registration are the same for an individual
and an organisation. The registration procedure of a DC is described as follows:
Individual registers to the CS using a unique user id and a password.
Organization has the same procedure as an individual, i.e., register with the CS
using a unique id and a password. On behalf of an organisation, a liaison oﬃcer registers
to the CS. When an organisation or an individual need a new data source registration
set up (which is not mentioned on the CS’s data repository), then an organisation or an
individual complete the requirements listed as follows:
1. Requirements
(a) An individual or an organisation should have registration details.
2. How to request for data source account setup
(a) State an organisation name or an individual full name.
(b) Insert the name of a data source is known as a data source user name. This
may be an organisation/individual name or a repository name of an organisa-
tion/individual.
(c) Insert complete name and email address of a primary contact person.
3. The CS reviews a request and creates data source account as requested.
4. Individual/liaison oﬃcer receives an email conﬁrmation from the CS when a request
has been completed.
5. Test the access and response automatically send to the CS (by clicking on a link
sent by the CS) when successful.
6. If an individual, a liaison oﬃcer, or an organisation changes the location then the
registration process details should be updated accordingly.
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4.10.2 The Uses of Digital Object Identiﬁer
I address the data identiﬁcation features by providing DOI (http://www.doi.org/
hb.html). Assigning a DOI to a CDS facilitates a CDS citation and is considered best
practice (http://ands.org.au/cite-data/). When a DC publishes data set, it receives
a DOI, which is an indication of successfully received CDS and identiﬁes the CDS in any
future interaction.
The International DOI Federation (IDF) (http://www.doi.org/doi_handbook/7_
IDF.html) appoints registration agencies who allocate and register DOI names, and pro-
vides the necessary infrastructure to allow registrants to declare and maintain metadata
(http://ands.org.au/guides/doi.html). A DOI consists of a unique, case-insensitive,
alphanumeric character sequence that is divided into two parts, a preﬁx and a suﬃx, sepa-
rated by a forward slash. The DOI preﬁx is composed of a directory indicator followed by
a registrant code. These two components are separated by a full stop. The directory in-
dicator always starts with “10”. This distinguishes it as a DOI as opposed to other types
of support. The second element of the DOI preﬁx is the registrant code which is a unique
string assigned to a registrant. The DOI suﬃx consists of a character string of any length
provided by the registrant (http://www.doi.org/doi_handbook/2_Numbering.html).
Example: 10.1594/PANGAEA.484677
This is a complete DOI name (http://www.doi.org/doi_handbook/2_Numbering.
html). The preﬁx 10.1594 consists of the directory code “10” and the registrant’s code
“1594” which is allocated by the German National Library of Science and Technology
for scientiﬁc data sets in its role as a registration agency. The DC that supplied the
metadata about this object is the Publishing Network for Geoscientiﬁc & Environmental
Data, and it provided the suﬃx “PANGAEA.484677” as its unique identiﬁer for this data
set. Citations for this DOI should be in the form doi:10.1594/PANGAEA.484677, but the
hypertext link should be in this form http://dx.doi.org/10.1594/PANGAEA.484677.
The assignment of a DOI name therefore indicates that a CDS will be well managed
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and accessible for long-term use. It also brands CDSs as a ﬁrst-class research output in
the publishing world since CDSs will be assigned DOIs regularly as is done for existing
scholarly publications.
The data formats and the data organisations of the CDSs are illustrated in Section
4.11.
4.11 Data Storage Management in a Data Reposi-
tory by the DSM
This section continues job descriptions of the DSM for managing CDSs in a data
repository. Data storage management processes are divided into following subsections:
Subsection 4.11.1 presents data format descriptions, Subsection 4.11.2 exhibits advertised
informations on a website for managing the CDS and for the DR to make a data query.
Subsection 4.11.3 describes data organization processes for managing the CDSs, The
proposed diagonal data aggregation (DDA) method illustrated in Subsection 4.11.4, and
B+ tree index algorithm for data storage management mentioned in Subsection 4.11.5.
I discuss in detail components of the DSM in terms of storing and managing the CDSs
on a data repository as follows:
4.11.1 Data Format for the DC
The DSM accepts CDSs only in XML data format. The DSM uses XML data format in
my architecture because XML is the most common tool for data transmissions between all
sorts of applications (http://www.w3schools.com/xml/xml_whatis.asp). XML has be-
come the de-facto standard for information exchange - it works across diﬀerent platforms
and is supported in every development platform that exists today (http://www.oracle.
com/technetwork/issue-archive/2005/05-jan/o15xml-098983.html). XML data
sets can be stored in plain text format, providing a software and hardware-independent
way of storing data sets, and making it easy to create data sets that can be shared by
diﬀerent applications (http://docs.oracle.com/cd/E11882_01/appdev.112/e16659/
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xdb01int.htm#ADXDB3989). Collaborative management requires a large amount of data
sets exchange across diﬀerent management systems. Many data formats with diﬀerent
management systems can be managed collaboratively by ensuring the security and in-
tegrity of data exchange by means of an XML scheme of data sets exchange platform as
presented [Bo14]. Each CDS is described by one or more elements chosen from:
• identiﬁer: a number or a code that identiﬁes the CDS, which is a suﬃx of DOI
(sDOI) as deﬁned in Subsection 4.10.2.
• location: the location of a CDS contains information about the current location of
the document, i.e., URL of a CDS, as deﬁned in Subsection 4.10.2, for example:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1594/PANGAEA.484677.
• coverage: The temporal and geospatial coverage related to the CDS. Geospatial
coverage refers to a geographical area where the CDS was collected, a place, which
is the subject of a collection, or a location, which is the focus of an activity (http://
www.ands.org.au/guides/cpguide/cpgspatial.html). Temporal coverage refers
to time period during which CDS was collected or observations made (http://www.
ands.org.au/guides/cpguide/cpgtemporal.html).
• subject: a term or a phrase representing an area of focus of the CDS.
• description: a text description of the CDS collection.
4.11.2 Data Advertisement on the Website by the DSM
The DSM advertises and maintains modiﬁed (inserted, deleted or updated) CDS on
the website, these points are listed as follows:
(i) Advertises data format for publishing data set to allow access and manage CDSs
for the DC.
(ii) Advertises data types of each attribute of each CDS for the DR to make data
query, for example the DSM uses numerical and nominal data types of each attribute of
each CDS.
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(iii) Advertises name of each CDS and corresponding attributes name to make query
for the DR.
(iv) Advertises the year of each CDS on the website for the DR, therefore the DR
knows how old each CDS that is advertized on the website. I use year information to
store updated CDS in a data repository, as deﬁned in Algorithm 4 of Subsection 4.11.4.
(v) If the CDSs or the attributes of the CDSs are deleted, updated or inserted new
rows or columns on each CDS, then the DSM maintains and advertises the inserted,
updated, or deleted each CDS on the website with updated year, CDSs name, and at-
tributes name. For example: Old CDS entry (year, CDS name, attributes name) is
inserted/deleted/updated to new CDS entry (year, CDS name, attributes name).
Therefore, the DR can see the previous CDS and attributes name with the year, and
also modiﬁed CDS, attributes name with year on the website. The step (v) solves the
problem of if the DR had queried some CDS in the past on this website, and it has now
been removed or updated, how would the DR knows this?
(vi) Advertises encryption method which is supported by the DSM. So, the DR can
use same encryption method to process data query privately.
(vii) Advertises types of queries supported by the DSM. So, the DR uses queries
formats to make data query. If the DR wants to use diﬀerent query format, which is not
advertised on a website then the DR asks (through a mail-id which is mentioned on a
website as a contact detail for the DSM) to the DSM for a speciﬁc data query format.
4.11.3 Data Organization
The data repository contains large distributed CDSs. In a distributed data manage-
ment system, the CDSs are partitioned to achieve scalability and replicated to achieve
fault-tolerance (http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/dn589795.aspx). Most
cloud applications and services store and retrieve data sets as part of their operations.
The design of the data sets stores that an application uses can have a signiﬁcant bear-
ing on the performance, throughput, and scalability of a system. One technique that is
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commonly applied in large-scale systems is to divide the CDSs into separate partitions to
optimize query performance [AAAD10]. So, I use partitioning method to partition each
CDS to query eﬃciently the CDS. The existing research studies [HMT04], [WAA14],
[HILM02] use the data bucketization algorithms, these algorithms use equi-depth, equi-
width, and wavelet-based partitioning methods [Ioa03], [PSC84] to partition attribute of
a data set. In the data bucketization approach, an attribute domain is partitioned into
a set of buckets, each of which is identiﬁed by a unique random number is known as
bucket-id. In my architecture, the DSM partitions each CDS into subset of that CDS
which is a collection of attributes instead of an attribute partitioning. The data bucke-
tization technique decomposes each CDS into more manageable parts. The partition of
each CDS corresponds to a splitting of its domain into a set of buckets. This function
divides an ordered partition into a speciﬁed number of groups called buckets, and assigns
a bucket number to each bucket.
Data Formats used by the DSM to manage CDS
In my setup I assume that the DSM accepts only XML data format as deﬁned in
Subsection 4.11.1. The DSM receives CDSs in XML data format. Then, the DSM
converts each XML format CDS in table format CDS using Java parsing method (http:
//docs.oracle.com/cd/B10501_01/appdev.920/a96621/adx04paj.htm) to easy data
querying evaluation and to manage CDS on a data repository. So, each XML format
CDS is organized in a table format CDS on a data repository by the DSM. These table
format of CDSs are re-interpreted as matrices and may have entirely diﬀerent types of
entries. I use this matrix format for each CDS in data bucketization technique to partition
into rectangular sub-matrices as buckets.
Bucket: In my context, I deﬁne a bucket to be storage of one or a set of rows of a
matrix, which contains entries from some sets. Each bucket has an associated description
which deﬁnes a region of the CDS elements, and which is called the boundary of the
bucket. All CDS elements in a bucket must be in the associated region. Each bucket
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contains a unique number in increasing order such as 1, 2, 3, and so on, which are called
the bucket-ids.
These bucket-ids are maintained as an index in Subsection 4.11.5, and are utilized by
the DSM to process the data queries. Since I use rectangular sub-matrices as buckets,
each bucket can be considered to be a set of rows of a matrix containing entries from
some set. I organize each CDS into buckets because (i) to enable more eﬃcient queries:
bucketing imposes extra structure on the table, which provides an advantage of when
performing certain queries; (ii) to make sampling more eﬃcient. When working with
large CDSs, it is very convenient to queries on a fraction of the CDS while you are in the
process of developing or reﬁning them.
Data Bucketization Setup
In my data bucketization algorithm setup, each CDS is partitioned using an arbitrary
partitioning method [YP12a], [JW05], [PR07] that is, the rows and columns of each bucket
can vary. Each CDS is partitioned into buckets. The boundary value of each bucket is
decided by the DSM using an illustrated method in “Bucket Boundaries”, description
given in below “Data Bucketization Technique”. Each bucket for each CDS is managed
using the DDA method (deﬁned in Subsection 4.11.4), and I get an aggregated matrix.
Each bucket is stored diagonally and rest of an aggregated matrix’s elements are ﬁlled
with 0s.
I need to develop some notations to present data storage management in a data
repository. An aggregated matrix is denoted as M . The size of a M is not ﬁxed, it can
vary. To simplify the presentation of a M , I assume that a M contains m rows and n
columns. Columns of a M are denoted as 1, 2, ...., n. Rows of a M are denoted as 1, 2,
...., m. The locations of each element of each bucket of a M are denoted as 11, 12, 13,
...., mn. I assume the number of buckets are d for simple description, but the number of
buckets are not ﬁxed. A bucket is denoted as B. I have d buckets, so I use this notation
∑d
i=1Bi to refer to all d buckets. When a new request will enter by the DC to publish a
data set then d will be changed by the DSM, and a M will be managed accordingly. Each
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CDS has an unique identity ﬁeld, which is called sDOI, described in Subsection 4.10.2.
These sDOIs for each bucket are denoted as
∑d
i=1 sDOIi. This unique identity number
distinguishes each CDS. Each bucket is sorted and stored by year denoted as
∑d
i=1 yi.
The DSM associates an index to each bucket, denoted as
∑d
i=1 Ii called bucket-ids. Now,
I illustrate the use of the data bucketization technique for managing each bucket on a
data repository.
Data Bucketization Technique
The data bucketization technique is used to partition each CDS into more manageable
parts. The CDSs are partitioned into d buckets
∑d
i=1Bi in a data repository. An aggre-
gated matrix M , which is a set of d buckets, satisﬁes the following properties [HDJ+13]:
(i) these buckets taken together cover the all attributes of a M ; and (ii) any two buckets
do not overlap.
I denote boundary of each bucket by using starting position of each bucket
∑d
i=1Bi.start and end position of each bucket
∑d
i=1Bi.end. I describe my data bucketi-
zation technique in Subsection 4.11.4. The boundary value of each bucket is deﬁned as
{∑di=1Bi: (∑di=1Bi.start,∑di=1Bi.end)}. As I mentioned in Subsection 4.11.3, I use rect-
angular sub-matrices as buckets. So, each starting position of each bucket
∑d
i=1Bi.start
contains location of a ﬁrst element of each bucket, Similarly, each end position of each
bucket
∑d
i=1Bi.end contains location of a last element of each bucket.
In the literature work [KW99], techniques have been studied extensively in the context
of estimating the costs of diﬀerent query execution plans. The two broad categories of
techniques are deﬁned: histogram-based that capture statistical information about a
distribution by means of counters for a speciﬁed number of buckets, and parametric that
approximate a distribution by ﬁtting the parameters of a given type of function. There
are several histogram-based techniques [Ioa03], including equi-depth, equi-width, and
wavelet-based methods studied in the literature [PSC84].
As in the paper [KW99], I also calculate bucket boundary values of each bucket, which
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provide the optimum cost of each bucket. I use the minimum description length (MDL)
principle [Ris89] to decide bucket boundary values of each bucket. I illustrate methods
to determine bucket boundary values of each bucket, as follows:
Steps of Partitioning of each CDS into Buckets This section explains the parti-
tioning of each CDS into buckets using bucket boundaries methods. I use bucket bound-
aries methods on the CDS to ﬁnd the position for partitioning each CDS. The partitioned
CDS will give the optimum cost. The “Bucket Boundaries” methods are described in the
following steps:
Step-1: The DSM considers each CDS as a bucket. In Subsection 4.11.3 I mention
that CDSs are re-interpreted as matrices. The DSM considers the starting and end
positions of the CDS to partition into submatrix. Each CDS is recursively split into ﬁner
partitions. Each partition of a bucket reduces the maximum deviation from the density
function within the newly formed buckets when compared to their parent bucket.
Each bucket {∑di=1Bi: (∑di=1Bi.start, ∑di=1Bi.end)} is a discrete set. The set S of
integers in the interval [1, n], where n is an integers > 1, but it can vary. I partition this
set of integers S = {1, 2, 3, ...., n} into B1 = {1, 2, ...., nb1}, B2 = {nb1+1, nb1+2, ...., nb2},
...., Bd = {nbd−1 + 1, nbd−1 + 2, ...., n}. I divide each CDS for each position s into number
of buckets. Next, for each position s in the bucket, I compute its expected value if the
positions were distributed according to the density distribution. Then split each bucket
for each position s that has the largest deviation from its expected value.
Step-2: In this step, I calculate the cost of each bucket
∑d
i=1Bi. The DSM uses
“bucket boundaries” methods as described in the Section 4 of the paper [AKSX04] to
calculate at which position the DSM can partition the CDS, these steps are illustrated
as follows:
a. The DSM will use a CDS whole as a bucket and use the starting position and
end position of a CDS, and partition at position s into two buckets using the MDL
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principle [Ris89] to decide bucket boundary values of each bucket, and partition the CDS
at position s into two buckets.
b. Repeat this process until the DSM gets the optimum cost of each bucket.
Explanation of bucketization technique using Example 4.9.1 I use the data
bucketization technique in an Example 4.9.1 on considered two CDSs i.e Cleveland and
Hungarian CDSs. I partition Cleveland CDS and Hungarian CDS into buckets. The
steps are as follows:
Step-1 (a) The DSM partitions Cleveland CDS which is a 303× 14 array, using an
arbitrary partitioning method into four buckets B1, B2, B3, B4 of sizes 115× 10, 230× 4,
115× 10, and 73× 4 respectively.
Figure 4.4. Cleveland CDS from Example 4.9.1 is Partitioned into Buckets using an
Arbitrary Partitioning Method
Step-1 (b) Step 1(a) is repeated for Hungarian CDS which is a 294 × 14 array. In
this case, the DSM constructs four buckets B5, B6, B7, B8 of sizes 63 × 14, 231 × 4,
115× 10, and 116× 10 respectively.
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Figure 4.5. Hungarian CDS from Example 4.9.1 is Partitioned into Buckets using an
Arbitrary Partitioning Method
4.11.4 The Proposed - Diagonal Data Aggregation Method
I propose a new data aggregation method for storing and managing CDSs called as
“diagonal data aggregation (DDA)” method, which is presented in Algorithm 4. Exist-
ing solutions have focused on the horizontal and the vertical partitioning methods for
aggregating data sets [MFHL10], [JX09], [KC04b], [VC03], [VCKP08], [SC13]. These
solutions cannot provide data modiﬁcation operations i.e. data deletion, data insertion
and data updation eﬃciently. I comparatively analysed these vertical, horizontal and
the proposed DDA methods in Subsection 4.17.2. The DDA method provides the eﬃ-
cient results in data modiﬁcation operations compare to the horizontal and the vertical
partitioning methods with acceptable data privacy and acceptable data utility, which is
illustrated in Table 4.1 of Subsection 4.17.2.
In my scenario, I can choose distributed data sets such as weather, heart disease,
patient record, employee record, and ﬁnancial data sets. I have not ﬁxed the dimension
of the CDSs. Due to heterogeneous data sets, I use properties of an arbitrary partitioning
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method in my DDA method. Arbitrary partitioning method is introduced in [JW05] and
several authors use this method [VXZ12], [JW05], [PR07], [YP12a] for data aggregation.
My arbitrary partitioned CDSs satisfy the properties of the data bucketization technique
as deﬁned in Subsection 4.11.3.
Figure 4.6. Diagonal Data Aggregation (DDA) Method
Each bucket has diﬀerent dimension, i.e rows and columns sizes are arbitrary. Each
bucket is stored in a diagonal way, known as DDA method based on an arbitrary par-
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titioned bucket properties. The DSM decides each bucket boundary value according to
the deﬁned bucket boundaries method presented in Subsection 4.11.3.
I describe my DDA method ﬁrst using an example and then present the proposed
DDA algorithm in Algorithm 4. I consider the same example, which is presented in
an Example 4.9.1 of Subsection 4.9.2. The ﬁrst Cleveland CDS with 303 rows and 14
columns, and the second Hungarian CDS with 294 rows and 14 columns. These CDSs are
partitioned into buckets, which are depicted in Figures 4.4 and 4.5 of Subsection 4.11.3.
In data aggregation step the buckets are now placed in a 1058× 76 matrix M along the
diagonal and the remaining entries are ﬁlled with 0’s as shown in Figure 4.6. The size
of the ‘M ’ is considered to be the dimensions of the corresponding matrix, for which I
generally use m× n.
Figure 4.6 depicts an aggregated matrix M . Each eight bucket is stored in a diagonal
order. The last row numbers of each stored bucket in a DDA method are: 115 for B1,
345 for B2, 460 for B3, 533 for B4, 596 for B5, 827 for B6, 942 for B7, and 1048 for B8. In
Figure 4.6, B1 is partitioned from 1 to 10, B2 from 11 to 14, B3 from 15 to 24, B4 from 25
to 38, B5 from 39 to 52, B6 from 53 to 56, B7 from 57 to 66, and B8 from 67 to 76. The
boundary value of each bucket is a starting position of each bucket and an end position of
each bucket i.e. boundary values for B1 is (11, 11510), for B2 is (11611, 34514), for B3 is
(34615, 46024), for B4 is (46125, 53338), for B5 is (53439, 59652), for B6 is (59753, 82756),
for B7 is (82857, 94266), and for B8 is (94367, 105876). Now, I present my proposed DDA
algorithm in Algorithm 4 as follows:
The DDA Data Storage Method using an Arbitrary Data Partitioning Method
I use data bucketization technique, which uses an arbitrary data partitioning method
to partition each CDS into buckets, which is described in Subsection 4.11.3. In this seg-
ment, I propose my DDA method which aggregates the partitioned buckets in manageable
and eﬃcient manner in Algorithm 4.
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Data: each d buckets
∑d
i=1Bi, bucket boundaries of each d bucket (
∑d
i=1Bi.start,∑d
i=1Bi.end), sDOI values of each d bucket
∑d
i=1 sDOIi, year of each d bucket
∑d
i=1 yi,
bucket-id of each d bucket
∑d
i=1 Ii
Result: partitioned, sorted and indexed a matrix M with rows m, columns n
1: Partition each CDS into d buckets using the data bucketization technique, deﬁned in Sub -
section 4.11.3.
2: Store each d bucket
∑d
i=1Bi in a matrix M using diagonal order as depicted in the Figure 4.6.
3: Each d bucket
∑d
i=1Bi is sorted in increasing order and stored by year
∑d
i=1 yi in a matrix
M .
4: Calculate bucket boundary values for each d bucket (
∑d
i=1Bi.start,
∑d
i=1Bi.end) in a matrix
M .
5: Store each d bucket
∑d
i=1Bi with bucket boundary values (
∑d
i=1Bi.start,
∑d
i=1Bi.end) in a
matrix M .
6: Use
∑d
i=1 sDOIi for each d bucket
∑d
i=1Bi in a matrix M .
7: If two or more than two buckets have the same year then the buckets are stored in First
Come First Serve (FCFS) order otherwise stored in an increasing year wise order.
8: Assign bucket-ids
∑d
i=1 Ii to each d bucket
∑d
i=1Bi as an index.
9: Fill the other elements of a matrix M with 0s.
10: I get an aggregated matrix M .
11: Repeat above Steps if new CDS will contribute to the CS.
Algorithm 4: Diagonal Data Aggregation Method
4.11.5 B+-Tree based Index Generation Algorithm
An index is a supplementary data structure used to eﬃciently access CDSs in the
data repository. Generally, CDSs are indexed by the values of one or more attributes.
In my architecture, I partition each CDS into d buckets and the DSM assigns bucket-ids
to each d bucket, as deﬁned in Algorithm 4 of Subsection 4.11.4. Indexes are typically
organized into tree structures, such as B+-tree [Com79]. A B+-tree is a type of a tree,
which represents the sorted data sets in a way that allows for eﬃcient insertion, retrieval
and removal of the data sets values, each of which is identiﬁed by an index [PZM13],
[DVJ+03]. Internal or non-leaf nodes of a B+-tree do not contain data sets values; they
only maintain references to children or leaf nodes. Data sets values are either stored in
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the leaf nodes, or the leaf nodes maintain references to the corresponding rows in the
data repository. Furthermore, the leaf nodes of a B+-tree may be linked together to
enable sequential data sets access during range queries [HMCK12] over an index; range
queries return all data sets values with an index attribute value in a speciﬁed range. I
use a B+-tree for maintaining indexes in the data repository.
Now, I present an index generation algorithm for each d bucket stored on a data
repository using a B+ tree method. First I deﬁne the concept of my B+-tree index
method in an Figure 4.7:
Figure 4.7. B+-Tree Index generated using Bucket-ids
Figure 4.7 is a B+-tree index generated using bucket-ids. These bucket-ids are deﬁned
in an Algorithm 4 of Subsection 4.11.4. A B+-tree is generated using bucket-ids 1, 2, 3,
4, .., 10, which are depicted in Figure 4.7. The leaf node of the tree contains sDOI values,
12345, and 78145 (12345 and 78145 are sDOI values of Cleveland CDS and Hungarian
CDS respectively) and bucket boundary values correspond to each bucket (for B1 is
(11, 11510), for B2 is (11611, 34514), for B3 is (34615, 46024), for B4 is (46125, 53338),
for B5 is (53439, 59652), for B6 is (59753, 82756), for B7 is (82857, 94266), and for B8 is
(94367, 105876)), which are stored in a diagonal order using an Algorithm 4 of Subsection
4.11.4. Each leaf node of a B+-tree has two ﬁelds. The ﬁrst ﬁeld contains data values,
which are in my case sDOI values and bucket boundary values correspond to each bucket.
The second ﬁeld contains a pointer, which points to the next bucket. This pointer
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is implemented as the same as the pointer in the standard B+-tree [TSWZ11]. This
property makes the query eﬃcient and save storage costs for the DSM.
As depicted in Figure 4.6 of Subsection 4.11.4, each eight bucket B1, B2, B3, B4, B5,
B6, B7, and B8 is stored in a diagonal order. These buckets are stored with the bucket-ids
and bucket boundary values. The DSM provides bucket-ids to each bucket is presented
in increasing order i.e. 1, 2, ...., 8. My B+-tree is used these bucket-ids and generated
an index algorithm to manage each bucket of an M .
I present the B+-tree index algorithm based on bucket-ids, sDOI values, and bucket
boundary values, which satisﬁes the standard B+-tree algorithm [TSWZ11]. Recall the
notations from the proposed DDA Algorithm 4 of Subsection 4.11.4, which are used in
an Algorithm 5. The algorithm is presented as follows:
Data: each d buckets
∑d
i=1Bi, bucket boundary values of each d bucket (
∑d
i=1Bi.start,∑d
i=1Bi.end), sDOI values of each d bucket
∑d
i=1 sDOIi, bucket-ids of each d bucket∑d
i=1 Ii
Result: B+-Tree Index of each d bucket
∑d
i=1Bi
1: Use bucket boundary values of each d bucket
∑d
i=1 Ii from an Algorithm 4 of Subsection
4.11.4.
2: Use sDOI values of each d bucket
∑d
i=1 sDOIi from an Algorithm 4 of Subsection 4.11.4.
3: Use bucket-ids of each d bucket
∑d
i=1 Ii from an Algorithm 4 of Subsection 4.11.4.
4: Create B+-tree using bucket-ids of each d bucket
∑d
i=1 Ii.
5: Store bucket boundary values for each d bucket (
∑d
i=1Bi.start,
∑d
i=1Bi.end), and sDOI
values of each d bucket
∑d
i=1 sDOIi in each data ﬁeld of B+ tree.
//Each data ﬁeld for each d bucket is stored in leaf node
//The pointer is the same as the pointer in the standard B+ tree
Algorithm 5: B+-Tree Index Generation Algorithm
Section 4.12 demonstrates the query processing components of the DSM.
4.12 Query Processing by the DSM
This section is divided into two parts. The ﬁrst part illustrates the processing steps of
requested data queries by the DR. The second part presents the types of queries, which
are supported by the DSM.
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As the DR uses selective encryption approach as deﬁned in Subsection 4.15.1. The DR
splits each data query into two subqueries, which are called public and private subqueries.
As recall from the Subsection 4.15.1, the public subquery contains tables name and
attributes name. These attributes and tables name are advertised on a website, which
are illustrated in Subsection 4.11.2. Additionally, the data types of each attribute are also
advertised on a website as described in Subsection 4.11.2. The private subquery contains
sensitive data which is not disclosed to the DSM. The DR uses an encryption method
(called as query generation) which is deﬁned in Algorithm 6 of Subsection 4.15.3. The
DR uses the encryption method which is advertised on a website by the DSM is described
in Subsection 4.11.2.
The steps to process the data queries are explained as follows:
Step-1: The DSM receives public subquery from the DR. The data query is in an
SQL query format. The types of queries format are advertised on a website, which are
described in Subsection 4.11.2. The DSM receives public subquery and checks sDOI
values of each requested table, which is stored on a data repository and described in
Subsection 4.13.3. The DSM gets sDOI values of each requested table.
Step-2: The DSM uses sDOI values and searches on aB+-tree as deﬁned in Figure 4.7
and Algorithm 5. The DSM sorts the buckets, which have sDOI values of each requested
table, and gets bucket-ids and bucket boundary values of those sort-listed buckets. These
bucket-ids are indexes in our architecture.
Step-3: The DSM uses bucket boundary values and gets requested attributes from
an aggregated matrix, which is deﬁned in Algorithm 4 of Subsection 4.11.4. The DSM
sends public subquery results with the corresponding indexes to the DR.
Step-4: The DR generates private subquery using public subquery result and indexes,
and sends the private subquery which contains the encrypted sensitive data. The DSM
receives the private subquery and starts to process the private subquery. The DSM
knows an encryption method. So, the DSM performs the decryption (called as response
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generation algorithm), which is deﬁned in an Algorithm 7 of Subsection 4.15.3. The
DSM generates the output of the requested private subquery without seeing the requested
query. The DSM uses the sort listed buckets from the Step-2 and uses bucket boundary
values of each bucket to process data query privately. These buckets are stored on a
diagonal order, which are illustrated in a DDA Algorithm 4. The DSM gets the response
from an aggregated matrix and sends the output to the DR.
In summary, the DSM uses these steps (1) - (4) to process each data query. I explain
the DSM query processing steps using the examples in types of queries Subsection 4.12.1.
4.12.1 Types of Queries
I examine the query execution scenario of typical equality, range, nested, order by,
join, and aggregation data queries. The DSM supports these data queries in my archi-
tecture. The basic form of an SQL query consists of the SELECT, FROM, and WHERE
clauses (see an Example 4.12.1). The SELECT clause produces a relation consisting of
the attributes. The FROM clause performs a cross product operation on the tables, each
of the resulting row has all the attributes of all the tables. The WHERE clause selects the
rows from the cross product that satisfy a given condition or predicate P . The predicate
P is a boolean expression on constants and the attributes. Also, WHERE clause involves
comparison operators =, <>, <, >, ≤, ≥ as well as logical operators AND, OR, and
NOT.
Example 4.12.1. SELECT <attribute list>
FROM <table list>
WHERE <condition>;
where, <attribute list> is a list of attributes name whose values are to be retrieved
by the data query, <table list> is a lists of the tables name required to process the data
query, and <condition> is a condition (Boolean) expression that identities the row to be
retrieved by the data query.
Another clause of interest to my work is the GROUP BY and HAVING clauses. These
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clauses are similar to the WHERE clause; however, it allows aggregate expressions, such
as SUM(∗) and COUNT(∗), in its predicate expressions. Now, I delineate the types of
queries, which are supported by the DSM. Additionally, I present the examples for each
query using Cleveland and Hungarian CDSs which are presented in an Example 4.9.1
of Subsection 4.9.2. These CDSs are partitioned and aggregated, which are deﬁned in
Figure 4.6 of Subsection 4.11.4, and indexed as deﬁned in Figure 4.7 of Subsection 4.11.5.
1. SubString Pattern Matching Query
In this query, the comparison conditions on only parts of a character/numeric string,
using LIKE comparison operator. This can be used for string pattern matching.
Example 4.12.2. Query-1 (SubString Pattern Matching Query): SELECT Trestbps
FROM Hungarian WHERE Trestbps LIKE ‘%2%’;
2. ORDER BY Query
SQL allows the DR to request the rows in the result of a query by the values of one
or more attributes, using the ORDER BY clause.
Example 4.12.3. Query-2 (ORDER BY Query): SELECT Thalach FROM Cleveland
WHERE Age = ‘45’ ORDER BY Thalach ASC;
3. Nested Query
The queries require that existing values in the data repository be fetched and then
used in a comparison condition. Such queries can be conveniently formulated by using
nested queries, which are SELECT-FROM-WHERE blocks within WHERE clause of
another query. That other query is called the outer query.
Example 4.12.4. Query-3 (Nested Query): SELECT CP, age FROM Cleveland WHERE
age IN (SELECT age FROM Cleveland WHERE Sex= ‘1’);
4. Join Query
The concept of joined table was incorporated into SQL to permit users to specify a
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table resulting from a join operation in the FROM clause of a query. Join queries are
performed on two tables or two partitions in an aggregated table.
Example 4.12.5. Query-4 (Join Query): SELECT Age, Sex, Thalach FROM Cleveland,
Hungarian WHERE Cleveland.Age = Hungarian.Age;
5. Range Query
To ﬁnd the rows whose index values fall in a bucket boundary range (
∑d
i=1Bi.start,∑d
i=1Bi.end) I locate all indexes in the leaf nodes. Then, I get the addresses of the
partitioned CDS associated with these indexes. I retrieve the answer rows from diagonally
stored partitioned CDS.
Example 4.12.6. Query-5 (Range Query): SELECT Thalach FROM Cleveland WHERE
Thalach BETWEEN 50 AND 140;
6. Aggregation Query
An aggregation query involving selection on index attributes can be processed by ﬁrst
performing a range query on the index attributes and then performing aggregation on the
result rows of the range query. Aggregation functions are COUNT, SUM, MAX, MIN
and AVG.
Example 4.12.7. Query-6 (Aggregation Query): SELECT AVG(CP) FROM Hungarian
WHERE Age= ‘54’;
Explanations of the examples of each query type in below as follows:
Step-1: As deﬁned in an Example 4.15.1 of Subsection 4.15.1, the DR uses public
subquery in SELECT and FROM clause, and the private subquery is in after WHERE
clause.
Step-2: In each query Example 4.12.2, 4.12.3, 4.12.4, 4.12.5, 4.12.6, and 4.12.7, the
DR uses SELECT, FROM and WHERE clause. From step-1, I know that the public
subquery will be in SELECT and FROM clause. The private subquery will be in after
WHERE clause.
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Step-3: The DR sends public subquery i.e. SELECT and FROM clause of SQL
syntax to the DSM. In each example 4.12.2, 4.12.3, 4.12.4, 4.12.5, 4.12.6, and 4.12.7,
the DSM uses Step-1, 2, and 3 from Subsection 4.12, and processes the public subquery.
At the end of this step, the DSM sends public subquery results with the corresponding
indexes to the DR for each example.
Step-4: The DR sends private subquery in each example i.e after the WHERE
clause. This subquery is in an encrypted form. The DR uses query generation algorithm
as deﬁned in Algorithm 6 of Subsection 4.15.3 to encrypt each private subquery and sends
to the DSM. The DSM uses step-4 of the Subsection 4.12 and sends the private subquery
results to the DR without seeing the contents of the private subquery.
Step-5: The DR uses response retrieval Algorithm 8 of Subsection 4.15.3 and obtains
the data query result.
The Section ahead 4.13 presents the detail works on the data repository components.
4.13 Data Repository Components
Figure 4.8. Data Repository Components
This section illustrates the description of each data repository component. The data
repository is designed to allow researchers and organisations to publish the data sets.
The data repository provides data storage of CDSs and registers data entries for each
DC. The components of the data repository are depicted in Figure 4.8. The components
of the data repository are described as follows:
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4.13.1 Data Storage of Online Registration Details of the DC
The data repository stores registration details of the DC. Online registration process
is maintained by the DSM, which is characterized in Subsection 4.10.1. The DC accesses
registration link, follows the instruction, which is mentioned by the DSM described in
Subsection 4.10.1 and registers to the CS. At the point when DC accesses the link and
submits the subtle elements of registration process, these data are stored on a data
repository. Data repository is responsible for storing registered data.
4.13.2 Data Storage of the CDSs
This component of the data repository maintains the data storage of the CDSs. The
DC maintains the CDSs according to the advertised data format on a website by the
DSM. As described data format in Subsection 4.11.1, the DC prepares a data set in XML
format with the necessary information of the data set: location, coverage, subject, and
description ﬁelds (as illustrated in Subsection 4.11.1), and submits these informations in
the CS. The DSM gets a CDS and associated informations of a CDS, converts into a
table format, and stores each CDS on a data repository.
4.13.3 Data storage of the sDOI values
The DC publishes a CDS on a CS and gets a DOI (digital object identiﬁer) value,
described in Subsection 4.10.2, which is an evidence of successfully received a CDS. The
sDOI values are stored on a data repository for each CDS by the DSM to manage each
CDS, as illustrated in Subsection 4.10.2.
Section 4.14 illustrates the steps of an interaction between the CS and a DC.
4.14 Interaction Between the CS and a DC
This section describes the communication processing steps between the CS and a DC.
The DSM and the data repository are two main functions of a CS. These two functions
are used to manage and process each step of communication between the CS and a DC.
The communication steps are presented in Figure 4.9:
Steps of the communication between the CS and a DC are described as follows:
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Figure 4.9. Processing Steps of Interaction between the CS and a DC
Step-1: The DC ﬁrst registers to a CS using an authorized registration process,
described in Subsection 4.10.1.
Step-2: At the CS end, the DSM receives registration details, checks details and
stores in a data repository.
Step-3: The DSM sends notiﬁcation to a DC after successful registration.
Step-4: The DC accesses XML data format from the website, described in Subsection
4.11.1 and prepares a data set accordingly. Then, the DC publishes a data set to the CS.
Step-5: The DSM veriﬁes the data format of a CDS, which is sent by the DC to
publish. If a CDS is prepared according to the mentioned data format then the DSM
stores the CDS in a data repository. Otherwise, the DSM denies a request for publishing
the data set of the DC.
Step-6: The DSM sends notiﬁcation of the CDS stored successfully. Additionally,
the DSM sends DOI value of the stored CDS to the DC.
Section 4.15 presents the description of each component of the DR.
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4.15 The DR Components
This section demonstrates each component of the DR. The components of the DR in-
clude use of the privacy preserving data querying method, and execute the data querying
steps. The DR components are summarized in Figure 4.10:
Figure 4.10. The DR Components
The description of each component of the DR is described as follows:
The DR uses Selective Private Data Querying method. Firstly, the DR ac-
cesses tables, attributes name, data types, encryption method, and types of queries format
from the website which are advertised by the DSM, which are presented in Subsection
4.11.2. Then, the DR employs selective private data querying method to get a data query
result from the CS in privacy preserving manner. Now, I introduce the use of selective
approach in data querying method.
4.15.1 Selective-Single-Database PBR from V-DGHV Method
I use the selective encryption [SZBB12b] approach to process data querying method
eﬃciently. According to the selective encryption method, I divide SQL data query into
two parts. The ﬁrst part contains tables and attributes name, which are the public
subquery. The second part of the data query contains sensitive data, which are the
private subquery. I use Single-Database PBR from V-DGHV data querying method on a
private subquery to process data query privately, which is presented in Subsection 4.15.3.
For example,
Example 4.15.1. SELECT “attributes name” FROM “tables name” WHERE “condition
which contains sensitive data i.e. private subquery”
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The public subquery part of an Example 4.15.1 is “SELECT attributes name FROM
tables name. The private subquery contains the predicate conditions containing sensitive
data i.e. after the WHERE clause in an Example 4.15.1.
The DR uses query generation Algorithm 6 of Subsection 4.15.3 on the private sub-
query. For brevity, I use the WHERE clause; a similar processing procedure applies to
the HAVING clause. The DR sends an encrypted private subquery to the DSM to re-
trieve the rows of interest from the subquery result privately. Now, the DR gets query
results. But, the DSM only accepts XML data format as mentioned in Subsection 4.11.1.
So, the DSM uses XML data format for querying results and sends to the DR. The DR
gets query results in XML format. To get the results in the table format to easy further
evaluation, the DR uses Java parsing methods as deﬁned in Subsection 4.11.1 to read
data in a table format.
The important beneﬁts of selective encryption approach as compare with the previous
approach [TKMZ13] are the optimizations realizable from having the data repository, ex-
ecute the public subquery, and the fewer numbers of PBR operations required to retrieve
the data of interest. In addition, the PBR operations are performed against subset of
query which will usually be smaller than the complete data query. So, the computation
cost is smaller than other existing methods [WAA14], [HDJ+13], [WLZ+13].
Use of Private Block Retrieval method
The DR uses single-database PBR method on private subquery as this part contains
sensitive data. The DR wants to hide the private subquery data from the DSM but at
the same time the DR gets the results of the private subquery from the DSM.
The PIR allows a DR to retrieve the ith bit of an n-bit data repository without
revealing to the DSM the value of i. The PBR protocol, a natural and more practical
extension of PIR in which the user retrieves a block of bits, instead of retrieving single
bit. In 2013, Yi et al. propose a practical PBR protocol from the FHE [YKPB13]. Yi
et al., extend Gentry’s basic idea [Gen09a] to a PBR protocol, where the the DR, who
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wishes to retrieve the ith block from a database with m blocks, sends to the DSM the
encryption of the index i, and the sends back the encryption of the ith block computed
by fully homomorphic properties, as if the DR sends the index i and the DSM replies the
ith block. It can be seen that this solution is conceptually simpler than any existing PBR
protocols without FHE. Yi et al. give a variant of Dijk et al.’s somewhat homomorphic
encryption scheme, from which they construct a practical PBR protocol [YKPB13].
I use Yi et al. proposed PBR protocol on the private subquery for processing data
query privately.
4.15.2 V-DGHV Scheme
I present the proposed Yi et al.’s variant of DGHV somewhat scheme (V-DGHV)
[YKPB13] in this subsection.
An obstruct to make the DGHV somewhat scheme practical is the size of the public
keys. For the purpose of PBR, the DSM does not need to perform any encryption
operation except from some addition and multiplication operations of ciphertexts which
require x0 only. In addition, the DR, who generates the private key p, is able to encrypt
the index of the interested block directly by using the secret key p and public key x0.
Therefore, the public keys x1, x2, ...., xτ become redundant in PBR. In view of this, Yi
et al. introduce a variant of the DGHV somewhat scheme (V-DGHV) for PBR with a
database of m blocks as follows:
1. KeyGen λ: The DR takes a security parameter λ and determines a parameter set
ρ = λ, η = (λ + 3) logm, γ = 5(λ + 3) logm/2. Chooses a random odd η-bit
integer p from (2Z + 1) ∩ (2n−1, 2n) as the secret key sk. Randomly chooses q0
from (2Z + 1) ∩ [1, 2γ/p) and sets x0 = q0p. The public key is pk = x0.
2. Encrypt(pk,M): To encrypt M ∈ 0, 1, the DR, who knows the secret key sk = p,
randomly chooses q from [1, 2γ/p) and an integer r from (−2ρ, 2ρ) and outputs the
ciphertext.
c = E(M, pk) = (M + 2.r + q.p)modx0 (4.15.1)
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3. Decrypt(sk, c): With the secret key p, the user decrypts a ciphertext as the DGHV
somewhat scheme, that is,
M = D(c, sk) = (cmodp)mod2 (4.15.2)
4. Homomorphic addition (Add): Using the public key x0, the DSM adds two
ciphertexts c1 and c2 as the DGHV somewhat scheme, that is,
Add(c1, c2) = (c1 + c2)modx0 (4.15.3)
5. Homomorphic multiplication (Mult): Using the public key x0, the DSM mul-
tiplies two ciphertexts c1 and c2 as the DGHV somewhat scheme, that is,
Mult(c1, c2) = (c1.c2)modx0 (4.15.4)
Like the DGHV somewhat scheme, the choice of parameters in the variant scheme
achieves at least 2λ security against all of known attacks, which is presented in the paper
[YKPB13].
4.15.3 Practical Single-Database PBR from V-DGHV Scheme
Yi et al. proposed Practical Single-Database PBR from V-DGHV Scheme. I use
this protocol in my architecture. The DR uses this method for privately process data
query. The DR uses this method on private subquery as deﬁned in Section 4.16. Yi et
al. [YKPB13] assume that an n-bit data repository DB is equally partitioned into m
blocks, denoted as, DB = B1‖B2‖....‖Bm, the practical single-database PBR from the
variant of DGHV scheme is described in Algorithms 6, 7, and 8.
The correctness and security properties of this practical single-database PBR from
V-DGHV scheme is proved by Yi et al. in the paper [YKPB13].
Yi et al. assumed that database DB is equally partitioned into m blocks, denoted
as, DB = B1‖B2‖....‖Bm. In my architecture, I use arbitrary partitioning method, but I
used the same protocol of Yi et al. in my architecture for privately process data query.
Let DB denotes data repository stored at the CS and n its size in bits. In my case,
the DSM partitions DB into d blocks, each block is denoted as Bj (j = 1, ...., d). These
blocks are the buckets in my setup.
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Data: The number m of blocks in the database DB, an index i ∈ [1,m], KG, E, and a security
parameter k
Result: A Query Q = (x0, E(i, pk)) and a secret sk = p, where (x0, p) is a public and private
key pair for the V-DGHV scheme
1: (The DR) generates a public and private key pair (x0, p) with the key generation algorithm
(KG) of the V-DGHV scheme and the security parameter k.
2: Assume that the binary representation of i is α1, α2,...., αl, where αi{0, 1} and l = logm.
(The DR) encrypts each αj with the public key x0, denoted as αˆj = E(αj , x0) =
(αj + 2.rj + qj .p)modx0, where rj and qj are randomly chosen on the basis of V-DGHV
scheme. Let E(i, x0) = (αˆ1, αˆ2, ....., αˆl).
3: Output the query Q = (x0, E(i, x0)) and a secret sk = p.
Algorithm 6: Query Generation QG(m, i, 1k)
Data: An n-bit database DB = B1‖B2‖....‖Bm, where Bj = (bj,1, bj,2, ...., bj,L) and L = n/m,
a query Q = (x0, E(i, x0)), E, Add, Mult, and a security parameter k
Result: A response R
1: For each index j  [1,m], (the DSM) writes j in the binary representation βj,1, βj,2, ....,
βj,L. (The DSM) computes
γˆj =
l∏
t=1
(αˆt + (betaj,t
⊕
1))modx0
2: For each c  [1, L], (the DSM) computes
Rc =
∑
bj,c=1
γˆjmodx0
3: Output the response
R = (R1, R2, ...., RL)
Algorithm 7: Response Generation RG(DB,Q, 1k)
Data: sk = p, an output of QG(n, i, 1k); R, an output of RG(DB,Q, 1k), and D
Result: A block B
′
= ((R1modp)mod2, (R2modp)mod2, ...., (RLmodp)mod2)
Algorithm 8: Response Retrieval RR((Q, p), R)
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I deviate from Yi et al. assumption and use an arbitrary partitioning method proper-
ties as mentioned in Subsection 4.11.4. Recently, authors of the papers used an arbitrary
partitioning method and get practical computation and communication cost [PBP12],
[NV13], [WAA14], and [HHG12].
Section 4.16 presents the processing steps of an interaction between the CS and a DR.
4.16 Interaction Between the CS and a DR
This section details an interaction between the CS and a DR. At the CS end, the
DSM and a data repository are used for each communication step as in Subsection 4.14.
I assume that the DSM does not provide registration process for the DR. The DR can
be public, a researcher, or an institution. The proposed architecture guarantees com-
plete privacy for the DR also maintains the practical eﬃciency. The DR uses selective
encryption approach for data query processing to maintain an eﬃciency, and the single-
database PBR method to maintain acceptable data and query privacy. The DR sends
an encrypted data query to the DSM to get results of requested data query. The DSM
processes an encrypted data query and sends query result to the DR without seeing the
content of requested data query.
The work ﬂow of query processing between the CS and a DR are presented as follows:
Step-1: The DR accesses tables, attributes name, data types, encryption method,
and types of queries format from a website, which is advertised by the DSM as presented
in Subsection 4.11.2.
Step-2: The DR uses selective encryption approach for data querying, which is
deﬁned in Subsection 4.15.1. The DR splits a data query into two parts: public subquery
and private subquery. The DR sends public subquery to the CS.
Step-3: At the CS end, the DSM receives public subquery and gets sDOI value
of the requested table from the data repository. The DSM maintains each sDOI value
correspond to each table name on the data repository.
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Figure 4.11. Processing Steps of an Interaction between the CS and a DR
Step-4: The DSM uses B+-tree method is mentioned in Algorithm 5 of Subsection
4.11.5. The DSM sort lists the buckets, which have the same sDOI values, and gets
bucket-ids and bucket boundary values correspond to each sDOI value.
Step-5: The DSM uses bucket boundary values to get attributes from the aggregated
matrix, which is maintained in an Algorithm 4 of Subsection 4.11.4.
Step-6: The DSM sends public subquery result with corresponding bucket-ids (in-
dexes) to the DR.
Step-7: The DR uses PBR method as advertised by the DSM on a website is in
Subsection 4.11.2. The DR uses an Algorithm 6 of Subsection 4.15.3 and sends to the
CS.
Step-8: The DSM receives private subquery and uses an Algorithm 7 of Subsection
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4.15.3 to process private subquery. The DSM sends private subquery result to the DR
in XML data format.
Step-9: The DR uses an Algorithm 8 of Subsection 4.15.3 and retrieves the private
subquery result. The results of the data query is in XML format, the DR uses parsing
method as presented in Subsection 4.11.1, and gets query result in table format.
Section 4.17 presents the experimental and comparison analysis of the data aggrega-
tion and the data querying methods.
4.17 Experimental Work
This section demonstrates the implementation of the proposed architecture and pro-
vides the comparison analysis of the proposed architecture with well known existing
methods. My experiments focused on the aggregating CDSs, the data querying analysis
on the DR, and communication between the DSM and a DR. This section is divided
into two subsections. The ﬁrst Subsection 4.17.2 illustrates the implementation of the
proposed DDA and delineates the comparative analysis with existing well known two
partitioning methods: horizontal [MFHL10], [JX09] and vertical partitioning [VCKP08],
[YW06] methods, also horizontal (HDA) and vertical (VDA) partitioning used data ag-
gregation in our architecture. The second Subsection 4.17.3 exhibits the experimen-
tal analysis of selective-single-database PBR from V-DGHV data querying method and
presents the comparative analysis with the well known existing data querying methods
[TKMZ13], [WAA14], [MBC13]. Firstly, I mention the general experimental settings for
both Subsections 4.17.2 and 4.17.3.
4.17.1 General Experimental Settings for Subsection 4.17.2 and
Subsection 4.17.3
I use both synthetic and real data sets for my experimental work. These data sets
are deﬁned in Section 3.3 of Chapter 3. The sizes of synthetic data sets are 151 KB
and 110 KB, and sizes of real data sets are 27.3 KB and 29.8 KB. I aggregate these four
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data sets using the DDA method as described in Subsection 4.11.4. The experimental
results of the DDA method are described in Subsection 4.17.2. The four granularities of
the bucketization were generated 200 buckets, 100 buckets, 50 buckets, and 10 buckets
respectively. The purpose of creating diﬀerent sizes of buckets in a data repository is to
study how the query execution time changes as the bucket size increases. I calculate the
query processing time for each bucket size partitioned CDS. I choose 6 diﬀerent queries
pattern matching query (Q1), order by query (Q2), nested query (Q3), join query (Q4),
range query (Q5), aggregation query (Q6), which are deﬁned in Subsection 4.12.1. The
query processing results are discussed in Subsection 4.17.3. The hardware environment
is a laptop with Intel (R) Core (TM) i5 CPU, 2.27 GHz and 3GB RAM and the setup is
conﬁgured on a Windows 7 operating system. All results are averaged over 15 runs.
4.17.2 The Proposed DDA Method
This section presents the experimental results of the proposed DDA method, which is
described in Subsection 4.11.4. Additionally, this section exhibits the comparative anal-
ysis of the proposed DDA method with the existing vertical and horizontal partitioning
methods, also horizontal (HDA) and vertical (VDA) partitioning used data aggregation in
our architecture. These horizontal [MFHL10], [JX09] and vertical partitioning [VCKP08],
[YW06] methods are well studied methods in literature work. The results are presented
in Table 4.1.
Experimental Setup:
I use MATLAB R2009b [FP10] for my experimental analysis. MATLAB is a highly
used application for numerical computing. It provides a programming language that
allows a user to work with numbers in any possible way imaginable through visualization.
I implement my DDA method in MATLAB, and consider four data sets 303×14, 294×13,
303× 121, and 294× 121 respectively for evaluation. These four data sets are described
in Section 3.3 of Chapter 3.
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Experimental Results and Comparison Analysis
This segment presents the experimental results, which are shown in Table 4.1. I
consider four parameters to examine the results: Data privacy, Data utility, CPU time
during data aggregation, and CPU time during data modiﬁcation. The data modiﬁca-
tion contains three operations: insertion, deletion, and updation. These operations are
performed using SQL syntax, which is described in Subsection 4.9. Data privacy is mea-
sured using the RMSE metric and data utility is measured using the F-measure metric,
deﬁned in Subsection 3.5.2 and 3.5.3 of Chapter 3 respectively. RMSE is also deﬁned in
Subsection 6.3.1 of Chapter 6. RMSE lies between 0 and 1; RMSE = 0 implies zero
data privacy, and RMSE ≥ 1 implies that there is no overlap between the original data
set and its perturbed data set. F-measure also lies between 0 and 1; F −measure = 0
denotes low data utility and F −measure ≥ 1 presents the value of the perturbed data
is similar to the original data.
The comparison analysis of exisitng horizontal, vertical, our used horizontal (HDA),
vertical (VDA), and our proposed diagonal (DDA) partitioning methods are presented
in Table 4.1.
I calculated data aggregation time, data privacy, data utility, and data modiﬁca-
tion operations time in existing horizontal [MFHL10], [JX09] and vertical partitioning
[VCKP08], [YW06] methods. I ﬁnd that the both existing methods horizontal [MFHL10],
[JX09] and vertical partitioning [VCKP08], [YW06] have high aggregation time, low data
privacy, low data utility, and high data modiﬁcation operations time in compare to my ar-
chitecture used horizontal (HDA), vertical (VDA), and proposed diagonal (DDA) method,
the values are shown in Table 4.1.
The RMSE for the HDA, is 0.9985 < 1. RMSE for the VDA is 0.9987 < 1 and RMSE
for the my proposed method DDA is 0.9993 < 1. From the result of these RMSE values
we can see that the DDA provides better data privacy compare to both partitioning
methods. Also, I calculate data utility using F-measure metric and the data utility for
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the HDA method is 0.7760, for the VDA method is 0.7759, and for the DDA method
is 0.7759. From data utility result, I ﬁnd that the values of data utility of the VDA
Table 4.1. Comparison of Horizontal, Vertical, and Diagonal Methods
Parameters
→
Aggrega-
tion
Time
Data
Pri-
vacy
Data
Util-
ity
Insertion
Time
Deletion
Time
Updation
Time
Partitioning
Methods ↓
Jurczyk et
al., 2009
[JX09]
0.007857 0.8328 0.7458 0.06817 0.06825 0.06884
Mohammed
et al., 2010
[MFHL10]
0.007317 0.8516 0.7281 0.04351 0.04385 0.04423
The HDA 0.002260 0.9985 0.7760 0.02773 0.02781 0.02783
Yang et
al., 2006
[YW06]
0.08174 0.8754 0.7158 0.1477 0.1482 0.1517
Vaidya et
al., 2008
[VCKP08]
0.05271 0.8927 0.7047 0.08217 0.08273 0.08291
The VDA 0.002526 0.9987 0.7759 0.02915 0.02957 0.02961
The DDA 0.002177 0.9993 0.7759 0.002349 0.002357 0.002361
Note: Data Privacy is measured using RMSE, Data Utility is measured using F-measure, Aggregation
Time, Insertion Time, Deletion Time, and Updation Time in Seconds
and the DDA are the same, but value of the HDA method is 0.7760. The diﬀerence
value of the horizontal and the DDA method is 0.0001, which is negligible. These results
are not clearly state that which method is suitable for the aggregating data sets. So,
I did more experiments on these three methods by measuring execution time during
data modiﬁcation and data aggregation operations. The execution time during data
aggregation operation for the HDA is 0.002260 seconds, for the VDA is 0.002526, and
for the DDA is 0.002177. So, we can see that the DDA method is more eﬃcient than
the horizontal and the vertical methods in terms of data aggregation operation. I also
calculate execution time during data modiﬁcation operations. I run 15 times of each
data modiﬁcation operation: insertion, deletion, and updation and get average of 15
times calculation. From the Table 4.1 I ﬁnd the DDA method provides an eﬃcient time
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for each data modiﬁcation operation insertion, deletion, and updation compare to both
horizontal and vertical partitioning methods.
In summary, I ﬁnd that my proposed DDA method has RMSE = 0.9993 i.e 99.93 %
data privacy, F-measure = 0.7759 i.e. 77.59 % data utility, an eﬃcient data aggregation
and eﬃcient data modiﬁcation execution time. Additionally, I ﬁnd that the HDA is better
than the VDA in terms of eﬃciency because the HDA provides better results in both the
data aggregation and the data modiﬁcation operations also provides RMSE = 0.9985 i.e
99.85 % data privacy and F-measure = 0.7760 i.e. 77.60 % data utility. I conclude that,
in comparing three partitioning methods based on eﬃciency, in general, The VDA < The
HDA < The DDA method, and based on data privacy in general, The HDA < The VDA
< The DDA method. The results are described in Table 4.1.
4.17.3 Time Consumption During Data Querying Process
In order to ensure that the considered data querying method (see in Subsection 4.15.1)
is practical, in the experiments, I tested the computation and communication processing
steps between the DSM and a DR. I calculated the time needed for the data querying
process to be completed between the DSM and a DR. I also comparatively analysed
my proposed architecture’s data querying method with the existing methods Tu et al.
[TKMZ13], HHE method of Wang et al. [WAA14], and Mayberry et al. [MBC13] in
Tables 4.2 and 4.3.
Experimental Setup:
I developed the DR application and the DSM architecture to simulate the data query-
ing process. I set up both the DR and the DSM modules on the same machine.
1. The DR end
I used eclipse IDE for Java EE developers (https://www.eclipse.org/downloads/
packages/eclipse-ide-java-ee-developers/lunar) to develop the DR application.
Eclipse is an integrated java development tool, which can be used for coding and compil-
ing, and conﬁgured MySQL 5.6 (http://dev.mysql.com/downloads/) with Eclipse IDE
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to create and execute SQL query on the DR end. MySQL is an open source database
software which can be used to store and retrieve data sets for the web applications.
2. The DSM end
For the server side implementation, I used Tomcat 7.0 server (http://tomcat.
apache.org/download-70.cgi) integrated with the Eclipse IDE for Java EE Develop-
ers (http://eclipse.org/downloads/packages/eclipse-ide-java-ee-developers/
indigosr2). Tomcat is an open source software for implementation of Java Web Pages.
The main reasons for choosing Tomcat 7.0 server integrated with Eclipse IDE for Java
EE Developers as development platform are: portability of Java code and wide imple-
mentation on almost all platforms, possibility to process data sets locally on a system
and reduce network traﬃc. I used a MySQL 5.6 (http://dev.mysql.com/downloads/)
data repository at the server end to maintain the data repository. I used MySQL
Connector/J (http://dev.mysql.com/downloads/connector/j/) to access the data
repository. MySQL Connector/J is the oﬃcial Java database connectivity (JDBC)
driver for MySQL and used format of the Connection URL is “jdbc:mysql://[host][:
port]/[database][?properties][=values]”. I used the SQL commands [MMK02] to
write queries which are sent to the DSM to communicate with a data repository. I deﬁned
the types of queries using SQL commands in Subsection 4.12.1.
I used Java 2 platform micro edition (J2ME) cryptography library [Hoo05] with
BouncyCastle for the private block retrieval implementation. As Yi et al., I chose
similar values of each parameter for λ = 60, η = 882, γ = 2205. I used Java API
(http://docs.oracle.com/javase/6/docs/api/java/math/package-summary.html),
(http://jsci.sourceforge.net/) which used to support very large integers. I conﬁg-
ured salesforce cloud (https://www.salesforce.com/au/form/signup/freetrial-lb.
jsp?d=70130000000tT0K) as the CS in my architecture.
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Experimental Results and Comparison Analysis
In order to measure data querying process time, I launched 15 requests and calculated
CPU time of each data query process over each deﬁned 200, 100, 50, 20, and 10 bucket as
mentioned in Subsection 4.17.1. I considered six queries: pattern matching query (Q1),
order by query (Q2), nested query (Q3), join query (Q4), range query (Q5), aggregation
query (Q6) (see Table 4.2). In order to minimize the unrelated network eﬀects, I ran both
the DR and the DSM on the same machine.
From the results of Table 4.2 we can see that the time needed for data querying
process in small number of bucket is more time consuming compare to the large number
of buckets. So, I consider 200 number of bucket for further experimental analysis.
In my architecture, the DR implements “Selective-Single-Database PBR from V-
DGHV method” (described in Subsection 4.15.1)” data querying process. The DR iden-
tiﬁes the private subquery, which is a subset of the data query, the DR then applies
query generation Algorithm 6 of Subsection 4.15.1 to encrypt the private subquery (this
data is assumed to be relatively small), and the larger non-sensitive data query (public
subquery) portion is in plaintext form. The DSM uses response generation Algorithm 7
of Subsection 4.15.1 and sends private subquery result to the DR. The DR gets encrypted
query result and uses response retrieval Algorithm 8 of Subsection 4.15.1 to retrieve query
result. I use message passing interface (MPI) (http://www.hpjava.org/mpiJava.html)
Java library to setup connection between a DR and the DSM module in my experiments.
The MPI library, allowing a Java application to eﬃciently run on distributed, parallel,
and high performance architecture.
Tu et al. [TKMZ13], average processing time needed for each ﬁve query to authenti-
cate are 27.2917 seconds for Q1 query, 25.2791 seconds for Q2 query, 34.5178 seconds for
Q4 query, 37.5681 seconds for Q5 query and 27.1612 seconds for a Q6 query. The HHE
method of Wang et al. [WAA14], average calculations are 27.1419 seconds for Q1 query,
24.9832 seconds for Q2 query, 35.2824 seconds for Q4 query, 36.1057 seconds for Q5 and
25.8172 seconds for Q6 query. Mayberry et al. [MBC13], average calculations are 0.4419
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Table 4.2. Time Needed During Querying Process between a DR and the DSM
Query processing steps
200
bucket
100
bucket
50
bucket
10
bucket
Time in seconds
1.
DR sends public sub-
query to the DSM
0.0084 0.0083 0.0085 0.00854
2.
Response sent of public
subquery result to the
DR
0.0575 0.0567 0.0572 0.0574
3.
DR apply query gen-
eration algorithm on
private subquery
Q1 0.00018 0.00021 0.00022 0.0002
Q2 0.00015 0.00016 0.00015 0.00017
Q3 0.00023 0.00027 0.00026 0.00024
Q4 0.00022 0.00024 0.00024 0.00022
Q5 0.00019 0.0002 0.00023 0.00019
Q6 0.00017 0.00019 0.00021 0.00018
4.
Sent encrypted private
subquery to the DSM
Q1 0.0128 0.0131 0.013 0.0132
Q2 0.0125 0.0127 0.0129 0.0126
Q3 0.0137 0.0139 0.0141 0.0135
Q4 0.0134 0.0137 0.0138 0.0134
Q5 0.0130 0.0134 0.0135 0.0133
Q6 0.0127 0.0129 0.0131 0.0129
5.
The DSM uses response
generation algorithm on
private subquery
Q1 0.014102 0.051302 0.1358 0.3132
Q2 0.012375 0.048285 0.11035 0.3007
Q3 0.026212 0.079116 0.1648 0.3618
Q4 0.024107 0.077205 0.1617 0.3528
Q5 0.023801 0.076803 0.1572 0.3461
Q6 0.013201 0.051009 0.12292 0.3105
6.
Sent encrypted private
subquery result to the DR
Q1 0.0140 0.0142 0.0141 0.0141
Q2 0.0137 0.0139 0.0138 0.0138
Q3 0.0146 0.0145 0.0148 0.0148
Q4 0.0145 0.0144 0.0145 0.0146
Q5 0.0139 0.01412 0.0145 0.0145
Q6 0.0138 0.0141 0.0139 0.0139
7.
DR uses response retrieval
algorithm and gets query
result
Q1 0.00011 0.00013 0.00015 0.00012
Q2 0.00009 0.0001 0.00012 0.00009
Q3 0.00015 0.00017 0.00017 0.000147
Q4 0.00014 0.00016 0.00016 0.00013
Q5 0.00012 0.00014 0.00015 0.000125
Q6 0.0001 0.00011 0.00011 0.00001
8.
DR uses Java parsing
method to get data in
table format
Q1 0.0104 0.0103 0.0104 0.011
Q2 0.0087 0.0086 0.0087 0.0097
Q3 0.0123 0.0113 0.0124 0.0127
Q4 0.0117 0.0101 0.0121 0.0123
Q5 0.0099 0.0098 0.0117 0.0119
Q6 0.0098 0.0098 0.0105 0.0107
seconds for Q1 query, 0.3832 seconds for Q2 query, 0.5129 seconds for Q4 query, 0.5057
seconds for Q5 and 0.4172 seconds for Q6 query. I performed 15 processing requests
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for each data querying process for each these three methods [TKMZ13], [WAA14], and
[MBC13]. Also, Only Tu et al. [TKMZ13] method support nested query Q3, 37.1285.
Table 4.3. Average time (in secs) during querying process for 200 bucket size
Methods
Used →
Tu et
al.,
2013
[TKMZ13]
Wang
et al.,
2014
[WAA14]
Mayberry
et al.,
2013
[MBC13]
Our Pro-
posed
MethodTypes of
Queries ↓
Q1 27.2917 27.1419 3.4419 0.1175
Q2 25.2791 24.9832 3.3832 0.1134
Q3 37.1285 X X 0.2531
Q4 34.5178 35.2824 3.5129 0.1300
Q5 37.5681 36.1057 3.5057 0.1268
Q6 27.1612 25.8172 3.4172 0.1157
The comparison analysis of my architecture with the existing methods of Tu et al.
[TKMZ13], Wang et al. [WAA14] and Mayberry et al. [MBC13] for each data query
process is shown in Table 4.3. The solutions of Tu et al. [TKMZ13] and Wang et
al. [WAA14] are signiﬁcantly slower than the other existing method Mayberry et al.
[MBC13], and my solution. The performance of the method by Mayberry et al. [MBC13]
is closer to my solution, but it is still slower than my solution; my simpler architecture
and their use of selection encryption based PBR data query method, our proposed DDA
method, and lightweight API for Java are major contributors to the diﬀerence.
Section 4.18 examines the outcomes of the proposed architecture, important ﬁndings,
and limitations of my architecture.
4.18 Discussion
4.18.1 Summary of the Experiments
I observed following points from the experimental analysis of my proposed architec-
ture:
• The proposed DDA method provides 99.93 % data privacy and 77.59 % data utility.
Additionally, the DDA provides better data privacy than both existing horizontal
and vertical partitioning methods, and also in our architecture tested the HDA
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and the VDA methods. For data utility, the DDA achieves the same level of data
utility as the VDA method, but lower than the HDA method. The diﬀerence value
between the HDA and the DDA method is 0.0001.
• For eﬃciency, my proposed DDA method achieves better results compared to both
existing horizontal and vertical partitioning, and also in our architecture tested the
HDA and the VDA methods. I calculated eﬃciency using CPU time calculation
during data aggregation and data modiﬁcation operations. I ﬁnd the DDA method
is more eﬃcient than all horizontal and vertical partitioning methods.
• The selective encryption based private block retrieval data querying method pro-
vides both security and eﬃciency.
• For the data querying method, I calculated each computation and communication
process between the DSM and a DR by considering six types of queries. Also, I
consider diﬀerent size of buckets. I observe that the DSM takes longer processing
time to execute response generation algorithm on private subquery in case of lower
number of bucket.
• From comparison analysis of data querying process, I determine my proposed ar-
chitecture is more eﬃcient than the existing [TKMZ13], [WAA14], and [MBC13]
solutions.
4.18.2 Important Findings
My performance testing architectures have introduced the following major improve-
ments to the existing architectures:
1. My proposed DDA method provides data aggregation and data modiﬁcation oper-
ations eﬃciently.
2. My selective encryption data querying method provides better eﬃciency compared
to the existing methods.
3. The proposed architecture overcomes the drawbacks of existing solutions by eﬀec-
tively maintaining levels of security while reducing the time complexity of other
solutions using single-database PBR method.
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4. The proposed architecture’s operations are faster than the techniques used by the
other approaches discuss in detail in the Sections 4.8, 4.9, 4.10, 4.11, 4.12, 4.13,
4.14, 4.15, and 4.16.
5. My architecture supports diﬀerent types of queries in data query processing steps.
4.18.3 Limitations
I observe the following limitations in my proposed architecture.
1. I tested and analysed my proposed architecture only on four data sets. The con-
sidered data sets have only numeric and nominal data types.
2. I did not consider categorical and complex (such as scanned pdf and jpeg) data
sets.
3. I consider only six diﬀerent types of queries in data querying processing steps.
4. I did not work on query freshness and query correctness features.
4.19 Summary of the Chapter
This chapter presented a solution for sharing of sensitive data sets in which a large
number of the DCs publish their privatized data sets on a CS, so that the data sets are
made available to anyone who wants access to it, for whatever purpose. The solutions
of my proposed architecture are two-fold. The ﬁrst is to deal with aggregation and
publishing of the privatized data sets. Secondly, I determine how aggregated data sets
can be eﬃciently queried, while retaining privacy not only of the data sets, but also of
the original data owner and of both the query and person querying.
The testing results have proven that my proposed DDA method performance is eﬃ-
cient and also maintained 99.93 % data privacy and 77.59 % data utility. My proposed
architecture also supports data modiﬁcation operations on the data repository at the
CS end. The testing results of the data querying method is also eﬃcient and maintains
privacy of the DR without disclosing the data query on the DSM and processes requested
data query. My architecture supports six diﬀerent types of queries.
The next chapter will present applications of proposed ﬁndings of this chapter and
thereafter develop a testing framework for applications.
153
Chapter 5
Application of use of Aggregated
Privatized Medical Data
The use case is an implementation challenge in the context of providing conﬁdential
patient medical aggregated data sets to a health responder far from a hospital environ-
ment.
The work presented in this chapter was done in part with other people. The ideas
and experimental work are mine, I use the ﬁrst person singular ‘I’; where the work was
done collaboratively in a team arrangement, I use the ﬁrst person plural ‘we’.
This chapter develops the architecture for privatizing aggregated data set and de-
livering it in a secure manner from a server to a remote wireless device. The proposed
architecture has three modules. The ﬁrst module presents a solution for maintaining the
privacy of aggregated data released en masse in a controlled manner, and for providing
secure access to the original data for authorized users, described in Section 5.2. The
second module presents detail overview of server side components in Section 5.3. We
present a detailed description of a data privatization module from the server side of data
delivery as well as the protocol between server and client. In addition, we present a prac-
tical implementation of our data provisioning utility as it would operate in an insecure
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environment. Third module presents detail of client side components in Section 5.4. This
proposed module presents a system designed to enhance privacy protection of sensitive
data set downloaded to a mobile client device from a remote server, such as in the case of
accessing medical information in emergency situations. Our complete proposed architec-
ture is presented in Section 5.5. The proposed architecture results show that the solution
is provably secure and maintains privacy in a more eﬃcient manner than previous solu-
tions, described in Section 5.7. This chapter links these ideas and results into a complete
architecture.
The chapter is organized as follows. Section 5.1 brieﬂy describes the motivation
to develop architecture. Section 5.2 presents ﬁrst module of our proposed architecture
i.e. privacy and security model. Section 5.3 describes second module of our proposed
architecture, a detailed description of a data privatization module from the server side
of secure aggregated data delivery as well as the protocol between server and client.
Section 5.4 developed the third module of our proposed architecture, client side module
and described a solution that provides a good level of privacy protection of downloaded
data at aﬀordable cost and provides more security features. We present our proposed
architecture in Section 5.5. I comparatively analysed the proposed architecture with
the most reasonable existing methods in Section 5.6. To validate our architecture, an
experimental analysis has been presented and introduced in Section 5.7. The testing
results and our ﬁndings are discussed in Section 5.8. This chapter is summarized in
Section 5.9.
5.1 Introduction
In an online environment, the sharing and exchanging of large amounts of data can be
essential in responding eﬃciently and eﬀectively to critical situations such as bush ﬁres,
earthquakes or medical emergencies. However, privacy and security issues continue to be
major barriers, since revealing sensitive data over the Internet can present an additional
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threat. For example, leaked information about an emergency response team in a war
zone, may lead to an attack on those providing aid to the victims.
The adoption of electronic health records has opened up new modes of patient treat-
ment. Their wide acceptance has been helped by the possibility of ubiquitous access, but
security and privacy concerns impose severe limitations. Controlling access to health-care
data has to strike a balance between utility and security/privacy. For patient treatment,
accurate data, as close as possible to the real records, has to be delivered in a secure
manner to the medical practitioner. Such data needs to be published in such a way that
privacy is maintained.
We proposed privatization techniques in Chapter 3 and privatized sensitive medical
data sets before sharing. The privatized sensitive medical data sets are stored in server
side module.
There are several hospitals involved in a multi-site medical study. Each hospital
has its own database containing patient medical data sets. The patient medical data sets
containing sensitive information such as demographics, clinical, and genomic information.
Integration of existing heterogeneous databases to provide eﬀective and eﬃcient
knowledge discovery and better knowledge management in hospitals is one of the most
popular issues in healthcare informatics. Such data sets have been used in automating
the workﬂow of healthcare. These patient medical data sets are recognized as an invalu-
able source for performing large-scale and low- cost biological, medical, and healthcare
analysis and decision making. These tasks are essential for the discovery of new drugs
and therapies, and are a key step towards realizing the vision of personalized medicine.
I have discussed privacy preserving data aggregation and privacy preserving data
query methods in Chapter 4.
Security and privacy are essential because leakage of medical data related to an in-
dividual’s health condition and medications can have both short term and long term
implications. If such information is maliciously altered when en route to a medical emer-
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gency responder, the patient may die. If the information is collected by an insurer or by
the patient’s employer, the patient may subsequently ﬁnd that she is unable to obtain
insurance or has lost her job.
Therefore, we have proposed our ﬁrst module of the proposed architecture in Sec-
tion 5.2 which provides data conﬁdentiality and privacy in an eﬃcient protocol. While
a number of widely-used communication protocols are available to provide security in
the transport layer and below, upper-layer security protocols need to be tailored to the
application, and no general solutions are available. However, solutions in the application
layer can protect data within the user equipment as well.
As mentioned in above paragraph we privatized sensitive patient medical data sets
using proposed privatization techniques in Chapter 3. Each medical researcher will pri-
vatize patient medical data sets before sending to the server’s database for collaboration
study. The server will aggregate each privatized data sets sent by medical researchers
using privacy preserving aggregated method, described in Chapter 3. Now, the server
stores aggregated privatize sensitive patient medical data sets in it’s database. Then we
have proposed our ﬁrst module, privacy and security model in Section 5.2 for maintain-
ing the privacy of aggregated privatized data released en masse in a controlled manner,
and for providing secure access to the original data for authorized users. Each medical
researcher will be interested for aggregated data sets for their medical study. So, we need
to develop a methodology for delivering privatize aggregated patient medical data sets in
a secure manner from a server to a remote wireless device.
When providing critical emergency care in a remote location, a local response team
needs access to the patient’s healthcare data. Such healthcare data is protected by privacy
rules and laws in most jurisdictions. It is therefore a challenge to be able to provide the
response team with the relevant data while protecting the privacy of that data. We also
need to design a system architecture to enhance privacy protection of sensitive aggregated
data downloaded to a mobile client device from a remote server, such as in the case of
accessing medical information in emergency situations.
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The following are ‘challenge’ scenarios of delivering appropriate medical data sets to
a remote location in an emergency situation:
Scenario 1: A woman who has a history of heart disease lives in a remote town far
from a hospital. She carries an emergency button in case she needs help from the local
nurse or doctor. One day, she has a stroke and is able to press the button, but lies on
the ﬂoor of her home awaiting help.
Scenario 2: In this scenario, a patient is in her last few weeks of pregnancy and relies
on a family member or friend to work with the hospital in retrieving any necessary data
to deal with complications of the pregnancy.
Scenario 3: In a third scenario, a worker in a remote community is applying for travel
insurance and needs to supply a copy of some of his medical history to the insurer.
In the literature, several methods have been described for preserving the privacy of
individuals when publishing data; simulation [AW89], noise addition [Kim86], micro ag-
gregation [DFMS02], randomization and perturbation methods [MS99], [KWG97] and
[ESAG02] are some prominent examples. These algorithms modify the initial data in
order to preserve privacy while still providing usable data. However, modiﬁcation to the
original data needs to be performed carefully, as large modiﬁcations may lead to loss
of important information, while minor changes may not be suﬃcient to protect privacy
[OYGB04]. While the data privacy mechanisms presented in [Swe02a], [CRKK09], [PP09]
and [MZB10] present a broad range of the research approaches published in the literature
over the last ten years, None of these papers considered security when the data is trans-
mitted on-line. Thus, these protocols are susceptible to a number of security attacks and
so cannot be considered semantically secure.
We propose an eﬃcient, secure protocol while also maintaining privacy. We bench-
mark our work on all three levels: privacy, security and eﬃciency, against the papers
in [Swe02a], [CRKK09], [PP09] and [MZB10]. While a number of widely-used commu-
nication protocols are available to provide security in the transport layer and below,
upper-layer security protocols need to be tailored to the application, and no general so-
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lutions are available. However, solutions in the application layer can protect data within
the user equipment as well. Therefore, we develop the proposed privacy and security
model in both client and server side to enhance privacy protection of sensitive aggre-
gated privatized data downloaded to a mobile client and deliver aggregated privatized
data from server to client with privacy preserve and secure manner.
Section 5.2 details ﬁrst module of our proposed architecture i.e privacy and security
model. This module presents a solution for maintaining the privacy of data released en
masse in a controlled manner, and for providing secure access to the original data for
authorized users.
5.2 Our Proposed First Module of Architecture:
Privacy and Security Model
This section introduces the ﬁrst module of the proposed architecture which provides
eﬃciency, maintains level of privacy and security of aggregated sensitive privatize medical
data sets without compromising data accuracy; the experimental results are presented in
Section 5.7. We privatize sensitive medical data sets before transmitting to the server-side
module; this is described in Section 5.3. The server aggregates all privatized sensitive
medical data sets using privacy preserving data aggregation methods, which were dis-
cussed in Chapter 3, and stores privatized data sets in the database. The users who are
interested in retrieving privatized medical data sets from the server’s database use the
data querying methods which were discussed in Chapter 4. In this section our speciﬁc
contributions are:
• A privacy preservation method for personally identiﬁable data set, which provides
low identiﬁcation probability with low overhead cost.
• A demonstrably eﬃcient encryption method for releasing the sensitive data set.
• Proofs that our method is secure against several standard attacks on the data set.
The module we propose is designed to maintain the best levels of privacy as discussed
in Section 2.2 of Chapter 2, but also to improve on existing data security as well as
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eﬃciency by using selective encryption [SS10b], [Bhu06], [VFJ+10] based on appropriate
asymmetric and symmetric encryption techniques. The privacy preserving techniques
employed are Salt Generation, Random ID and Random Grouping along with symmetric
encryption. These privacy techniques are all employed in the paper [MZB10] and the
model here is based on the one given there. We show in a subsequent subsection that in
fact, this privacy model outperforms the best competing privacy models in its ability to
maintain data privacy.
In choosing an appropriate method of securing data while in transit, we need to decide
between systems embedded into network protocols such as SSL and TLS [ORH09] in
which a master key is established and subsequent uses of it are managed by the protocol,
or introduce our own cryptographic method where the keys are owned and managed by
the users. In making this decision, the most important feature for us is eﬃciency as it
may be necessary in an emergency to send data to a small, low-resourced device.
Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) allows for eﬃcient implementation due to shorter
underlying bit lengths key sizes (160...256 bit) when compared to RSA or DLP in ﬁnite
ﬁelds (1024...4096 bit) at an equivalent level of security [ECR11]. This results in faster
computations and lower power consumption, as well as memory and bandwidth savings
[PRRJ03].
The RSA has the advantages of being a reliable and safe system but it also has the dis-
advantage of being very slow in data calculating (http://en.kryptotel.net/rsa.html).
The implementation of RSA requires repeated exponentiation which based on expensive
multiplication. Since battery, computing power and bandwidth are scarce commodities
in mobile and wireless systems, the use of a computationally intensive cryptosystem, such
as RSA, is not a feasible choice in such environments. For this reason I use RSA along-
side ECC. The major advantage of using ECC is the ability to use shorter keys, which,
both in terms of key management and eﬃcient computation, make elliptic curve based
variants highly attractive for many application environments [Mar12]. Additionally, ECC
requires less implementation complexity, including code size, and power consumption as
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compared to RSA. This makes it ideal for implementations on smart cards with limited
memory and processing power.
Modern security protocols such as SSL and TLS are widely used in e-commerce ap-
plications. These are arithmetic-intensive public-key primitives; the use of SSL increases
computational cost of transactions by a factor of 5-7 [KIM00] in comparison with vari-
ous parameters such as throughput, utilization, cache sizes, ﬁle access sizes and network
load on the server. In addition, several weaknesses of these protocols exist and are well-
known including the possibility of session hijacking [FH09], [CGG10]. Thus we opt for
establishing our own protocols and key management. In fact, we adopt recommendations
of [ECR11] and encrypt sensitive data by using asymmetric techniques ECC [BSS99]
and RSA [TWLP11], and encrypt non-sensitive data by using the symmetric encryption
technique AES for maintaining security and eﬃciency [OBSC10], [EKH10].
We use the architecture in [MZB10] as the basis of the current proposal as that
architecture is the only one in the literature (to our knowledge) which provides a high
level of data privacy and also tackles the issue of data security.
In our model, we assume that the data to be sent contains sensitive information about
individuals. Our objective is to maintain the privacy of these individuals by ensuring
that any attacker who obtains the data cannot connect this sensitive information with
the individual it describes.
Thus, in the setup, a sender S wants to send data M to a receiver R in a secure
and eﬃcient manner in such a way that the privacy of the data is preserved. S ﬁrst
determines which portion ofM should be considered to be ‘sensitive’ or in need of privacy
maintenance. For instance, patient data may be contained in the sender’s database; from
this, S may select the name and address as sensitive data, but regard the age of the
patient along with the patient’s medical condition as non-sensitive data. We use P to
refer to sensitive data, as determined by S, and M −P to refer to the non-sensitive data.
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In advance of sending the data, S and R each ﬁrst establish three secret keys. Two
are asymmetric, or public, keys based on Elliptic Curves (EC) and RSA; the third is a
symmetric key based on AES [OBSC10], [EKH10] and needs to be agreed on by both
parties.
In addition to establishing in advance the keys to be used, R and S also establish a
common algorithm for use in the privacy management process. This is the ‘Salt Gen-
eration’ algorithm. Salting is a method of adding some random digits to a plaintext
before it is encrypted and is done in a standardized manner so that someone knowing
the decryption key and the salt digits (unencrypted) can recover the original plaintext.
See [LT91] for an example of how this is implemented. The original purpose of salting is
to prevent fast password attacks using look-up tables; however, the method works well
as a data privacy technique as the salt digits can be used to ‘perturb’ sensitive data. An
advantage of salting is that it can eﬀectively perturb the target string without a high
computational cost.
Figure 5.1. Key Generation Process in Proposed Module
The total initial interaction between S and R is described in Figure 5.1 where key
setup for the EC and RSA asymmetric keys, the symmetric key, and for the salt infor-
mation is done over an insecure channel. The key generation is described in detail in the
next subsections. Note that RSA keys are permanent while the other keys are session
keys only and must be changed at each data transfer session.
The theory of elliptic curve introduces the rudiments that will be useful for our
purpose. In this section, the deﬁnition of an elliptic curve over a ring Zn is provided.
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5.2.1 Elliptic Curves over a Ring
We consider an elliptic curve En(a, b) over the ring Zn, where n is an odd composite
square free integer, as described in the paper [KMOV91], pages 254 -255:
Deﬁnition 5.2.1. Let n = pq and p, q both be prime. Let a and b be integers such that
gcd(4a3 + 27b2, n) = 1. An elliptic curve En(a, b) over the ring Zn is the set of points
(x, y) ∈ Zn × Zn satisfying the equation
y2 = x3 + ax+ b(modn) (5.2.1)
together with the point at inﬁnity n∞.
5.2.2 Elliptic Curve based RSA-type System
We use an elliptic curve based analogue to RSA [KMOV91], [Dem93], [Ble97], [SS10b].
The following lemma (which is lemma 3 of the paper [KMOV91]) is useful for our work:
Lemma 5.2.1. Assume that n = pq where p and q are prime and let En(a, b) be an
elliptic curve over Zn. Let Nn = lcm(
Ep(a, b), 
Eq(a, b)); then
∀PE ∈ En(a, b), ∀k ∈ Z : [kNn + 1]PE = PE (5.2.2)
This lemma helps establishes an ECC based RSA-type system for which we require
the above result along with lemma 1 of [KMOV91] which is presented as follows:
Lemma 5.2.2. Let p be an odd prime satisfying p ≡ 2 (mod 3). Then for 0 < b < p
Ep(0, b) is a cyclic group of order:

Ep(0, b) = p+ 1 (5.2.3)
In our setup, the primes p and q above are both chosen to be congruent to 2 modulo 3.
Assumption: Our elliptic curve has the form En(0, b) over the ring Zn and so the
equation
y2 = x3 + b(modn) (5.2.4)
Lemma 5.2.3. Let n = pq, where p and q are prime, and let En(0, b) be an elliptic curve
over Zn. Set Nn = lcm(
Ep(0, b), 
Eq(0, b)). If de ≡ ed ≡ 1 mod(Nn) then for any point
PE on En(0, b), we have
d(e.PE) = e(d.PE) = PE (5.2.5)
Proof. Since de ≡ 1mod(Nn), then exists an integer k such that de − 1 = kNn. Therefore,
de = kNn + 1 and so by Lemma 5.2.1, de.PE = (kNn + 1).PE = PE for any point PE on
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5.2.3 Key Generation Setup
Step 1. RSA-type key setup (permanent keys) S and R jointly select an integer
n which is the product pq of two large and distinct prime numbers. S and R Compute n
= pq and Nn = lcm(p + 1, q + 1). S and R now each separately choose integers eS and
eR, 1 < eS < Nn, and 1 < eR < Nn, such that gcd(Nn, eS) = 1 and gcd(Nn, eR) = 1. S
and R calculate their private keys dS and dR as e
−1
S modulo Nn and e
−1
R modulo Nn for dS
and dR respectively. Thus S has constructed a public key pair (eS, n) and private key dS,
and similarly R has public key (eR, n) and private key dR.
Step 2. Elliptic Curve asymmetric key setup (sessional keys). Each time
S communicates with R, an elliptic curve session key is established. For all sessions, S
and R jointly choose an elliptic curve En(0, b) over ring Zn, where n and p and q are as
above, along with a point PE on En(0, b). The elliptic curve En(0, b) and the point PE are
the public domain parameters. For the ﬁrst session, S selects a public key Q1S relatively
prime to Nn and computes the secret key K
1
S so that Q
1
SK
1
S ≡ 1modNn. Similarly, R
generates the key pair (K1R, Q
1
R). Now K
1
S and K
1
R are secret keys for S and R and Q
1
S
and Q1R are the public keys respectively.
Notation: We use (KnS , Q
n
S) and (K
n
R, Q
n
R) respectively to denote the EC asymmetric
session keys for S and R for the nth session.
Step 3. AES symmetric key setup (sessional keys). To generate the symmetric
key for use with the AES cipher, R and S use AES standard algorithm to generate secret
key K1 for non sensitive data encryption/decryption. K1 is now available to each of them
for use as a ﬁrst session symmetric key for the AES encryption and decryption process.
The symmetric key for the nth session is denoted as Kn.
5.2.4 Encryption Process
Step1. Asymmetric encryption/decryption for sensitive data P . The process
for sending encrypted sensitive data to a receiver uses both the EC and RSA asymmetric
keys established in Steps (1) and (2) of Subsection 5.2.3. Recall that the EC and AES
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keys are sessional and so new keys will be established when a new set of sensitive data is
to be sent.
Figure 5.2. A Sender Sends Sensitive Data P to a Receiver
In Figure 5.2, KS, KR and dS, dR are secret, while eS and eR are public. To send
P to R, S uses R’s RSA public key eR and the inverse of S’s secret key K
−1
S and sends
eR.K
−1
S .P . When R receives this, he multiplies by dR to obtain dR(eR.K
−1
S .P ) = K
−1
S .P
(using Lemma 5.2.3). Then, R multiplies this by eS.K
−1
R , and sends eS.K
−1
R .K
−1
S .P to S,
as shown in step (2) of Figure 5.2.
Upon receiving this, S calculates K−1R .P by decrypting with S’s RSA secret key and
EC secret key as follows, dS(eS.K
−1
R .K
−1
S .P ) = K
−1
R .K
−1
S .P (using Lemma 5.2.3) and
KS.K
−1
S .K
−1
R .P = K
−1
R .P [HMV04].
Finally, S sends K−1R .P multiplied by R’s public key eR (as shown in step (3) of Figure
5.2), eR.K
−1
R .P . Upon receiving this, R obtains P by using R’s RSA and EC secret keys
as follows, KRdR(eR.K
−1
R .P ) = P (using Lemma 5.2.3).
In each part of the above procedure, the (sessional) secret keys of the participants
are required in order to obtain the correct information. In order to verify that what R
receives is indeed P , R now sends eS.P to S who checks dS.eS.P and sends a conﬁrm
message if P is actually obtained.
Step 2. Symmetric encryption/decryption for non-sensitive data M − P .
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The AES standard for symmetric block ciphers oﬀers variable plaintext block length and
key length. The three key lengths available are: 128, 192 and 256; we chose length 256
bits for both the key length and plaintext length in our implementation. The AES en-
cryption/decryption process is shown in http://www.cs.bc.edu/~straubin/cs381-05/
blockciphers/rijndael_ingles2004.swf.
Figure 5.3. Our Proposed First Module: Privacy and Security Model
Our ﬁrst module of the proposed architecture is now described in Figure 5.3. The
data P is ﬁrst processed on the sender side by the privacy-enhancing protocol of [MZB10]
and the use of sessional asymmetric ECC and RSA encryption keys in the Privacy En-
hancement stage. The sensitive data P is passed into the ‘Random ID’ box in Figure
5.3, and the salt algorithm is applied to it. In [MZB10], identifying information is then
hashed using a standard hash function such as SHA-1 [Han05], however, this makes it
necessary for S to send R ID information separately over an insecure channel so that
R can reconstruct the original IDs by checking hashes against a look-up table. In the
current module of the proposed architecture, we eliminate this because R now knows the
parameters of the salt algorithm which permits it to reconstruct the IDs. In the ﬁnal
stage of the privacy-enhancement process, this salted data is sent to the ‘Random Group-
ing’ box which also accesses data from P . In this box, the data in P is classiﬁed into
types such as ‘gender’, ‘postcode’ etc., and the data passed to the box from the ‘Random
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ID’ box is distributed into ﬁles corresponding to its type, but in a random order. Now S
encrypts the contents of the ‘Random Grouping’ box, again using the sessional ECC and
RSA asymmetric keys, while the non-sensitive data M − P is encrypted using the EC
sessional symmetric key. The two results are then sent to R across an insecure channel.
In Figure 5.3, the bar above P and above M − P indicates the encrypted versions of
P and M − P respectively. When R receives these two pieces of data, it ﬁrst decrypts
both using the respective keys and then reconstitutes the set P by reversing the privacy
techniques used. To reverse the eﬀects of the ‘Random Grouping’ box, the attributes
deﬁning the types are ﬁrst identiﬁed. The salt algorithm is reversed by using the known
salt algorithm and parameters. Thus, both P and M − P are ﬁnally in R’s hands.
This privacy and security model is our ﬁrst module for our proposed architecture.
This module is incorporated in both server-side and client-side module. Our ﬁrst module
(privacy and security model) is implemented in Figure 5.4 of server-side module, as a
‘Data Privatization’ sub-module and in Figure 5.5 of client-side module as a ‘File Privacy
Enforcer’ sub-module respectively. We describe these sub-modules in Sections 5.3 and
5.4 respectively.
We employ the proposed privacy and security module of this section both in Sections
5.3 and 5.4. Section 5.3 presents a detailed description of a data privatization architecture
from the server side of data delivery as well as the protocol between server and client.
5.3 Our Proposed Second Module of Architecture:
Server-side Module
from the server side of aggregated privatized data delivery as well as the protocol
between server and client. In addition, I present a practical implementation of the data
provisioning utility as it would operate in an insecure environment. The privatization and
data aggregation methods are discussed in Chapter 3. The aggregated privatize sensitive
data sets are stored on server’s database.
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The adoption of electronic medical data sets have opened up new modes of patient
treatment. Their wide acceptance has been helped by the possibility of ubiquitous ac-
cess, but privacy and security concerns impose severe limitations. Controlling access to
health-care data has to strike a balance between utility and security/privacy. For patient
treatment, accurate data, as close as possible to the real records, has to be delivered in a
secure manner to the medical practitioner. Such data needs to be published in such a way
that privacy is maintained. Privacy and security are essential because leakage of medical
data sets related to an individual’s health condition and medications can have both short
term and long term implications. If such information is maliciously altered when en route
to a medical emergency responder, the patient may die. If the information is collected
by an insurer or by the patient’s employer, the patient may subsequently ﬁnd that she is
unable to obtain insurance or has lost her job. While there may be many interpretations
of what is meant by ‘data privacy’, in this article, we deﬁne it as the ‘inability to deduce
the identity of an individual from the data presented about that individual’. This is
pertinent in the medical setting mentioned above. In other settings, we may want to
prevent someone from identifying some key information about which characteristics may
have been revealed. There is always a tradeoﬀ between privacy loss and information loss,
and to preserve the accuracy of results and to reduce loss of information, a number of
techniques have been developed. In the literature, the existing solutions to maintaining
data privacy are based on determining how to reduce the probability of an individual’s
identity discovery when a large amount of private data is shared in an online environment.
However, such solutions overlook the possibility of security breaches in which whole sets
of (modiﬁed) data may be intercepted in transmission and read or altered.
5.3.1 System Architecture: The Server-Side Module
Our system is designed to enhance privacy protection of sensitive data downloaded
to a mobile client device from a remote server, such as in the case of accessing medical
information in emergency situations. The mobile client device is not part of our system
in this section; we focus only on the Data Server and describe how it privatizes the data,
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authenticates a request for data and delivers the data requested in a secure manner,
preventing data leaks and data privacy breaches.
Our full architecture includes several clients, all accessing the one server. Because the
client-side is not a focus of attention in this work, in the system model here we present
only one client, as shown in Figure 5.4. The client can be a resource- constrained remote
device (RCRD), such as a smartphone, tablet PC or a laptop, with limited battery life,
low computational power, and moderate storage capacity. On the server side, we use
a Trust Server to handle the privacy and security aspects. Every transfer between the
client and the Data Server is under the control of the Trust Server. The server side is
assumed to have no threats from the inside.
Figure 5.4. System Architecture: The Server Side Module
To secure the connection, the participants are authenticated, and the connection is
protected. We perform authentication on three levels: on device, software and User.
First, the device is authenticated by checking its ID, such as the IMEI number for 3G
phones or MAC address for Wi-Fi connections. Then, the software sends a preliminarily
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agreed port-knocking code to prove that it is running the appropriate software. Finally,
the User has to perform an ordinary login procedure.
We provide data protection both during transit and in the end-user device. TLS (SSL)
(http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246) protects the data while travelling across net-
works. TLS was chosen because it is widely available, and provides interoperability
between diﬀerent platforms. We provide additional conﬁdentiality and privacy protec-
tion in the application layer to cater for the mobile nature of the client device. In the
following subsections, we describe the components of our server side module. The client
side details are presented in next Section 5.4.
5.3.2 Server-Side Sub-Modules
The main component on the server side is the data repository whose data the RCRD
User wants to access. Our focus in this work is how the source of the access request is
veriﬁed, and how the server’s response is securely delivered to the User. We do not deal
with the Data Server’s internal working or its data here. (See Figure 5.4.) The security
on the server side is provided by our Trust Server Proxy. Each server- side module has a
corresponding partner on the client side; there is a secure connection building module, a
User authentication module and a privacy protection module.
1. Security-checking Server (ScS) sub-module This sub-module is the server-side
implementer of the three-level authentication described above. It uses an internal,
user-proﬁle database to verify the components. A list of IDs (IMEI numbers)
identiﬁes the hardware devices allowed to connect to the system.
The module waits for incoming connections, and when one arrives, it does some
internal processing to see if it should respond to the request. Namely, ﬁrst it
validates the client device by checking the device ID against a list. Then the port-
knocking code received from the client is considered. The module remains silent
until the correct port-knocking code arrives. To prevent replay attacks, this code is
generated run-time on the client side, according to a preliminarily agreed rule. To
avoid any conﬂicts with ﬁrewalls, a single port is used to receive the code. Upon
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positive authentication, a TLS connection is set up and is used to send a message to
the client asking for a username. After receiving the username, the phone number
of the User is transferred to the User Authentication Checking sub-module for
veriﬁcation of the User’s information.
2. User Authentication Checking (UAC) sub-module The UAC sub-module
contains a database of authorized Users, and for each User it stores the public key
and a mobile phone number (to which, as part of the authentication process, a one-
time password is sent). When the ScS sends a login request for veriﬁcation to the
UAC, the UAC checks its database and sends veriﬁcation of the User to the ScS as
well as a one-time password to the User’s mobile phone number. The UAC module
also sends connection information to the Data Transfer Control sub-module.
3. Data Transfer Control (DTC) sub-module This sub-module controls the data
transfer between the Data Server and the outgoing server port. The data obtained
from the Data Server is examined before being sent to the User, and certain data
types are encrypted and randomized for privacy and data conﬁdentiality using the
privacy model described in Section 5.2 before being sent to the RCRD client. This
model employs the privacy preserving techniques of salt generation, random ID
and Random Grouping along with symmetric encryption using selective encryption
[SZBB12a]. The encryption key for each session is sent to the other side by using
the public key of the client-side User.
In summary, when the User tries to connect to the Data Server via a web browser
or other application, the request is intercepted by the RCRD proxy which attempts to
set up a secure connection. In the ﬁrst step the RCRD proxy sends out the agreed port-
knocking code immediately followed by a TLS connection request (client hello). If the
correct port-knocking code is received from a valid client device ID, the TS accepts the
request and a TLS connection is set up. At this point the RCRD Proxy asks the User via
the User interface to enter the username, which is forwarded to the server-side via the
TLS connection. The Trust Server then generates a one-time password and sends it to the
User via SMS. When the User enters this password, it is forwarded to the server. If the
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correct password is received by the TS, the User is considered to have been authenticated
and the proxy will relay data between the User and the Data Server in both directions.
When the connection is no longer needed, the client logs out by exiting the data viewer
which results in closing the TLS connection. The connection has a maximum inactive
connection time, after which the client is automatically disconnected; this provides safety
when the User forgets to log out even though the connection is not used anymore, a
frequently occurring scenario in emergency cases. The details are described by the ﬂow
chart in Figure 5.7. The data privatization is done in this sub-module and not in the
Data Server itself. Since, in many situations, a third party proxy will not be granted
access to the Data Server. Establishing privacy and security techniques in the Proxy also
allows for eﬃcient and frequent updates of these protocols as required by government,
regulation or the privacy and security requirements with no impact on the Data Server
itself.
5.3.3 Privacy Enforcement
As described in Subsection 3, the DTC provides privacy and data conﬁdentiality
of data being sent to the client using sub-module of ‘Data Privatization’. The ‘Data
Privatization’ sub-module is the implemented part of our ﬁrst proposed module that is,
privacy and security model, described in Section 5.2. The connection between server and
client is expected to be terminated on the client side by explicit User logout via exiting
the data viewer. On the server side, disconnection is initiated by the inactivity timeout.
5.3.4 Solutions of Scenarios Described in Section 5.1
Our proposed module provides the usefulness in above described scenarios (see in
Section 5.1). The descriptions are deﬁned as follows:
In the ﬁrst scenario, when the woman presses the emergency button her case enters
into emergency mode and her device is automatically connected to a hospital server
through wireless network access for emergency help. The hospital provider contacts a
physician or medical professional in her area and requests that he attend her home.
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Since the physician needs her history of heart disease from the hospital, he enters into
our 3-level authentication process with the hospital based on his own device.
In the second scenario, the patient and her family will be well prepared prior to
the due date of the baby. A member of the patient’s family, or a family friend, will
be equipped with a suitable device which can be used to contact the hospital server to
acquire any necessary information.
In the third scenario, the worker can access his own hospital data using his medical
provider’s mobile device and determine what data he needs to pass on to the insurer.
In the above scenarios, we assume that, in all cases, the individual has data in the
hospital database. Our solution will not be usable if this is not the case.
5.3.5 Key Management
In all cases, the server side of the system is responsible for deciding which devices
clients and medical staﬀ will be able to authenticate to the system and which data they
will be allowed to access. Because medical data should be cumulative in order to provide
the best possible support for clients, it is recommended that long term key management
be required, and that it be provided by a professional and sophisticated system which can
deliver this service securely and eﬃciently, and update and revoke passwords regularly.
There are several providers of such services and so we do not recommend any
one speciﬁcally. Medicare, Australia, uses the National Authentication Service for
Health Public Key Infrastructure Certiﬁcate for Healthcare Provider Organizations
(medicareaustralia.gov.au); Symantec oﬀers the Verisign public key infrastructure ser-
vice as well as a one-time password methodology to support multi-factor authentication
(http://enterprise.symantec.com). Medical staﬀ and devices, as well as clients are
also serviced by such providers.
The port-knocking protocol described in Figure 5.7 is based on a standard ‘hand-
shake’ concept which is easy to implement between any two devices.
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In this work, we encrypt sensitive data by using asymmetric techniques ECC and
RSA, and encrypt non-sensitive data by using the symmetric encryption technique AES,
as explain in [SZBB12a], for maintaining security and eﬃciency. In advance of sending
the data, the User and DTC module each ﬁrst establish three secret keys. Two are
asymmetric key pairs based on Elliptic Curves (EC) and RSA; the third is a symmetric
key based on AES and needs to be agreed on by both parties. These are needed in order
to complete the communication steps described in Figure 5.7.
The RSA keys are permanent while the other keys are session keys only and must be
changed at each data transfer session.
After the User and the DTC have independently generated their RSA public and
private key pairs, they jointly choose a common elliptic curve over a ﬁnite ﬁeld and
separately generate secret random numbers which are used in an elliptic curve scalar
multiplication to produce their corresponding public session ECC keys.
The third keys are generated using AES. In this step both the User and the DTC again
use secret random numbers to perform elliptic curve scalar multiplication and produce
the symmetric AES session key.
The adjacent Section 5.4 presents a system designed to enhance privacy protection of
sensitive data downloaded to a mobile client device from a remote server. Also, employed
the security and privacy module from the Section 5.2 to reinforce the data privacy.
5.4 Our Proposed Third Module of Architecture:
Securing Data Privacy on Client-side/Mobile
Devices
When providing critical emergency care in a remote location, a local response team
needs access to the patient’s healthcare data. Such healthcare data is protected by
privacy rules and laws in most jurisdictions. It is therefore a challenge to be able to
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provide the response team with the relevant data while protecting the privacy of that
data. In this section we present a system designed to enhance privacy protection of
sensitive data downloaded to a mobile client device from a remote server, such as in the
case of accessing medical information in emergency situations.
The evolution of mobile technology has facilitated remote access to various databases.
There are established methods to protect the data while in transit, but protecting data
on the user device is still an issue [WRR09]. A major challenge is that mobile equip-
ment can easily fall into the wrong hands, while the often limited resources make data
protection diﬃcult. Health-related data frequently needs access from remote locations,
such as for out-of-hospital care or in emergency scenarios, and maintaining the privacy
of data downloaded to a mobile device is an essential requirement [MBR11], [WERR07],
[WRER08].
This section describes a solution that provides a good level of privacy protection of
downloaded data at aﬀordable cost and provides more security features than previous
work in the literature. In particular, our solution:
• enforces privacy at the user end
• authenticates the mobile hardware, the software running on it and the user
• has a ﬂexible, and so scalable, architecture provided by a modular approach.
We integrate data privacy techniques in a novel way with classical security methods
including encryption and one-time-passwords. At the user end, this gives us the capability
of preventing the unwanted ﬁle-related functions of copying, saving and redistribution of
the ﬁle.
5.4.1 System Architecture: The Client-Side Module
Our system is designed for enhanced privacy protection of sensitive data downloaded
to a mobile client device from a remote server, such as in the case of accessing medical
information in emergency situations. The data server is not part of this section; any data
sent to it (such as authentication data) or obtained from it (such as medical data) is not
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interpreted by the system described in this work. The server side detail components are
described in Section 5.3.
Our full architecture includes several clients, all accessing the one server. To simplify
the explanations, in the system model here we present only one client, as shown in
Figure 5.5. The client can be a resource-constrained remote device (RCRD), such as a
smartphone, tablet PC or a laptop, with limited battery life, low computational power,
and moderate storage capacity. On the server side, a Trust Server (TS) handles the
privacy and security aspects, and every transfer between the client and the data server
is under the control of the TS. The server side is assumed to have no threats from the
inside; we provide protection only against external attacks.
Figure 5.5. System Architecture: The Client Side Module
To secure the connection, the participants are authenticated and the connection is
protected. We perform authentication on three levels: device, software and user. First,
the device is authenticated by checking its ID, such as the IMEI number for 3G phones
or MAC address for WiFi connections. Then, the client side has to send a preliminarily
agreed port-knocking code to prove that it is running the appropriate software. Finally,
the user has to perform an ordinary login procedure.
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We provide data protection both during transit and in the end-user device. TLS
(http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246) protects the data while traveling across net-
works; it was chosen because it is widely available and provides interoperability between
diﬀerent platforms. We provide additional conﬁdentiality and privacy protection in the
application layer to cater for the mobile nature of the client device.
In the following subsections, we describe the components of our architecture.
5.4.2 Client-Side Sub-Modules
We have augmented the RCRD with a proxy module to provide privacy and security
protection. The RCRD proxy operates in conjunction with a proxy module in the TS.
(See Figure 5.5.) We do not show the applications communicating with the data server
here, except for the user interface part that our system makes use of.
1. User interface The user interface is our system’s only visible part to the user. It
is used for inputting user authentication data, which is forwarded to the TS. All
other modules of the system are not visible to the user.
2. RCRD Proxy sub-module The Proxy performs three major tasks in the system.
(i) ﬁlters URLs and IP addresses for outgoing connections, (ii) builds and maintains
a secure connection to the Trust Server, and (iii) provides privacy protection to data
downloaded into the client device.
The RCRD proxy does not interact with the user and its operation is transparent
to the end user, to facilitate operation when the user has to concentrate on other,
vital tasks, as is the case in medical emergencies. It has three sub-modules: the
request ﬁltering unit (RFU), the secure connection builder (SCB), and the ﬁle
privacy enforcer (FPE); each sub-module corresponds to one of the three functions
listed above.
3. RFU sub-module The Request Filtering Unit performs simple access control for
connection requests. For outgoing requests, it checks if connections are allowed to
be set up to the URL or IP address of the remote peer mentioned in the request,
and if yes, what sort of connection needs to be set up; for example it may need data
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conﬁdentiality (encryption) or privacy protection. Incoming connection requests are
also ﬁltered, to prevent links to unknown (and possibly rogue) peers. As the mobile
device is likely to be used by various legitimate users, this is a basic protection
against unintended use.
4. SCB sub-module The user-to-data server communication has to go through a
secure communication channel, to protect the data. Building up this channel starts
with a three-level authentication. On the device level, the RCRD is authenticated
to the Trust server by forwarding its ID. Next, on the software level we employ a
port-knocking mechanism, in which the client module automatically sends a prelim-
inarily agreed code to the Trust Server. If the code is correct, the Trust Server will
accept the incoming connection request, and a communication channel with TLS
protection is built up between the RCRD and the Trust Server. The port-knocking
code is calculated separately on both sides, and it requires synchronization of the
clocks on the client and server sides to some degree. Upon successful completion of
device and software authentication, a third authentication on the user level takes
place, and this time the messages go through the TLS connection established ear-
lier. On the client side the user is asked to enter a username that is forwarded to
the TS. Upon receiving the login request, the TS generates a one-time password
(OTP) and sends it to the user via a diﬀerent channel (SMS). The user has to
enter this password, and the SCB sub-module sends it back to the TS. If the TS
receives the correct password, communication via the connection will be enabled.
If the password is not correct or does not reach the TS within a speciﬁc amount of
time, the connection is closed. Each login attempt triggers the generation of a new
password. The password is sent to the phone number registered against the user-
name in the TS. Users are required to use a mobile phone separate from the RCRD
itself; this is likely to be their usual personal mobile. We increased protection by
requiring two devices, the RCRD and a mobile phone for successful authentication.
We assume that they do not fall into the wrong hands at the same time. If the
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RCRD is compromised, the legal user still gets notiﬁcation about each login at-
tempt via the reception of a new password. As both generation and checking of the
OTP take place on the server side, the user does not need to carry extra devices for
generating the password, and the password-generating algorithm can be changed
without notifying any of the other participants.
5. FPE sub-module The proxy monitors all data transfer of the established con-
nection, and if a ﬁle of a particular data type (e.g. pdf) arrives from the server,
the privacy- enforcer module will be activated. The FPE sub-module is the imple-
mented part of our proposed ﬁrst module, is describe in Section 5.2. The purpose of
the FPE sub-module is to ensure privacy and security of the protected information
by not allowing certain operations in the associated data viewer which could lead to
unauthorized access, such as copy or save. The data received from the server is in
encrypted form and is stored in that form to provide protection within the mobile
device as well. It is decrypted only for display. Furthermore, the FPE will erase
the data from local memory (including the cache) in the RCRD after the user exits
the data viewer. Data sent by the TS and is encrypted using AES (key length: 256
bits); decryption is done at the user side in the FPE. Our implementation uses Java
1.6.0 with ﬁle handlers for jpeg and pdf ﬁles and Java Cryptographic Architecture
for AES. (For more details see Subection 5.7.4.) The FPE module is also a place-
holder for enhanced privacy-protection, such as additional algorithms to improve
both security and data usability at the same time.
5.4.3 Protocol Operation
The ﬂow of messages and their relative timings in our protocol are summarized and
shown in Figures 5.6 and 5.7 respectively.
We devided our protocol operations into two ﬁgures. The ﬁrst Figure 5.6 presents the
ﬂow of messages between ‘User’, ‘RCRD Proxy’, ‘TS Proxy’ and ‘TS’. These sub-modules
are deﬁned in Figure 5.5 of client-side. Our ﬁrst Figure 5.6 of protocol operation will
not give the detail ﬂow of messages between sub-modules of server-side module. The
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Figure 5.6. Flow Diagram of the Proposed Protocol- A general Process
ﬂow of messages between sub-modules of server-side module are described in Figure 5.7.
The Figure 5.7 presents the ﬂow of messages between sub-modules of server-side i.e.
‘Client device’ i.e. User as deﬁned in Figure 5.6, ‘Security-checking Server (ScS)’, ‘User
Authentication Checking (UAC)’, ‘Data Transfer Control (DTC)’ and ‘Data Server’.
The protocol starts with authentication in two steps: device authentication followed
by user authentication. In the ﬁrst step the RCRD proxy sends out the agreed port-
knocking code immediately followed by a TLS connection request (client hello). If a
valid client device ID and the correct port-knocking code are received, the TS accepts
the connection request and a TLS connection is set up.
In the second step, the user is asked to enter the username via the user interface,
which is forwarded to the server side via the TLS connection. The TS then generates a
one-time password and sends it to the user via SMS. The user has to enter this password,
which will be forwarded to the server. If the correct password is returned to the TS, the
user is considered to have been authenticated, and the proxy will relay data between the
user and the data server in both directions. At the end of the session, the client logs
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Figure 5.7. Flow Diagram of the Proposed Protocol: A detailed Server Side Process
out by exiting the data viewer, and this results in closing the TLS connection. There
is a maximum inactive connection time as well, after which the server automatically
disconnects the client. This provides safety when the user forgets to log out, a frequently
occurring scenario in emergency cases.
The server-side proxy also monitors the type of the data to be sent, and certain data
types are encrypted before being forwarded to the client.
The next Section 5.5 presents our proposed complete architecture which includes all
three proposed modules from the above Sections 5.2, 5.3 and 5.4 respectively.
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5.5 Communication Between Server and Client-
Sides
This section provides our proposed complete architecture which includes all three
modules, are described in Sections 5.2, 5.3 and 5.4. Our proposed ﬁrst module is incor-
porated in both server-side module as ‘Data Privatization’ sub-module in Subsection 3
and client-side module as ‘File Privacy Enforcer’ sub-module in Subsection 5.
The client side module is presented in Section 5.4 for enhanced privacy protection
of sensitive data downloaded to a mobile client device from a remote server, such as
in the case of accessing medical information in emergency situations. We discussed the
detail components of client side modules in Subsection 5.4.1. We presented a detailed
description of server side module in Section 5.3. The main component on the server side
is the data repository whose data the RCRD user wants to access. Our focus is how the
source of the access request is veriﬁed, and how this server’s response is securely delivered
to the user. Server side security is provided by our Trust Server. Each client-side module
has a corresponding partner on the server side: a secure connection building module
(ScS), a user authentication module (AUC) and a privacy protection module (DTC).
Detail description of the server side components are presented in Subsection 5.3.1. We
present our complete architecture i.e. communication between Server and Client sides in
Figure 5.8.
Our proposed architecture of communication between server and client sides provides
a fast solution for accessing health-care data from a mobile device in a secure manner.
Security was provided by authenticating the participants: equipment, software and user.
First, the device ID is checked against a list of authorized RCRDs, eliminating requests
from rogue devices. The software must be able to generate a port-knocking code, and,
combined with the device ID-check, this protects the server from port scanning and denial
of service attacks.
The User must have a preliminarily registered contact phone, where the server will
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Figure 5.8. System Architecture: Communication between Server and Client Modules
send a one-time password. Using a OTP instead of prearranged passwords improves
usability as well as eﬃciency for a health-care worker in an emergency scenario. To
introduce additional security, a second device is involved, but rather than having a sep-
arate OTP generator, we assume the availability of a phone carried by the user. Using a
separate channel (SMS) makes eavesdropping more diﬃcult, and, in addition, users get
SMS notiﬁcation if someone is trying to access the server by using their login name. As
the OTP is generated and checked by the same module, there is no need for password
synchronization between diﬀerent modules.
The method employed in the proposed architecture uses certiﬁcates for authentication
and negotiates a cipher suite for encryption, thereby protecting the data in transit from
unauthorized access. The modular architecture allows additional, privacy preserving
features. The data is stored in encrypted form on the RCRD, and is decrypted only for
display. This prevents usable data from being left on the device unintentionally, an often
occurring scenario in an emergency.
Section 5.6 exhibits the comparative analysis between our proposed architecture and
mentioned several papers in Section 2.5 of Chapter 2. These papers built architectures
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to deal with an environment similar to ours: a low-resource device is used in a remote
location to pull private patient information from a server.
5.6 Comparison with Other Architectures
5.6.1 Comparison based on Architecture Attributes
In Section 2.5 of Chapter 2, we mentioned several papers which built architectures
to deal with an environment similar to ours: a low-resource device is used in a remote
location to pull private patient information from a server. Here, we compare that work
with our architecture based on what we believe are the critical points, and summarize
the details in Table 5.1.
A modular structure of an architecture provides it with ﬂexibility for adaptation to
varied environments and also with the ability to grow with the client base, and so we
list modularity as one of the valuable features of an architecture designed to provide the
User with data as a service.
We also consider the security of the communication mechanisms and apply weightings
to the security provided. Following [SZM+12], for password security, Level 0 refers to
no passwords used at all; Level 1 refers to a user-generated password or one generated by
any participant and not changed regularly; Level 2 refers to a regularly refreshed OTP
(one-time-password) supplied to the User from the server end. For access security,
Level 0 refers to the use of an organizational ID; Level 1 refers to the generation and use
of a OTP as well as organization ID; Level 2 refers to those mechanisms used in Level 1 as
well as a second, independent OTP or password generation provided by a means diﬀerent
from that used for the ﬁrst OTP. (In our architecture, the port knocking pattern is the
second OTP.) For data security, Level 0 refers to no use of encryption; Level 1 refers to
the use of encryption on either the channels used or the data being communicated, but
not both; Level 2 refers to the use of encryption on both the channels used and the data
being communicated.
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The work of Mirkovic et al.
The authors of [MBR11] propose an architecture for securing mobile access to data
from an electronic health record system. A made-for-purpose application is installed
in advance on the mobile device but is independent of the device and mobile service
provider. In their implementation, a request from a user to the health service provider
is forwarded to an identity server to conﬁrm user identity, and subsequently, the user re-
quest is forwarded to the authentication provider for authentication. While they indicate
an SMS PIN push, which the user uses to generate an encrypted challenge, the result-
ing one-time-password generation at the authentication provider end was not actually
implemented in their scheme.
Thus, the user is identiﬁed by means of an organization identiﬁer (for example, the
medical service in which the user works) and the mobile device is identiﬁed by a sub-
scription number to a GSM or UMTS mobile network. The user must also be registered
with the health service provider, the identity server and the authentication provider.
The communication protocol operation needs a user to communicate with three dif-
ferent servers in [MBR11], while in our approach, the user deals directly only with one
server (the Security-checking Server). The use of three servers rather than one increases
the opportunity available for slowing down the operation of the overall system. In addi-
tion the architecture of [MBR11] lacks a mechanism for ﬁle processing after data has been
downloaded from the server to the mobile device. In our system, we prevent ﬁle-related
functions such as copying, saving or distribution of the ﬁle; moreover, the ﬁle is erased
from the cache as soon as the user exits it.
In the implementation of Mirkovic et al. (2011) [MBR11], a request from a user to
the health service provider is forwarded to an identity server to conﬁrm user identity, and
subsequently, the user request is forwarded to the authentication provider. Authentica-
tion is based on two factors: user identity is ﬁrst submitted to the identity server, and
once this has been veriﬁed, a OTP is supplied by the authentication provider allowing the
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user to log in to the service provider and complete a request for information. Successful
receipt of the OTP via a secure channel is deemed to be the second authentication factor.
Like [MBR11], we require the use of a OTP sent via a secure channel, however, in our
case it is only provided after two other items have been used as identiﬁcation: the ﬁrst is
User identity and the second is a pattern for use in a port-knocking scheme designed to
protect the security checking server from malicious attacks, but to gain the User access
based on their knowledge of a previously agreed pattern. We also note that the com-
munication protocol operation needs a User to communicate with three diﬀerent servers
in [MBR11], while in our approach, the User deals directly only with one server (the
Security Checking Server). The use of three servers rather than one may slow down the
operation of the overall system, which can cost valuable time in an emergency situation.
While the authors of [MBR11] identify their mobile device by means of a network
subscription number and registration with the identity server, in addition to such iden-
tiﬁcation, we authenticate the device by means of a port knocking mechanism. (See
Subection 5.4.2.)
The Work of Weerasinghe et al.
We focus particularly here on the paper [WRR09] in which there is a detailed descrip-
tion of a ‘security capsule’ embedded in the mobile device. In fact, it is the authentication
service in their architecture that installs this capsule in the mobile device. It is assumed
that the capsule is secure, while the mobile device is susceptible to attacks. A password
is used to gain access to the mobile device. The security capsule can store encrypted
data and is also used to authenticate the device to other parties and to encrypt commu-
nication channels between the device and other parties. Only encrypted data is stored
in the security capsule, and it is decrypted there on user request. The data interface on
the mobile device cannot be changed or saved.
Authentication of the mobile device and user to the healthcare operator is based
on a member ID, a OTP, some key material provided through a second channel and
a token which is encrypted and includes a time-stamp [WERR07]. This is similar to
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Table 5.1. Comparison of Key Attributes of Architectures in the Literature with Our
Proposed Architecture
References
− − − − −
Attributes
Singh
[SZBB12b]
Weerashinghe
et al [WR11]
Mirkovic et
al [MBR11]
Proposed Model
Level of
Password
Security
2 2 2 2
Level of
Access
Security
1 2 1 2
Level of
Data Secu-
rity
2 2 2 2
Privacy
Features
Middleware
based lim-
ited privacy
control
Encryption
with public
keys
Out of band
OTP transfer
for access
control
Out of band OTP
transfer for access
control. Use of
symmetric encryp-
tion Randomized
privacy preserving
method
Security
Features
Selective
encryption
based on
data type
3 types of to-
kens for au-
thorisations
No extra
operations
beyond TLS
(HTTPS)
Selective encryp-
tion based on data
type
Complexity
of server
interaction
Single server Single server Three servers Single server
Transparent
to User
With limita-
tions
Yes Yes Yes
Module
structure
of architec-
ture
N/A Yes Yes Yes
System im-
plemented?
No Yes Yes Yes
the scheme of [MBR11] (although the authors of [MBR11] implement it without their
equivalent of the key material). Weerasinghe et al [WERR07] point out that the use of
a time-stamp prevents a replay attack; this is also true with the use of a OTP. In their
architecture, the communications used in authenticating the mobile device are encrypted
using symmetric encryption. Once the authentication is given, the healthcare operator
provides a public/private key pair to the user and then any conﬁdential patient data
187
is sent using the private key of the patient; this is the fundamental privacy preserving
mechanism used in this architecture.
The Table 5.1 is presented comparative analysis of our proposed architecture with
existing architectures. The Table 5.1 presents the comparison analysis based on ‘Level
of Password Security’, ‘Access Security Level’, ‘Data Security Level’, ‘Privacy Features’,
‘Security Features’, ‘Complexity of Server Interaction’, ‘Transparent Features’, ‘Modular
Structure’, and ‘Implementation Features’.
Section 5.7 demonstrates the experimental analysis of our proposed architecture which
is described in Section 5.5 and performs the comparison analysis in three fold: privacy,
security and eﬃciency. Also, implements the test analysis of responsiveness of the server,
mobile device end and the communication between client and server.
5.7 Experiment Analysis
This section discuss the experimental analysis of our proposed architecture described
in Section 5.5.
The experimental work is presented in three parts. In the ﬁrst part, I present the
simulation results of the proposed architecture and comparison with analogous data on
existing solutions. The basis of the comparison was three-fold: privacy, security and
eﬃciency, experimentally analysed in Subsection 5.7.2. In the second part of the experi-
ment, I test the responsiveness of the server and the communication setup. I calculated
the time needed for the authentication process to be completed between the client and
server. I also comparatively analysed the existing method with the proposed architecture
of Server side module, experimentally analysed in Subsection 5.7.3. In the last part of
the experiment, I focus on the mobile device end and the communication between client
and server, experimentally analysed in Subsection 5.7.4.
5.7.1 Experimental Setup
I developed a mobile application and server architecture to simulate the proposed
solution.
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Mobile Client Device Setup
For development of the mobile application I used Nokia Symbian Belle SDK v1.0
(http://www.developer.nokia.com/info/sw.nokia.com/id/ec866fab-4b76-49f6-b5a5)-
(af0631419e9c/S60_All_in_One_SDKs.html) integrated with Eclipse Pulsar IDE
(http://www.developer.nokia.com/Community/Wiki/Developing_MIDlets_using_
Pulsar_and_Eclipse). I used Java 2 Platform Micro Edition (J2ME) cryptography
library [Hoo05] with BouncyCastle for the AES encryption and decryption. Also, I tested
using an HTC Wildﬁre phone (Android OS, internal storage: 146 MB, additional SD &
phone storage: 1.7 GB). The RCRD was emulated on an Android emulator 4.0.3 (API
Level: 15) using Eclipse indigo 3.7.0 (http://www.eclipse.org/).
Server-Side Setup
For the server side implementation, we used the Tomcat 7.0 server (http://tomcat.
apache.org/download-70.cgi) integrated with Eclipse IDE for Java EE Develop-
ers (http://eclipse.org/downloads/packages/eclipse-ide-java-ee-developers/
indigosr2). The main reasons for choosing mobile platform Eclipse Pulsar IDE and
Tomcat 7.0 server integrated with Eclipse IDE for Java EE Developers as development
platform are: portability of Java code and wide implementation on almost all mobile plat-
forms, possibility to process data locally on a mobile device and reduce network traﬃc.
Server-side Database Setup
For storing patient’s health data I use a MySQL 5.6 (http://dev.mysql.com/
downloads/) database at the server end.
Hardware Requirement Setup
The hardware environment was a laptop with Intel (R) Core (TM) i5 CPU, 2.27 GHz
and 3GB RAM and the setup was conﬁgured on a windows 7 operating system.
5.7.2 Experiment 1: Simulation Results of Proposed Architec-
ture and Comparison Study
This subsection describes the ﬁrst part of the experiment. I compare a number of
solutions in the research literature to the proposed solution, described in Section 5.5. In
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order to make fair comparisons, I simulated each method based on a common data set
but adapted the data format as needed for each method. The basis of comparison was
three fold: privacy, security and eﬃciency.
Privacy Comparison
In the tests, four recent, existing solutions [Swe02a], [CRKK09], [PP09] and [MZB10]
are selected for comparison with the proposed solution; each representing a commonly
adopted privacy scheme. The one in [Swe02a] implements a generalization technique,
[MZB10] presents a random reordering technique, [CRKK09] describes a dummy data
inserting technique and [PP09] gives details of a data transformation technique. Test
conditions and the environment are the same for all examined solutions, including the
same sample data set. We assumed no background-related attacks. The parameters are
chosen based on the papers. As the proposed method improves on security aspects of the
existing approach of [MZB10], the privacy performance of the two methods are expected
to be similar. In the ﬁgures PM stands for the proposed method. The same micro table
[Zha10], a matrix containing personal information, is used in all our privacy tests, and it
is generated from the experimental data in [Swe02a], [CRKK09] and [PP09]. It contains
16 patients (rows) and 5 attributes (columns); two of the attributes are sensitive data
and three of them are non-sensitive.
In our evaluation tests, ﬁve metrics commonly used in privacy research papers were
used: data accuracy, identiﬁcation probability (ip), overhead, entropy and distribution.
Data accuracy measures the changes, or lack thereof, when processing the data. The
identiﬁcation probability is the probability of identifying a particular patient from a
given micro table. We assume that the identiﬁcation probability for the original data is
100%, while for the dummy data it is 0%. The formula used in the calculations is
ip =
(Math.floor((
∑MP
i=1 (
1
MP
× ipi))× 100))
100
(5.7.1)
where Math.floor is the conventional truncating function that cuts the digits after the
decimal point; MP is the number of patients and ipi is the identiﬁcation probability for
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each patient. Overhead is the data added to the original data set, and includes decryption
keys, dummy data and so on. More privacy usually entails higher overhead. Entropy
in privacy protection measures data uncertainty; higher entropy means that additional
background information is needed to identify a particular person. Distribution indicates
how much original information has been kept.
Figure 5.9. Data Accuracy and Identiﬁcation Probability
Figure 5.9 shows how the identiﬁcation probability changes when data accuracy is
set at diﬀerent values. The ﬁgure shows that data accuracy in the proposed method and
also in that of [MZB10] is always 100% regardless of identiﬁcation probability, while for
[Swe02a], the identiﬁcation probability is rising linearly when data accuracy is increasing.
The identiﬁcation probability result for [CRKK09] ﬂuctuates between 18 and 33.5 and
data accuracy is stable at around 77%. The approach of [PP09] encrypts data and so its
data accuracy is considered to be 0%. Hence, its result is not drawn in the graph.
Figure 5.10. Number of People and Identiﬁcation Probability %
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Figure 5.10 illustrates the trend when the number of patients is increasing. In this
test, lower identiﬁcation probability indicates better performance. The ﬁgure shows that
the proposed method is able to keep the identiﬁcation probability under 5% while the
methods of [Swe02a] and [CRKK09] are signiﬁcantly higher than that. Because of using
encryption, [PP09] has a 0% identiﬁcation probability in this test.
Figure 5.11. Identiﬁcation Probability % and Overhead Unit
Figure 5.11 shows the low overhead of the proposed solution when compared to the
others and illustrates how reducing the probability of identiﬁcation can increase data
overhead. Identiﬁcation probability (ip) was calculated according to the formula pre-
sented earlier, while overhead was measured as the number of additional micro table
data entries (units).
A common expectation is that better privacy entails higher overhead, and the be-
havior of methods [Swe02a] and [CRKK09] are consistent with this. The solution of
[CRKK09] has a much higher overhead than the others. In case of algorithm [Swe02a],
the overhead increases sharply when the identiﬁcation probability drops below 10%, and
it gradually decreases when the identiﬁcation probability increases. However, it is still
higher than that of solution [MZB10] and of the proposed method; the latter two can
keep the overhead at a constant low level, even when the identiﬁcation probability is low.
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The overhead of [PP09] is only related to the number of the patients and does not
involve identiﬁcation probability, and thus it is not shown in the ﬁgure.
Figure 5.12. Entropy
Figure 5.12 shows the entropy of the processed data. Higher entropy gives higher
uncertainty about the original data. In the test result, the proposed method is around
40% better than the second best solution.
Figure 5.13. Distribution
Figure 5.13 shows the data distribution for diﬀerent approaches. The solution de-
scribed in [MZB10] and the proposed method [PM] do not change the data. Hence, a
single line starting at (18, 1) represents three sets of values: these two solutions and the
original data. The approach proposed in [CRKK09] approximates the original data quite
well, as indicated by the line starting at (18, 2). K- anonymity [Swe02a] arranges the
data in three groups and the actual values within each group are not known; this is indi-
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cated by the three shaded blocks in the ﬁgure. The solution described in [PP09] is also
a grouping method, but it maintains the order of data within a group without revealing
the real values; the corresponding line starts at (18, 0) in the ﬁgure.
Security Comparison
The architectures presented in [Swe02a], [CRKK09] and [PP09], which are discussed
in Subsection 5.7.2, did not consider the security aspects of electronic data during trans-
mission. Only [MZB10] uses a cryptographic approach to maintaining the privacy level
and providing security. In this section, I compare the proposed architecture with that in
[MZB10] on the basis of security.
Data encryption. Since a part of the data being sent is considered to be sensitive,
encryption is a recommended tool for providing both privacy and security. In the pro-
posed architecture, I therefore encrypt all data before sending it to the receiver. In the
interest of eﬃciency, since encryption carries an overhead cost, I propose the use of two
diﬀerent encryption methods, a cheaper one for non-sensitive data and a more expensive
one for sensitive data; in general, the size of the sensitive data set is much smaller than
that of the whole set and symmetric encryption is a cheaper solution for large data sets.
Use of session key. If a secret key is captured by an attacker and has not been
changed, the attacker may use the key to pretend to be someone else, or to read conﬁ-
dential data. (This is the case in the proposal of [MZB10].) Thus, frequent changes of
a secret key are an additional recommendation for security. The EC (asymmetric and
symmetric) sessional keys described in Section 5.2 allow a user to reserve a single secret
key but use it to generate new session keys each time data is to be sent to a receiver.
This same session key is used in the salt generation component of the architecture as
described in Section 5.2 and so needs to be changed each time the sender and receiver
transmit and receive data.
Eﬃciency Analysis of Proposed Architecture
Experimental setup. The experiment was performed on a 3.20 GHz CPU with i5
processor using the Windows 7, 64-bit operating system. Four tests were run on 256, 512,
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1024 and 2048 bits as the total data set size respectively. For each test, I chose sensitive
data to be multiples of 64 bits. Table 5.2 gives the actual numbers used as sizes of M−P
and of P . I used elliptic curve and RSA encryption for the sensitive data P , and AES
encryption for M − P .
Table 5.2. Encryption Speed and Time of p and m− p Using a Combination of EC and
AES
S.No. Selected
bits P
Encrypt-
ion time
for P
(secs)
Encrypt-
ion
speed
(P ; bits/sec)
Unselec-
ted bits
(M − P )
Encrypt-
ion time
for M − P
(secs)
Encrypt-
ion speed
(M −
P ; bits/sec)
1
0 0 0 256 0.00072 355556
64 0.005 12800 192 0.00048 505263
128 0.0062 20645 128 0.00028 457143
256 0.007 36571 0 0 0
2
0 0 0 512 0.0008 640000
64 0.005 12800 448 0.00077 581818
128 0.0062 20645 384 0.00074 518919
256 0.007 36571 256 0.00072 355556
512 0.0086 59535 0 0 0
3
0 0 0 1024 0.0014 731429
64 0.005 12800 960 0.0010 960000
128 0.0062 20645 896 0.0009 995556
256 0.007 36571 768 0.00089 862921
512 0.0086 59535 512 0.0008 640000
1024 0.010 102400 0 0 0
4
0 0 0 2048 0.0029 706207
64 0.005 12800 1984 0.0025 793600
128 0.0062 20645 1920 0.0021 914286
256 0.007 36571 1792 0.00197 909645
512 0.0086 59535 1536 0.0018 853333
1024 0.010 102400 1024 0.0014 731429
2048 0.021 97524 0 0 0
In assessing eﬃciency, we need to consider the two data sets M and P , and the
diﬀerent encryption algorithms applied to them. An initial approach to preserving data
privacy might be to apply the privacy enhancement method to the entire data set and
encrypt this with the elliptic curve algorithm. Our aim in this section is to demonstrate
that much greater eﬃciency can be achieved by designating only a part of the data set to
be sensitive and separating encryption methods based on this. Hence, in the two tables
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in this section, I measure performance based on encryption time and speed and separate
the data into P and M − P .
The parameters used to assess performance are:
• Encryption time (and speed) for the sensitive data set.
• Encryption time (and speed) for the non-sensitive data set.
where the encryption time (CPU time) is considered as the time for the encryption
algorithm to produce a cipher text from the original plain text. The speed of encryption
is calculated by, speedofencryption = (sizeofplaintext(bits))/(encryptiontime(secs))
The results are discussed in the experimental analysis.
Table 5.3. Encryption Speed and Time of M Using EC
Test
No.
File Size in
Bits (M)
Encryption
time for
M(secs)
Encryption
speed
(M ; bits/sec)
1 256 0.018 14222
2 512 0.021 24381
3 1024 0.034 30118
4 2048 0.046 44522
Experimental analysis. When applying the architecture proposed in Section 5.5
to a set M of data, the two diﬀerent encryption paths are used in parallel. Thus, the
total time to run the complete process is the maximum time needed to run either one
separately.
From Table 5.2, we see that AES encryption is always faster than EC encryption,
and hence the smaller P is chosen to be, the faster we can run the entire protocol; the
table shows that the smaller P is relative to M , the faster the encryption time. Table 5.3
shows the worst case scenario (most time and slowest speed) where all data is encrypted
using the elliptic curve method applied to sensitive data.
The best case scenario occurs when all data is encrypted using AES, however, in this
case, no privacy enhancement was applied. From a privacy perspective, the research
challenge here is to ﬁnd the smallest set of sensitive data P from a given data set M as
this will provide greatest eﬃciency.
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Proof of Security
In this section I analyze the added security provided by the proposed scheme which
is missing in [MZB10]. In an online environment, when data is transmitted between two
or more parties, then a number of attacks are possible. Here I consider three attacks
which are particularly important when sensitive data is being transmitted. These are
the Man-In-The-Middle attack [JDS09], the Isomorphic attack [SS10a] and the Denial
of Decryption attack [LAS07]. The Man-In-TheaˆMiddle attack is designed to allow an
attacker to intercept, read, and possibly change information being sent between two
parties. The Isomorphic attack is designed to allow an attacker to capture the secret key
of a receiver when a certain type of elliptic curve [Koy95] has been chosen. The Denial
of Decryption attack is designed to convince a sender to use an incorrect public key or
to introduce garbage into the transmission from S to r, thus denying the receiver the
opportunity to decrypt the message. I show that these attacks can be used against the
architecture described in [MZB10], while none works in the proposed architecture.
1. Man-In-The-Middle Attack (Key Establishment)
Often during symmetric key setup a Man-In-The-Middle attack is possible. Here I
show how the proposed architecture prevents it.
Deﬁnition 5.7.1. Where two parties S and R exchange information over an inse-
cure channel in order to establish a common key, a person can intercept and pretend
to be R to S and pretend to be S to R, thus establishing a common key with each
separately. The interceptor can then communicate seamlessly with R and S making
them believe that they are communicating with each other. This is known as the
‘man-in-the-middle’ attack for key establishment.
Theorem 5.7.2. Our architecture is secure from the man-in-the-middle attack dur-
ing key setup of the symmetric key.
Proof. In Subsection 5.2.3, S and R jointly choose an elliptic curve E over a ﬁnite
ﬁeld GF (p), p a prime number, and a point PE on E. The prime p, the elliptic
curve E and the point PE are public domain parameters. S generates a secret
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random number KS in the interval [1, p − 1] and then performs an elliptic curve
scalar multiplication to get the corresponding public key QS = KS.PE. Similarly,
R generates the key pair (KR, QR). Now KS and KR are secret keys for S and R
respectively.
To generate the symmetric key for use with the AES cipher, R and S use their
public keys and each easily generate K = KS.KR.PE independently without the
need to send any additional information over a channel. Thus, no data needs to be
exchanged.
2. Man-In-The-Middle Attack (Data Theft) The use of an ECDH (http://
technet.microsoft.com/zh-cn/library/cc488016.aspx) key exchange does not
prevent an interceptor from stealing data because it does not authenticate the public
key of receiver. Here, however, I show that the architecture prevents this attack.
Figure 5.14. Man-In-The Middle Attack (Data Theft)
Deﬁnition 5.7.3. Once S sends data to R, an interceptor can pretend to be R
and enter into a protocol with S to reveal the sensitive data destined for R. This is
known as a man-in-the-middle attack for data theft. The protocol is played out as
in Figure 5.2.
Theorem 5.7.4. Our architecture is secure from the man-in-the-middle attack for
data theft.
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Proof. S wants to send sensitive data P to R. As in Figure 5.2, S ﬁrstly sends
eR.K
−1
S .P to R. An attacker A intercepts the message eR.K
−1
S .P and tries to modify
it by randomly choosing an element α and then sending α.eR.K
−1
S .P encrypted with
eS to S. Thus S obtains α.eR.P by multiplying by K
−1
S and the secret key dS. S
then sends α.eR.P to R, which is intercepted by A, from which A gets eRP . Here,
A cannot obtain the sensitive data P due to the fact that it is computationally
infeasible to derive P from eRP .
3. Isomorphic Attack When considering this attack, I use the mathematical no-
tations which are described in Section 5.2. In the Isomorphic attack [SS10a] an
attacker A wants to get R to sign a message generated by A pretending that it
came from S, and use this to obtain R’s secret key. I show here how this can be
achieved when the elliptic curve E chosen has the special form over a ﬁnite ﬁeld
GF (p) where p is a prime.
y2 + axy = x3where, a = 0 (5.7.2)
In this attack, A wants R to sign the message M = (mx,my) chosen by A. A
obtains the public key, QR, of R, and generates a random number u from the set
[2, p− 1]. A then generates the new message
M
′
= (u2mx(modQR), u
3my(modQR)) (5.7.3)
Now, A sends M
′
to R pretending to be S and asks R to sign it. R signs using its
secret key, KR, obtaining S
′
= KR.M
′
= KR.(u
2mx(modQR), u
3my(modQR)) and
sends this to A.
Because of the special form of the elliptic curve, it has been shown [Koy95] that the
set of points of E is isomorphic to the set of non-zero elements of GF (p). Hence,
A can re-compute this equation in GF (p), invert the corresponding value for M
′
there and calculate KR, thus obtaining the secret key of R.
Theorem 5.7.5. Our architecture is secure against the Isomorphic attack.
Proof. Given that the elliptic curve E has the special form over a ﬁnite ﬁeld GF (p),
y2 + axy = x3 (5.7.4)
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p a prime, A chooses the messageM = (mx,my), obtains the EC asymmetric public
nth session key, QnR, of R, and generates a random number u from the set [2, p− 1].
A then generates the new message and sends it to R pretending to be S, and asks
R to sign it.
M
′
= (u2mx(modQ
n
R), u
3my(modQ
n
R)) (5.7.5)
R will only sign this message if R has a current session key in use with S. If it does
not, it requests A for identiﬁcation before it runs a new session. In this case, A will
be detected. However, if there is still a current session key available between R and
S, R signs using its session key, KnR, obtaining S
′
= KnR.M
′
and sends this to A.
As described above, A can now solve this equation for R’s sessional EC asymmetric
key. However, A is only able to use this key until it expires. If A requests new
sensitive data from S it will be required to establish a new session key.
Hence, the Isomorphic attack is not possible in our architecture.
4. Denial of Decryption Attack During elliptic curve encryption/decryption, the
sender S wants to send encrypted sensitive data P to the receiver R. S takes
R’s public key and his identity (or personal information) as input to the encryption
function. However, attacker A, has replaced R’s public key by someone else’s public
key (A’s own public key or a public key of another person). S is unaware of this
replacement and continues to execute the encryption algorithm using R’s identity
and public key not belonging to R. Although A cannot decrypt the cipher text,
neither can R. This is known as a denial of decryption attack on R. While we are
not able to prevent such an attack, our architecture can detect it as shown in the
next theorem.
Theorem 5.7.6. Our architecture is able to detect a Denial of Decryption Attack.
Proof. S wants to send sensitive data to R.S sends eR.K
−1
s .P to R but an adversary
A intercepts it, includes eA and then sends eA.eR.K
−1
s .P to R. Now, R applies her
RSA secret key and encrypts the message with the RSA public key of S and sends
eA.eS.K
−1
s .K
−1
R .P back to S. Now, S calculates eA.K
−1
R .P using his RSA secret key
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Figure 5.15. Denial of Decryption Attack
and multiplying by his ECC secret key. Now S uses R’s RSA public key and sends
eA.eR.K
−1
R .P to R. So R obtains eA.P by applying her two secret keys.
However, R cannot make sense of this message and sends eA.eS.P to S for veriﬁ-
cation (If R sends eA.P to S over an insecure channel, then A can intercept and
compute e−1A .eA.P = P .) If S or R suspects A of an attack, they obtain eA and
compute eA.P , verifying that A was the attacker. However, A can avoid detection
by using a random value not his public key. In any case, such an attack is detected
in our architecture.
5.7.3 Experiment 2: Time Calculation during Authentication
Process
In ﬁrst part of the experiment we experimentally analysed our proposed architecture
provides better privacy, security and eﬃciency in comparison with existing methods.
In order to ensure that our architecture is practical, in the second part of our ex-
periments, we tested the responsiveness of the server and the communication setup. We
calculated the time needed for the authentication process to be completed between the
client and server but did this eliminating external factors that could have inﬂuenced and
varied the results. We also comparatively analysed the methods and results of Mirkovic
et al [MBR11], Weerashinghe et al. [WRR09] and our proposed method (see Tables 5.4
and 5.5).
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The Authentication Time Calculation Results
In order to measure authentication process time, I launched 20 login requests and
calculated the time of every authentication process over a 3G network andWLAN network
(See Table 5.4). In order to minimize unrelated network eﬀects, I ran both RCRD and
TS on the same machine. From the results of Table 5.4 we can see that the time needed
for the authentication process in the proposed method is 4.021 seconds over 3G network
and 2.010 seconds over a WLAN network respectively.
Table 5.4. Time Needed During Our Authentication Process
S. No.
Authentication Steps
Time in Seconds
3G net-
work
WLAN
1. Request for Port Knocking + TLS connection
request
0.0086 0.0002
2. Response sent for the acceptance of Port
Knocking and TLS connection setup
0.585 0.316
3. Ask for Login username 0.678 0.320
4. User ID Inputted 1.203 0.710
5. Redirect (Login validation request sent to
UAC module)
1.707 0.810
6. Sent One-Time Password via SMS to client
device
1.889 0.855
7. SMS push received 2.844 1.545
8. Inputted One-Time Password for veriﬁcation
to TS proxy module
3.718 1.748
9. Response sent to device (User validated) 3.799 1.810
10. Data request sent to Data Server 3.842 1.852
11. Data Server sent Plain text to TS proxy mod-
ule for perturbation method
3.902 1.902
12. Estimated time for Perturbation method 4.006 2.006
13. TS proxy module sent perturbed data to de-
vice (User authenticated successfully)
4.021 2.010
In our architecture, the Data Transfer Control (DTC) module implements the privacy
and security data model of Section 5.2, and so dispenses with the need for any modiﬁca-
tion to the data server as well as enabling the system to work with several servers. Keys
are generated as described in Subsection 5.3.5. The DTC module receives data from the
Data Server in plaintext form and the sensitive data is identiﬁed by the DTC module
as a subset of that data; the module then applies selective encryption to encrypt the
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Table 5.5. Average Time (in secs) During Authentication Process on 3G And WLAN
Network
Methods Used
Mirkovic et
al. (2011)
[MBR11]
Weerashinghe
et al. (2009)
[WRR09]
Proposed
Method
Average authenti-
cation time in Sec-
onds
3G 31.3 7.108 4.021
WLAN
(Wi-Fi)
25.8 4.020 2.010
sensitive data with the asymmetric key (this data is assumed to be relatively small), and
to encrypt the larger non-sensitive data portion with the symmetric key as in [SZBB12b].
The DTC module sends the encrypted data to the User. I used the socket programming
(http://www.oracle.com/technetwork/java/socket-140484.html) to generate keys
between the User and the DTC module in my experiments.
For Internet access Mirkovic et al. [MBR11] use 2.5G, 3G and WLAN networks.
The average time needed for authentication is 49.1 seconds for a 2.5G network, 31.3
seconds for a 3G network and 25.8 seconds for a WLAN network. Thus, their lowest
authentication time is achieved on WLAN networks. Mirkovic et al. [MBR11] did 10
login requests for each authentication. Weerashinghe et al.’s [WRR09] average calculation
was 4.020 seconds on a Wi-Fi network and 7.108 seconds on a 3G data network. For the
authentication process, Weerashinghe et al. [WRR09] did 20 tests for both networks
using a Nokia N8 phone and achieved lower authentication time on the Wi-Fi network.
Existing work [Gar10] conﬁrms the general expectation that 3G network provides better
speed and bandwidth than a 2.5G network, while WLAN (Wi-Fi) (11 mbps) provides
substantially faster transfer rates than the 3G network. So I chose high speed network
for my experiment i.e. 3G and WLAN network.
The comparison with the existing implemented methods of Mirkovic et. al [MBR11]
and Weerashinghe et al. [WRR09] on 3G and WLAN networks is shown in Table 5.5.
The solution of Mirkovic et al [MBR11] is signiﬁcantly slower than the other two, possibly
because of the use of three servers. The performance of the method by Weerashinge et
al [WRR09] is closer to our solution, but it is still only about half as fast; our simpler
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architecture and their use of hefty XML-based messaging may be major contributors to
the diﬀerence.
5.7.4 Experiment 3: Time and Speed Calculation of Privatized
Sensitive Data Downloaded to a Mobile Client Device
Our experiments focused on the mobile device end and the communication between
client and server. We measured the speed of the client-server connection, with and
without port-knocking, decryption time for pdf and jpg ﬁles with AES on the RCRD and
decryption time with an RSA private key of short keystrings, also on the RCRD.
Client-Server Connection Speed.
In the experiment, we launched 20 login requests and calculated the average time to
connect. Both RCRD and TS were running on the same machine to minimize the eﬀect
of network conditions on the results. Moreover, we deleted the step of sending the OTP
in an SMS to eliminate external factors such as human reaction time and phone network
latency in the tests. The average login time was 3.16 sec from clicking on the login button
to the display of the requested page; performing port knocking added 0.82 sec to this.
Table 5.6. Encryption/Decryption Time and Speed of .pdf and .jpg Files (AES 256-bit
key)
File
Size
(KB)
File For-
mat
Encryption
Time
(msec)
Decryption
time
(msec)
Encryption
speed
(KB/msec)
Decryption
speed
(KB/msec)
55
pdf 24.78 22.56 2.219 2.438
jpg 138.24 136.99 0.398 0.401
110
pdf 32.81 31.80 3.353 3.459
jpg 205.57 203.22 0.535 0.541
333
pdf 64.24 62.89 5.184 5.295
jpg 350.82 347.89 0.949 0.957
685
pdf 80.89 79.02 8.468 8.669
jpg 410.21 408.16 1.669 1.678
890
pdf 98.12 96.88 9.071 9.187
jpg 530.22 528.07 1.679 1.685
AES Decryption on RCRD.
I implemented AES decryption with a key length of 256 bits. The main goal was to
compare the decryption times on the RCRD of the two ﬁle formats pdf and jpeg. The
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results are shown in Table 5.6. In the experiments, I considered ﬁle sizes ranging from
55 kb to 890 kb of text and image data, and averaged over 15 runs. The jpg ﬁles were
signiﬁcantly more costly to manage than the pdf ﬁles.
RSA Decryption on RCRD.
Because the AES key is sent encrypted with the receiver’s public RSA key, I measured
the decryption times of small strings of ciphertext. As the keys were regularly changed,
I used short keys: the encryption key used was 18 bits; the decryption key was 8 bits.
Encryption and decryption times for 256 bits of data, for example, were on average 0.0584
and 0.0438 secs respectively.
Section 5.8 discusses the outcomes of the proposed architecture, important ﬁndings,
and limitations of our architecture.
5.8 Discussion
5.8.1 Summary of the Experiments
We observed the following points from the experimental analysis of our proposed
architecture:
• The proposed method addresses eﬃciency, privacy and security issues for online
access of sensitive data.
• The proposed method demonstrates increased speed of encryption/decryption and
reduced overhead when compared to other recent privacy preserving solutions, with-
out compromising on data privacy, accuracy or security of transmissions between
sender and receiver.
• From the privacy aspect, the method proposed here keeps identiﬁcation probabil-
ity under control while maintaining data accuracy. On the other hand, to keep
identiﬁcation probability low, usually communication overhead is increased, either
because dummy data is added or because of extra parameter processing.
• The use of selective encryption in the proposed architecture provides both security
and eﬃciency. We also provided proofs of security against some of the classic attacks
on transmission of sensitive data.
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• Security was provided by authenticating the participants at the client end: equip-
ment, software and User.
• The method employed in the proposed architecture uses certiﬁcates for authenti-
cation and negotiates a cipher suite for encryption, thereby protecting the data in
transit from unauthorized access.
• Safeguarding data after its delivery at the remote end has to consider the security
of the data access device.
• The proposed solution guarantee that the health-care data is displayed to authorized
Users only.
• The data is stored in encrypted form on the RCRD, and is decrypted only for
display. This prevents usable data from being left on the device unintentionally, an
often occurring scenario in an emergency.
• The average login time was 3.16 sec from clicking on the login button to the display
of the requested page; performing port knocking added 0.82 sec to this.
• The encryption key used was 18 bits; the decryption key was 8 bits. Encryption
and decryption times for 256 bits of data, for example, were on average 0.0584 and
0.0438 secs respectively.
• The main goal was to compare the decryption times on the RCRD of the two ﬁle
formats pdf and jpeg. We considered ﬁle sizes ranging from 55 kb to 890 kb of text
and image data, and averaged over 15 runs. The jpg ﬁles were signiﬁcantly more
costly to manage than the pdf ﬁles.
5.8.2 Important Findings
Our performance testing architectures have introduced following major improvements
to existing architectures:
1. Our proposed architecture eﬃciently reduces the overhead and maintains level of
privacy and security of sensitive information in an online environment without
compromising data accuracy.
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2. The proposed architecture overcomes the drawbacks of existing solutions by eﬀec-
tively maintaining levels of security while reducing the time complexity of other
solutions.
3. The proposed architecture demonstrates increased speed of encryption/decryption
and reduces overhead when compared to several recent privacy preserving solu-
tions; it does this without compromising on data privacy, accuracy or security of
transmissions between sender and receiver.
4. Our proposed architecture provides fast solution for accessing health-care data from
a mobile device in a secure manner.
5. The proposed architecture’s operation is faster than techniques used by the other
approaches discussed in the Sections 5.3 and 5.4, likely due to our having a simpler
architecture.
6. Our work has demonstrated the feasibility of providing private patient health data
to medical emergency teams with resource-constrained devices in locations remote
from the server while adhering to relevant privacy policies or laws.
5.8.3 Limitations
Our proposed architecture has three limitations.
1. In ﬁrst module of privacy and security model 5.2, we have not considered the
eﬃciencies available at the receiver by examining resource-constrained (mobile)
devices and bandwidth limitations.
2. In client side module 5.4.1, we provide limited protection against intentional misuse
as we turn oﬀ data saving and manipulating options in the data viewer. Protecting
the screen from being photographed, however, was beyond the scope of the project.
3. In server side module 5.3.2, there is a limit, however, to how far protection of
the sensitive data can go. For instance, no protection against screen-scraping is
provided.
We summarize this chapter in next Section 5.9.
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5.9 Summary of the Chapter
This chapter presented the solution in the context of providing conﬁdential patient
medical aggregated data sets to a health responder far from a hospital environment. We
propose an architecture which handles the ‘challenge’ scenarios of delivering appropriate
medical data sets to a remote location in an emergency situation. These scenarios are
discussed in Section 5.1. Our proposed architecture have three modules: Privacy and
Security model, Server-Side module and Client-Side module, described in Sections 5.2,
5.3 and 5.4 respectively.
Our proposed architecture provides a solution for maintaining the privacy of data
released en masse in a controlled manner, and for providing secure access to the original
data for authorized users. The results show that the solution is provably secure and
maintains privacy in a more eﬃcient manner than previous solutions. The architecture
also provides a solution for delivering health-care data to remote locations. It has three
basic requirements. First, secure channels are needed for data forwarding. Second, where
there is a possibility that the device at the remote end is not properly secured, addi-
tional steps have to be taken to keep the information conﬁdential. Finally, providing
quick access to data is crucial in emergency situations, and the methods used should
not impose unacceptable delays in data access. The architecture provides a solution for
accessing health-care data from a mobile device in a secure manner. Also, the archi-
tecture demonstrated the feasibility of providing private patient health data to medical
emergency teams with resource-constrained devices in locations remote from the server
while adhering to relevant privacy policies or laws.
The next chapter will examine data privatization techniques by testing it against
well-known attacks. Also, indicate how the data privatization technique examined can
be modiﬁed to assist it to withstand these attacks and compare the performance of the
these techniques.
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Chapter 6
Attacks on Data Privatization
Methods
This chapter examines attack analysis on privacy preserving data mining methods.
It will also recently proposed data privatization methods against well-known classical
data-reconstruction methods: Spectral Filtering, Bayes-Estimated Data Reconstruction,
Multiple Data Mining and Fusion, and Known Sample Attack methods. Data Privatiza-
tion methods are described in Section 6.2. The data reconstruction methods: Spectral
Filtering (SPF), Bayes-Estimated Data Reconstruction (BE-DR), Multiple Data Mining
and Fusion (MDMF), and Known Sample Attack (KSA) methods are deﬁned in Section
6.3. I show that all of these data reconstruction methods successfully retrieve a relatively
large (and unacceptable) portion of the original data, described in experiment Section 6.5.
I then indicate how the data privatization methods examined can be modiﬁed to assist
it to withstand these attacks. I compare the strengths of the these data reconstruction
methods based on over 4500 data sets in Section 6.7.
The proposed privatization method is presented in Section 6.6. The proposed method
results show that the solution is provably secure from data reconstruction methods and
maintains privacy and utility than previous solutions, described in Subsection 6.6.2. I
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compare the performance of the proposed method with existing privatization methods
in Section 6.7. I also show that the proposed method has better privacy and lower
information loss than the former methods in Subsection 6.7.2. This chapter links these
ideas and results into a complete architecture.
The chapter is organized as follows. Section 6.1 brieﬂy describes the motivation to
test and analyse existing privatization methods and develop new privatization method.
Section 6.2 present the Chebyshev-based data-privatization methods; This section deﬁned
two perturbation methods; Additive and Hybrid perturbation methods. Additive pertur-
bation method is deﬁned in Subsection 6.2.1 as describe in [Sin12] and Hybrid perturba-
tion method deﬁned in Subsection 6.2.3 as describe in [ZMB]. Summary of Symbols and
Values used are deﬁned in Subsection 6.2.4. Section 6.3 presents the data reconstruction
attack methods; the SPF, the BE-DR, the MDMF and Known Sample Attack methods
respectively. Section 6.4 presents the analysis steps of data reconstruction methods. Sec-
tion 6.5 presents the experimental setup (deﬁned in Subsection 6.5.1), and experimental
results of both existing perturbation methods (Additive [Sin12] and Hybrid [ZMB]) in
Subsection 6.5.2. I presented the revised version of the Hybrid data-privatization method
in Section 6.6. To validate my method, an experimental analysis has been presented and
introduced in Subsection 6.6.2. The comparison analysis is broken into two parts. In
ﬁrst part I did comparison analysis between data reconstruction attack methods for each
privatization method; Additive, Hybrid and The Proposed method deﬁned in Subsection
6.7.1. In second part, I compare the performance of the proposed method with the former
methods in Subsection 6.7.2. Section 6.8 focused on important ﬁndings and limitations
of my work. This chapter is summarized in Section 6.9.
6.1 Introduction
In 1977, Dalenius [Dal77] provided a very stringent deﬁnition of privacy preservation:
access to the published data should not enable the adversary to learn anything extra
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about any target victim compared to no access to the database, even with the presence of
any adversary’s background knowledge obtained from other sources.
Preservation of data privacy is becoming an increasingly important issue in many data
mining applications dealing with sensitive data such as health-care records. A number
of data privacy preserving techniques [AS00], [DZ03], [AA01] and [SZBB12b] have been
developed. In Chapter 3, I have brieﬂy discussed data privacy preserving techniques. Re-
cent interest in the collection and monitoring of data using data mining technology for the
purpose of security and business-related applications has raised serious concerns about
privacy issues. For example, mining health-care data for detection of bio-terrorism may
require analyzing clinical records and pharmacy transaction data of certain oﬀ-the-shelf
drugs. However, combining such diverse data sets belonging to diﬀerent parties may vio-
late privacy laws. Privacy Preserving Data Mining (PPDM) strives to provide a solution
to this dilemma. The PPDM has become an important enabling technology for integrat-
ing data and determining interesting patterns from private collections of databases, thus
improving productivity and competitiveness for many businesses. The PPDM requires
data modiﬁcation, which limits information loss (thus increasing utility), as it is intended
that a legitimate receiver of the modiﬁed data be able to recover the original data needed
for a response.
6.1.1 Attacks on Privacy Preserving Data Mining Methods
I survey a recent body of research aim at better understanding the vulnerabilities of
the PPDM methods. The PPDM methods are described in Section 2.1 of Chapter 2.
I address all possible the PPDM methods in Section 2.2 of Chapter 2: Anonymization,
Perturbation, -Diﬀerential, and Cryptographic based data privatization methods. I also
discuss the attacks on data privatization methods in Chapter 2.
Subsection 2.2.1 of Chapter 2 identiﬁes the detail review of attack analysis on the
anonymization methods. I list most popular anonymization methods in the literature
i.e. k-anonymity, l-diversity, (α, k)-Anonymity, and t-closeness anonymization methods.
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I obtain that these k-anonymity, l-diversity, (α, k)-Anonymity, t-closeness anonymization
methods suﬀer from attribute disclosure, identity disclosure attacks. Subsection 2.2.2
of Chapter 2 determine the attacks on data perturbation methods. This Subsection
deﬁnes mainly two types of data perturbation: additive and multiplicative. In additive
perturbation methods, attackers can extract the original data set using spectral ﬁltering,
principal component analysis, and maximum likelihood estimation reconstruction attack
methods. Multiplicative perturbation methods are suﬀered from known input-output,
known sample attack and ICA attacks. Another data privatization method is -diﬀerential
privacy method, described in Subsection 2.2.3 of Chapter 2. -diﬀerential can not prevent
from the adversarial queries, timing, state, and privacy budget attacks.
Cryptographic based data privatization methods are deﬁned in Subsection 2.2.4 of
Chapter 2. I list the SMC based cryptographic methods, homomorphic encryption, fully
homomorphic encryption, and other recently proposed methods. For most cryptographic
methods, the cost of communication is very high and the encryption operations are
expensive; therefore, cryptographic methods are not practical in large-scale distributed
applications due to its complexity.
I analysed number of best known privatization methods in Chapter 3 and ﬁnd that
the Perturbation methods are good method to privatize sensitive data sets.
6.1.2 Detailed Attack Analysis on Data Perturbation Methods
Several perturbation techniques [AS00], [Dat04], [Liu07], [SZBB12a], [MS99] have
been proposed for mining purposes, but in all these papers, privacy and utility are not
satisfactorily balanced. In the research literature, there are two general approaches to
the PPDM: the randomization approach [DZ03] and the secure multi-party computation
approach [DA01]. In the randomization approach, random noise is added to the origi-
nal data, and only the resulting perturbed data are shared [Dat04], [DZ03], [KDWS03],
[KDWS05]. There are two diﬀerent major randomization methods: the Random Pertur-
bation scheme [Dat04] and the Randomized Response scheme [DZ03].
212
Agrawal and Srikant [AS00] propose a scheme for the PPDM using random perturba-
tion in which a random number is added to the value of each sensitive attribute. It has
been shown [AS00] that this scheme suﬀers from the information loss, but Agrawal and
Aggarwal [AA01] develop a novel reconstruction algorithm called Expectation Maximiza-
tion algorithm which minimizes the data loss of the former scheme. Du and Zhan [DZ03]
also propose an approach to conduct privacy preserving decision tree building based on
the randomized response technique. Liu has proposed a multiplicative method [Liu07]
which improves on the level of privacy achieved in [AS00] and [Dat04], but with reduced
utility.
This leads us to the following research question: Given a data-privatization
method which leaks data under certain attacks, can it be improved to with-
stand these attacks without aﬀecting information loss?
In this chapter, I demonstrate that this is possible by taking the examples of the
data-privatization techniques in Section 6.2, showing that it leaks data under data recon-
struction attack methods and then adapting it to withstand these attacks while retaining
low information loss characteristics.
When considering or testing the eﬀectiveness of privacy preserving methods, all au-
thors try to extract the data patterns without directly accessing the original data. A
signiﬁcant drawback of these techniques from the point of view of a data miner is that
she can only learn the original distributions of attribute values from a perturbed data set
and cannot expect to extract other original information such as classiﬁcation rules and
clusters of records.
In Subsection 2.2.2 of Chapter 2 I discussed the drawbacks of additive perturbation
method. Therefore, I ﬁnd the attackers can derive a good estimation of the original data
set values from the perturbed data set using the SPF, the BE-DR, the MDMF [SB13].
As mention in [HDC05], [KDWS03] additive perturbation is vulnerable to attacks based
on data correlations. In Subsection 2.2.2 of Chapter 2 also I addressed the drawbacks
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on multiplicative perturbation method. Attackers can recover the original data from the
transformed data and prior information in multiplicative perturbation methods. The
ﬁrst based on basic properties of linear algebra and the second on principal component
analysis. These attacks are labeled Known Input-Output and Known Sample (See details
in Subsection 2.2.2 of Chapter 2).
The purpose of this chapter is to examine attacks on data privatization methods and
test data-perturbation methods [Sin12], [ZMB] to see how well the data-perturbation
methods withstand these classical data-reconstruction methods. I choose three additive
data reconstruction methods the SPF [KDWS03], the BE-DR [HDC05] and the MDMF
[SSND09], and one multiplicative data reconstruction method the KSA method [Liu07].
The KSA data reconstruction method is used in Hybrid perturbation approach testing
where the additive and multiplicative perturbation approaches are combined.
I use the SPF method because this is the ﬁrst data reconstruction method deﬁne by
Kargupta et al. [KDWS03] and author claim that we can reconstruct original data in
additive perturbation method using the SPF method. The SPF is based on eigenvalues
of covariance matrix and theory of random matrices [KDWS05]. The BE-DR method
used because of easy calculation and also related to same mathematical calculation as
the SPF i.e covariance matrix. The third MDMF method is a combination of multiple
data mining [SSND09] and fusion technique [TN07]. I use WEKA software [HFH+09] for
data mining techniques in the MDMF method. Therefore, I can calculate reconstructed
data using the MDMF method. For easy calculation I use the MDMF method. The
KSA method [Liu07] also uses the same base mathematical computation as the SPF
and the BE-DR i.e eigenvalues of covariance matrix. Accordingly, due to similarity of
mathematical computation and easy solving computation I use all four reconstruction
methods.
The particular data-privatization method [Sin12] tested is based on Chebyshev poly-
nomials of the ﬁrst kind [MH02], [SZL13], [HYD06] which are explained in detail in
Subsection 6.2.1. This method was developed recently by a group of researchers [Sin12]
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but needed testing to see if it withstood the classical attacks. As discussed above, I ﬁnd
from Kargupta et al. [KDWS03] paper that attacker can reconstruct data in additive
perturbation method [AS00], [AA01]. But the author of the deﬁned additive perturbation
method [Sin12] claims that an attacker cannot reconstruct data. In [ZMB], authors have
proposed hybrid perturbation method. This is called hybrid method because it consists
both additive and multiplicative perturbation methods. This method is also based on
the Chebyshev polynomials of the ﬁrst kind and detail of this method [ZMB] is described
in Subsection 6.2.3.
I use these methods for testing based on over 4500 data sets; I examine the ability of
my three chosen additive and one multiplicative data reconstruction methods to recover
the original data. In addition, for each attack, I am able to specify how to modify the
data privatization algorithm to make the data resistant to the attack with the result
that I produce a revised data privatization method and show that it is resistant to these
attacks.
Section 6.2 presents the recently developed additive perturbation and hybrid data
perturbation methods.
6.2 Data Privatization Methods
This section describes the chebyshev polynomial method [HYD06], [SZL13], [Isl14]
and existing data privatization methods which have used this method. I discuss ﬁrst
basic of chebyshev polynomial in Subsection 6.2.1. Then I discuss Additive perturbation
method based on chebyshev polynomial in Subsection 6.2.2 and Hybrid perturbation
method based on chebyshev polynomial in Subsection 6.2.3.
6.2.1 The Chebyshev Polynomial Additive Perturbation
Method
An additive perturbation technique based on Chebyshev polynomials [MH02],
[HYD06], [SZL13], [Isl14] is currently being developed in [Sin12]. The authors of the
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present paper have tested the algorithms using the three attacks mentioned in the previ-
ous section. Before describing my methodology, I ﬁrst provide a short description of the
Chebyshev polynomials and how they can be used in data privatization.
The well-known Chebyshev polynomials [MH02] are deﬁned on the interval [−1, 1]
and can be determined with the following recurrence formula:
Tn+1(t) = 2tTn(t)− nTn−1(t) ≥ 2 (6.2.1)
where the ﬁrst two Chebyshev polynomials T0(t) = 1 and T1(t) = t are
given. These polynomials are said to be Chebyshev of the ﬁrst kind as opposed
to Chebyshev polynomials of the second kind (http://mathworld.wolfram.com/
ChebyshevPolynomialoftheFirstKind.html). In this chapter I use the expression
‘Chebyshev Polynomial’ to refer exclusively to the Chebyshev Polynomials Tn(t) above,
of the ﬁrst kind.
Zhong et al. [Sin12] propose an additive perturbation algorithm based on Chebyshev
polynomials as follows:
6.2.2 Chebyshev Data Perturbation Algorithm
Data
In the paper [Sin12] numerical type data for computation, such as the age of a patient
which is common in health data, is considered. While the original data is commonly in
matrix form, I store its contents in vector form. Since some tests are easier to describe
in vector form and others in matrix form I allow myselves to use both formats. In vector
form, I double index each vector entry, using a ﬁrst variable i varying from 1 to a ﬁxed
valuem along with a second index which remains at 1. In matrix form, I assume (without
loss in generality) that the matrix is square and so there are
√
m rows and
√
m columns.
Subsection 6.2.4 provides deﬁnitions and notations.
Setting Parameters
m : the number of entries in the original vector (or matrix)
n : the degree of the Chebyshev polynomial ﬁrst kind n ≥ 2,
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l : a positive integer divisor of n, l > 1
The values of m, n and l are all integer. The original data set is referred to as O (in
matrix or vector form); for the noise data set to be added to O, I use N (of the same size
as O).
Data Perturbation
The initial values m, n, l of the above parameters for the purposes of producing a
perturbed data set are assumed to be ﬁxed.
(a) Preparation: Derive the nth degree chebyshev polynomial Tn.
(b) Division process: Divide the original data into intervals with the length of l; this
results in D = m
l
intervals. Label the D intervals t1, t2, ...., tD. The ﬁrst interval
t1 contains the original data o11, o21, ...., ol1; the second contains the next l elements
o(l+1)1, ...o(2l,1) and so on. Let T0 = 1.
(c) CDP data processing: In this step I generate noise to add to the original data. If
an element oi1, 1 ≤ i ≤ m, of the original data set is in interval j, 1 ≤ j ≤ D,
then I add it to the corresponding element of the noise matrix deﬁned as: pt(ti)1 =
Tn(−1 + 1n +
2(1− 1
n
)j
|l+1 ) obtaining p˜i1 using Equation 6.2.2
p˜i1 = oi1 + pt(ti)1 (6.2.2)
And so, the general equation describing this method is:
P˜ = O +N (6.2.3)
Restoration
When p˜i1 and pt(ti)1 are known, the data can easily be restored by using equation as:
oi1 = p˜i1 − pt(ti)1 (6.2.4)
An example:
Let the original data in matrix form be
O =
⎡
⎢⎣ 0 1
−1 3
⎤
⎥⎦
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and stored in the computer as (0, 1,−1, 3) in vector format.
Set parameter values to be m = 4, n = 5, l = 2 and calculate: D = 2 and
pt(t1)1 = T5(−1 + 15 +
2(1− 1
5
)
3
)
pt(t1)1 = T5(− 415) = −0.9576,
pt(t1)2 = T5(− 815) = −0.3230,
pt(t2)1 = T5(− 415) = −0.9576,
pt(t2)2 = T5(− 815) = −0.3230,
Now,
N =
⎡
⎢⎣ −0.9576 −0.3230
−0.9576 −0.3230
⎤
⎥⎦
and I get the perturbed data set from P˜ = O +N .
The authors of [Sin12] use multiple rows and single column during transmission of
data for privacy reasons, and they claim that an attacker cannot estimate original data set
values from perturbed data set. My aim is to reconstruct the original data set values from
the perturbed data set thus breaking the privatization method of the paper [Sin12]. For
the reconstruction I choose four diﬀerent attack methods against additive perturbation:
these attacks are the SPF [KDWS03], the BE-DR [HDC05], the MDMF [SSND09] and
last is the KSA [Liu07]. These attacks are described in detail in Section 6.3.
6.2.3 The Chebyshev Polynomial Hybrid Perturbation Method
In this Subsection, I describe hybrid data perturbation method [ZMB]. This method
is combination of Additive and Multiplicative perturbation. This method has two noise
matrices; one is added to original data set matrix and other noise matrix is multiplied.
Both noise matrices are generated using chebyshev polynomial of ﬁrst kind equation as
deﬁned in Equation 6.2.1 of Subsection 6.2.1.
The noise matrices N1 and N2 are generated using a Chebyshev polynomial of the
ﬁrst kind as generated in Additive method described in Subsection 6.2.2.
Hybrid perturbation [ZMB] is deﬁned as follows:
1. Data: Hybrid method use the format of Subsection 6.2.2.
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2. Setting parameters: The values m, n and l are as in Subsection 6.2.2.
3. Data perturbation: Data preparation and division are as in Subsection 6.2.2,
part 3. Data processing: In this step of Hybrid method generate two noise matrices
based on Chebyshev polynomial of the ﬁrst kind as deﬁned in Subsection 6.2.1.
The ﬁrst noise matrix N1 is multiply to the original data and second noise matrix
N2 is added.
Each element of the noise vector pt(ti)1 = Tn(−1 + 1n +
2(1− 1
n
)j
|ti|+1 ) is generated as in Sub-
section 6.2.2. The general equation describing this method is:
P˜ = O ×N1 +N2 (6.2.5)
where P˜ , O, N1 and N2 are as in Table 6.1.
6.2.4 Summary of Symbols and Values used
This subsection provides the basic deﬁnitions and notation for Subsection 6.2.2 and
subsequent parts of the chapter.
Table 6.1. Summary of Symbols and Deﬁnitions
Symbols Deﬁnitions
O original data set matrix
oi1, i = 1, 2, 3, .....,m elements of original data set matrix with m
rows and 1 column.
P˜ perturbed data set matrix P˜ = O +N
p˜ij , i = 1, 2, 3, ....., l j = 1, 2, 3, ...., D elements of perturbed data set matrix with l
rows and D columns.
N noise data set matrix
pt(ti)j , i = 1, 2, 3, ....., l j =
1, 2, 3, ...., D
elements of noise data set matrix with l rows
and D columns.
Oˆ estimated data set matrix
oˆij , i = 1, 2, 3, ....., l j = 1, 2, 3, ...., D elements of estimated data set matrix with l
rows and D columns.
Ocov, Ncov, P˜cov covariance of O, N and P˜
I identity matrix
σ, σ2 standard deviation and variance of pt(ti)j
μO, μN , μP˜ mean vectors of O, N and P˜
λ eigenvalue of covariance of data matrix
[λmin, λmax] eigenvalue bounds for N
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Deﬁnitions
(a) Original data set: This is a set of data compiled for use in, for example, situa-
tions dealing with hospital patients, vehicle performance, or traﬃc accidents, which
contains a portion of sensitive data and which is easily readable by anyone with
authorized access to it.
(b) Noise data set: A data set which is added to O. The noise data set should have the
appearance of random numbers ([Dat04]) and is generally drawn from a distribution
with predetermined mean and standard deviation. For my study elements of the
noise data set matrix are generated using Chebyshev polynomials.
(c) Perturbed data set: This data set is obtained when the noise data is added to the
original data O.
Section 6.3 demonstrates the data reconstruction attack methods; the SPF, the BE-
DR, the MDMF, and the KSA on the additive and hybrid perturbation methods described
in Subsections 6.2.1 and 6.2.3 respectively.
6.3 Data Reconstruction Attack Methods
In this section I present a detailed descriptions of data reconstruction attack methods
on privatization methods, described in Section 6.2. I have brieﬂy discuss the possible
assumptions for each data reconstruction attack method. Also, I deﬁne the measurement
for the success of each data reconstruction attack method.
6.3.1 Spectral Filtering Method
The SPF [KDWS03] uses a random matrix-based approach for retrieving an original
data set matrix from the data set matrix distorted by adding noise. The SPF method
analyzes the eigenvalues of the covariance matrix of the perturbed data set matrix and
identiﬁes those eigenvalues likely to have come from the noise data set matrix using the
known distribution of random matrices. The result is a decomposition of the covariance
matrix: a part containing useful information from the original data set matrix and another
part capturing the noise data set matrix. Therefore estimating the elements of the original
data set matrix becomes possible.
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Assumptions
I suppose that the entries of O are independent, and that O and Ocov have distinct
and non-zero eigenvalues [KDWS03]; these assumptions hold in most practical situations.
I also assume that the noise data set matrix and the original data set are uncorrelated
and that the distributions of the noise data set matrix and the perturbed data set matrix
are known to the attacker [KDWS03]. Since the unauthorized retriever does not generally
know the distribution of the original data, I assume that it follows a normal distribution.
I also assume that P˜ is public (as it can be captured or legitimately purchased).
Measuring the Success of the Attack
Points 1) to 4) below describe conditions under which the SPF attack is successful.
1. Let λi and λˆi be the eigenvalues of the covariance matrices of O and Oˆ respectively.
If the λˆi are close to λi, especially those above λmax of N , then the SPF attack is
considered to be successful. Even if there are λˆi less than λmin of N , the estimation
of oij may be accurate enough because the λˆi below λmin are usually very small and
so negligible.
• Deﬁnition of close: For practical application, I apply the following deﬁnition of
‘close’ in order to check the success of my recovery attack. If |λi−λˆi| < 0.00001
∀i = 1, 2, .....,√m where the eigenvalues are listed in ascending order (in my
case maximum number of eigenvalues are 80), then I say that the attack has
been successful.
2. The performance of estimation is dependent on the relative noise content in the
perturbed data set, The paper [KDWS03] deﬁnes the term “Signal to Noise Ratio”
(SNR) to quantify the relative amount noise data set contained in the perturbed
data set SNR = V arianceoforiginalmatrix
NoiseV ariance
. I expect that the estimation error increases
as SNR decreases and if SNR lies in [0, 1]. So the larger this ratio, the better the
approximation to the original data.
3. Lower and upper bound analysis: Songtao et al. [GWL08] deﬁne the upper and
lower bound for spectral analysis reconstruction method. First, they derive an
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upper bound for the reconstruction error by which attacker can determine how
close their estimates are to the original data set elements. Then they derive a
lower bound for how much noise should be added to satisfy a given threshold of
the tolerated privacy breach. If the estimated data set matrix satisﬁes both upper
bound and lower bound criteria then the SPF attack is considered to be successful.
4. The Root Mean Square Error (RMSE) [KDWS03] in reconstruction of individual
user data set, is deﬁned by RMSE =
√
1
m
∑m
i=1(oi1 − oˆi1)2. RMSE lies between 0
and 1; RMSE = 0 implies perfect reconstruction of original data set matrix and
RMSE ≥ 1 implies that there is no overlap between original data set matrix and
its estimated data set matrix.
6.3.2 Bayes-Estimated-Based Data Reconstruction
According to the BE-DR [HDC05] method, given the matrix P˜ , I then search for O
such that the posterior distribution of (O|P˜ ), is maximized. This scheme assumes that
the original data has a normal distribution and that an adversary has the perturbed data
set and knows the distribution of the random noise. The Equation 6.3.1, where σ and σ2
are the standard deviation and variance of the noise respectively, provides an estimated
data set matrix.
Oˆ = (O−1cov +
1
σ2
.I)−1(O−1covμo +
P˜
σ2
) (6.3.1)
In the attack section 6.4, I explain how I use this method to break the Chebyshev poly-
nomial based perturbation methods.
Assumptions
I assume that the original data has a normal distribution and that the independent
rows of the original data sets from an m-dimensional random vector O. I assume that
the attacker knows the distribution of the noise data set matrix and that P˜ is public
[HDC05].
Measuring the Success of the Attack
1. The value of RMSE [KDWS03] lies between 0 and 1; success of the attack is mea-
sured by the RMSE value as described in Subection 6.3.1, part 4.
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2. If the values of the reconstruction errors |oi1 − oˆi1| decrease, as i ranges from 1 to
m, then the attack is successful.
For example, when the number of rows increases such as 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, ......, 6400 (I
consider 6400 no. of rows) and I calculate reconstruction error corresponding to
every rows of data sets such as for record 1 reconstruction errors (oˆij − oij) is
0.015161, for record 2 is 0.014837 and so on till record 6400 is 3.5e − 005. If
I get lower reconstruction errors when number of record increases then attack is
successful.
6.3.3 Multiple Data Mining and Fusion Method
The third reconstruction attack relies on data mining [SSND09] and fusion [TN07]
and is known as the MDMF reconstruction attack. This attack method does not assume
that any background knowledge is available to the adversary. It is very practical and can
be launched by adversaries that have no or very little knowledge about data mining and
fusion.
An adversary uses multiple data mining algorithms [SSND09] to analyze the known P˜
in order to uncover hidden trends and obtain multiple predictions of each of the sensitive
data that would allow removal of the added noise and obtain Oˆ. These multiple predic-
tions are fused [SSND09] together and the combined value then represents an estimate
of the original data set providing an Oˆ that is possibly close to O.
A fusion algorithm F combines the data mining results using average calculation.
Using s data miners, it takes each row p˜w, 1 ≤ w ≤
√
m of the matrix P˜ and a set
of s predictions q1, q2, ....., qs, combines the predictions based on a fusion strategy, and
outputs the combined prediction qw of row w, resulting in an estimate of the original
data. I write this as,
qw ← F (p˜w, q1, ......., qs) (6.3.2)
The adversary uses this fusion algorithm F to obtain a single prediction q. The
adversary’s intention is to use all these predictions and combinations to obtain reasonable
estimates of the original data.
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Assumptions
I assume that P˜ is public and can be used by legitimate people or by adversaries.
Measures of Success of the Attack
1. The value of the RMSE [KDWS03] lies between 0 and 1; the deﬁnition was discussed
in Subection 6.3.1.
2. I evaluate the success of attack by a “nearness” concept applied to matrix notation
taken from [SSND09] and explained below. I have retrieved some original data if
the inequality holds for all w and j.
Deﬁnition of nearness:
A value ˆowj is near to owj, if d( ˆowj, owj) < d( ˜pwj, owj), where d is a Euclidean
distance function [SSND09] and 1 ≤ w, j ≤ √m.
The “nearness” tells us whether the estimation ˆowj is a good representation for owj.
Of course, this is only usable if I have the original data to begin with; so the success
of this method of measuring is useful for data privatization developers who wish to
determine the resistance of their method against the attack-as is the case here.
3. A third measure of success is obtained by computing the amount of noise that has
been added to the diﬀerent values during perturbation and comparing it with the
amount of noise that remains in the estimated values.
The cumulative added noise is,
Added noise =
∑
owj
| ˜pwj − owj|, where 1 ≤ w, j ≤
√
m.
The cumulative remaining noise after the attack is
Remaining noise =
∑
owj
| ˆowj − owj|, where l ≤ w, j ≤
√
m.
So, a measure of the success of the MDMF attack is in indirect proportion to
remainingnoise
addednoise
.
This quotient lies between 0 and 1. If it is near 1, then the estimate is far from the
original; if it is near 0, then the estimate is close to the original data.
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6.3.4 Known Sample Attack Method
In this subsection, I introduce the KSA method, which is more appropriate for hy-
brid method than the additive method as it is designed to attack non additive data-
perturbation methods [Liu07]. Like the SPF method, the KSA also uses eigenvalues of a
covariance matrix and so this simpliﬁes computations for us.
In the KSA, the attacker is assumed to have some prior knowledge of the original
sample and then uses the relationship between the eigenvectors of the perturbed data and
those of the known sample data to estimate the private data from the public perturbed
data by exploring the relationship between the principal eigenvectors of the original and
perturbed data.
Assumptions
I assume that the attacker has a set of 2% of independent, original data elements
chosen with the same distribution as all elements of O. This known set is represented as
S. And, additionally I assume that the covariance matrix of the original data has distinct
eigenvalues.
The KSA Measures of Success of Attack
1. If RMSE (as deﬁned in Subsection 6.3.1) lies between 0 and 1, the attacker has a
low probability of reconstructing O; if RMSE = 0 then O has been reconstructed;
if RMSE ≥ 1 then no data in O has been recovered.
For 2) and 3) below I need: for m elements of a vector X, the relative error bound
(REB) is
‖O−Oˆ‖
F
‖O‖F , where ‖X‖F =
√∑m
i=1 x
2
i1.
2. When the perturbation matrix and relative error bound of the original and es-
timated data in vector form are ﬁxed, the probability of a privacy breach PoP
increases as i ranges from 1 to m [Liu07].
3. When the perturbation matrix and the sample sizes of the original and estimated
matrices are ﬁxed, then PoP increases [Liu07] as the REB increases.
Section 6.4 scrutinizes the above-described data reconstruction attack methods and
investigate how well these data reconstruction methods estimate the original data.
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6.4 Reconstruction Attacks
In this section I explore the four above-mentioned in Section 6.3 data reconstruction
attack methods and examine how well they estimate the original data set O.
• Reconstruction Problem: I make the assumptions on data mentioned in Subsections
6.3.1, 6.3.2, 6.3.3 and 6.3.4 as appropriate, and use the notation of Table 6.1.
I generate 4500 matrices using the privatization methods of [Sin12], [ZMB] as de-
scribed in Section 6.2. Because the data is stored in vector form, I am at liberty to
decide on the matrix size for the reconstruction.
Matrices with more columns than rows may be more easily susceptible to attack by
one or more of the methods I use, and organized the data into matrices of three types of
sizes: (i) more columns than rows, (ii) an equal number of columns and rows, and (iii)
more rows than columns.
6.4.1 Spectral Filtering based Reconstruction Method
I assume that the attacker knows the distribution of the noise data set and is thus
able to calculate the noise variance.
INPUT: p˜i1 is in 1500 data sets of 400 ∗ 1 matrix, 1500 data sets of 1600 ∗ 1 matrix
and 1500 data sets of 6400 ∗ 1 matrix. An attacker can calculate noise variance of any
4500 data sets of diﬀerent size of matrices 400 ∗ 1, 1600 ∗ 1 and 6400 ∗ 1.
OUTPUT: estimated data set matrix elements oˆi1
1. Preparing the original data set:
In the SPF, I split the 400 ∗ 1 matrix into 20 ∗ 20 and 25 ∗ 16 sizes of matrix,
1600 ∗ 1 matrix split into 40 ∗ 40 and 50 ∗ 32 sizes of matrix and 6400 ∗ 1 matrix
split into 80 ∗ 80 and 160 ∗ 40 sizes of matrix. But, for the BE-DR, the MDMF and
the KSA reconstruction methods I use same setup as the SPF attack method with
addition of 16 ∗ 25 for 400 ∗ 1, 32 ∗ 50 for 1600 ∗ 1 and 40 ∗ 160 for 6400 ∗ 1 sizes
of matrix. Because, I cannot choose rows < columns size of matrix for the SPF
[KDWS03]. Let λ be the eigenvalues of covariance of perturbed data set matrix.
226
λmin and λmax are calculated [KDWS05] for deﬁne the theoretical bounds of noise
data set eigenvalues, as Equation 6.4.1:
λmin = σ
2(1− 1√
Q
)2, λmax = σ
2(1 +
1√
Q
)2 (6.4.1)
Q = l
D
, where l = m
k
and D = k.
Now I calculate σ2. I consider 20∗20, 25∗16 for 400∗1, 40∗40, 50∗32 for 1600∗1 and
80∗80, 160∗40 for 6400∗1, original data matrix oij. I consider a noise matrix pt(ti)j
with same dimension. Although the noise matrix introduce seemingly signiﬁcant
diﬀerence between oij and p˜ij, it may not be successful in hiding the data. For the
SPF attack I use only two sizes of matrix because according to the SPF algorithm
[KDWS03] Q ≥ 1.
2. Apply the SPF steps [KDWS03] and get the oˆij. I give a brief summary of the
steps, as follows:
Distribution of pt(ti)j is completely known, so ﬁrstly calculate σ
2. Then calculate
λmin and λmax by using Equation 6.4.1. I get λmin, λmax. Compute the eigenvalues
of the covariance matrix of the ˜Pcov, λ1 ≤ λ2 ≤ ... ≤ λm. Identify the noisy
eigenvalues λi ≤ λi+1 ≤ .... ≤ λj such that λi ≥ λmin and λj ≤ λmax. The remaining
eigenvalues are corresponding to the oij. Then calculate diagonal matrix with all
noise-related eigenvalues
∧
N = diag(λi ≤ λi+1 ≤ .... ≤ λj), and calculate matrix
whose columns are the corresponding eigenvectors which is represented as AN .
Same calculation for O represented as
∧
o, and Ao. And, decompose the covariance
matrix into two parts, original and noisy data set values. ˜Pcov = Ocov +Ncov
where Ncov = AN
∧
N A
T
N , and Ocov = Ao
∧
oA
T
o , are the covariance matrix corre-
sponding to N part and O respectively. An oˆij is obtained by projecting the data
p˜ij on to the subspace spanned by the columns of Au, represented as oˆij = AoA
T
o p˜ij.
I get oˆij. Now, its columns are concatenated to form a single vector and obtain oˆi1.
In Section 6.5, I test the estimated data set matrix elements oˆij are close to original
data set matrix elements oij.
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6.4.2 Bayes-Estimated-Data Reconstruction Method
Use the mentioned assumption from Subection 6.3.2 and calculate σ2. My objective
is to extract oi1 from p˜ij.
I use 20∗20, 25∗16, 16∗25 for 400∗1, 40∗40, 50∗32, 32∗50 for 1600∗1 and 80∗80,
160 ∗ 40, 40 ∗ 160 for 6400 ∗ 1 sizes of matrices. I have p˜ij as an input. Then I get the
Equation 6.4.2, the following equation is deﬁned as in the paper [HDC05]:
oˆij = (O
−1
cov +
1
σ2
.I)−1(O−1covμo +
p˜ij
σ2
) (6.4.2)
where, I is the identity matrix of the same size as Ocov.
Case:1 number of rows = number of columns (20 ∗ 20 for 400 ∗ 1, 40 ∗ 40 for
1600 ∗ 1 and 80 ∗ 80 for 6400 ∗ 1)
1. Calculate Ocov by using ˜Pcov,
I have p˜ij as an input data. Then calculate, Ocov by using theorem-5.1 [HDC05]:
Ocov = ˜Pcov − σ2, i = j
2. The BE-DR reconstruction method, as follows:
INPUT: p˜i1 and variance of noise data set matrix σ
2.
OUTPUT: Estimated data set matrix oˆi1.
a) Derive Ocov by using P˜ and use Theorem 5.1 [HDC05]. I get 20 ∗ 20, 40 ∗ 40 and
80 ∗ 80 sizes of matrix.
b) Derive μO = μ tildeP
I know that, μO ≈ μP˜ , because random noises have zero means.
c) Then, I calculate oˆij for each p˜ij using Equation 6.4.2 and get the oˆij. Now, its
columns are concatenated to form a single vector and obtain oˆi1.
I test another two formats of data,
Case 2: number of rows>number of columns (25 ∗ 16 for 400 ∗ 1, 50 ∗ 32 for
1600 ∗ 1 and 160 ∗ 40 for 6400 ∗ 1)
Case 3: number of rows<number of columns (16 ∗ 25 for 400 ∗ 1, 32 ∗ 50 for
1600 ∗ 1 and 40 ∗ 160 for 6400 ∗ 1)
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For both cases 2 and 3 σ2 and μO are same as case 1. I calculate, Ocov by using
theorem-5.1 [HDC05]: Ocov = ˜Pcov (i = j). Then calculate oˆij for each p˜ij using Equation
6.4.2. In the last step, I concatenate columns into a single vector and obtain oˆi1.
6.4.3 Multiple Data Mining and Fusion Method
I consider seven data mining algorithmsMs where (s = 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7) are algorithms
and p˜i1 as the input.
I have 20 ∗ 20, 25 ∗ 16, 16 ∗ 25 for 400 ∗ 1, 40 ∗ 40, 50 ∗ 32, 32 ∗ 50 for 1600 ∗ 1 and
80 ∗ 80, 160 ∗ 40, 40 ∗ 160 for 6400 ∗ 1 sizes of matrices.
The miner determines prediction for the w−th ﬁeld of the tuple p˜ij =
p˜1j, p˜2j, ...., ˜pwj, ...., p˜ij, and consider here m. The following 7 miners representing
four diﬀerent types of miners were selected from the Weka software package, version
3.7.7 [HFH+09], and used in the attack: Function-based: Logistic (M1), Bayes: Naive-
Bayes (M2), Rule-based: DecisionTable (M3), ZeroR (M4) and JRip (M5),Tree-based:
DecisionStump (M6) and REPTree (M7).
I use MDMF method for calculating oˆij, steps are as follows:
1) Calculate the prediction for the every tuple of data obtained by using Ms =
(M1,M2,M3,M4,M5,M6,M7) is denoted by pi, that is,
pi ← Ms(p˜ij) (6.4.3)
After the adversary applies all chosen mining algorithms, adversary obtains predictions
for each data set value oi1. At this step by considering any single miner, the adversary
possesses a pi for every tuple oij.
Consequently, because of the noise function, the same perturbed value ˜pwj appears
in multiple tuples in the data set. Therefore predictions for the same original value
oij may be diﬀerent over diﬀerent tuples pij having the same value ˜pwj, because the
predictions are based on all the ﬁelds of the tuple pij, the adversary possesses diﬀerent
predictions for each single ˜pwj. The adversary proceeds with the attack by ﬁrst fusing
these diﬀerent predictions for each distinct value of ˜pwj and then the adversary fuses
the values from diﬀerent miners.
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2) Use a fusion algorithm F1 to combine the diﬀerent predictions by a single miner that
obtained for the same value of ˜pwj. The adversary does this for all distinct perturbed
values and for all miners. Algorithmically, for each miner Mr ∈ M , and for each
distinct perturbed value ˜pwj, the adversary computes.
qij ← F1(pi|pi = Mi( ˜pwj)) ≈
∑ pi
c
(6.4.4)
This computation results in w predictions for each distinct p˜ij, where c is the number
of such p˜ij
′s . This was repeatedly computed for all distinct perturbed sensitive values
and for all miners Ms r = 1, 2, ..., 7, resulting in seven predictions q1,y, ....., q7,y for each
distinct ˜pwj.
3) Then, attacker merges the multiple predictions from multiple miners into a single
prediction oˆij for each perturbed value p˜ij using a fusion algorithm F2. F2 took the
seven combined predictions obtained as a result of mining with seven miners, and fused
them once more, again using simple average: oˆj = F2(q1,j, ....., qi,j) ≈ q1,y+.....+q7,y7 . The
fused value oˆij represents an estimate of the perturbed value p˜ij. The adversary ends
with derived p˜ij of each tuple is replaced with its estimated data set values oˆij.
So, I get ˆo[ij]. Then its columns are concatenated to form a single vector and obtain
oˆi1.
I use all three cases for the MDMF,
Case 1:number of rows=number of columns (20 ∗ 20 for 400 ∗ 1, 40 ∗ 40 for 1600 ∗ 1
and 80 ∗ 80 for 6400 ∗ 1)
Case 2: number of rows>number of columns (25 ∗ 16 for 400 ∗ 1, 50 ∗ 32 for 1600 ∗ 1
and 160 ∗ 40 for 6400 ∗ 1)
Case 3: number of rows<number of columns (16 ∗ 25 for 400 ∗ 1, 32 ∗ 50 for 1600 ∗ 1
and 40 ∗ 160 for 6400 ∗ 1)
I ﬁnd the better predictions for all elements of O in case1 comparison with other two
cases, experimentally analysed in Section 6.5.2.
230
6.4.4 Known Sample Attack Method
I use the mentioned assumption from Subsection 6.3.4. My objective is to extract oi1
from p˜i1. For the KSA also have same 20 ∗ 20, 25 ∗ 16, 16 ∗ 25 for 400 ∗ 1, 40 ∗ 40, 50 ∗ 32,
32 ∗ 50 for 1600 ∗ 1 and 80 ∗ 80, 160 ∗ 40, 40 ∗ 160 for 6400 ∗ 1 sizes of matrices as the
BE-DR, the MDMF format.
INPUT: p˜i1 and S.
OUTPUT: Estimated data set matrix oˆi1.
Case:1 number of rows=number of columns (20 ∗ 20 for 400 ∗ 1, 40 ∗ 40 for 1600 ∗ 1
and 80 ∗ 80 for 6400 ∗ 1)
1. Compute ˜Pcov, Scov.
2. Compute the eigenvector matrix Zˆ of Scov and W of ˜Pcov.
3. Choose D = argmax{G(WˆD ˆZ ′S, P˜ ) : DIn}, where In is n ∗ n identity matrix.
4. Compute Oˆ = ZˆDWˆ ′P˜ .
5. I get Oˆ.
6. Convert 20 ∗ 20, 40 ∗ 40 and 80 ∗ 80 matrices in matrix size 400 ∗ 1, 1600 ∗ 1 and
6400 ∗ 1 respectively and get oˆi1.
Similarly, Case1 I calculate oˆi1 for Case2: number of rows>number of columns (25∗16
for 400∗1, 50∗32 for 1600∗1 and 160∗40 for 6400∗1). Case3 : number of rows<number
of columns (16 ∗ 25 for 400 ∗ 1, 32 ∗ 50 for 1600 ∗ 1 and 40 ∗ 160 for 6400 ∗ 1). I ﬁnd better
estimated data for all elements of O in case1 comparison with other two cases.
Adjacent Section 6.5 organizes the experimental setup to implement and analyse the
described Additive and Hybrid data privatization methods using four data reconstruction
methods as deﬁned in Sections 6.3 and 6.4 for all deﬁned cases.
6.5 Experimental Results of Attacks on Additive and
Hybrid Perturbation Methods
This section discuss the experimental analysis of described data privatization meth-
ods of Section 6.2. The experiment section is divided into two main parts. In ﬁrst part
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I examine which case gives the best result to reconstruct original data set in Additive
perturbation methods parallel I work on measures of success of attacks using all consid-
ered data reconstruction attack methods in Additive perturbation method, described in
Subsection 6.5.3.
Then, I analyse Hybrid perturbation methods using measures of success of attacks
based on all same data reconstruction attack methods as Additive method. I consider the
case-1 (number of rows=number of columns) which gives best result in Additive method,
described in Subsection 6.5.4.
6.5.1 Experimental Setup
My experiments focused on the how close estimated data set elements to original data
set elements reconstructed by these SPF, BE-DR, MDMF and KSA attack methods. I
successfully tested and calculated criteria of successful reconstruction attack methods for
additive perturbation method [Sin12]. The other perturbation method [ZMB] is also not
resist successfully reconstruction attack methods SPF, BE-DR, MDMF and KSA. I use
MATLAB R2009b [FP10], Weka 3.7.7 [HFH+09] for my experiment analysis. Using the
Chebyshev Polynomial method described in Section 6.2, I generated 4500 data sets of
varying sizes including 1500 vectors ‘small’ with m = 400, 1500 vectors ‘medium’with
m = 1600 and 1500 vectors ‘large’ withm = 6400 elements. (Note that because MATLAB
[FP10] was used to generate and attack the vectors, I was restricted to the largest vector
size it can handle, which is vectors of 6400 elements.).
For Additive perturbation method [Sin12], I considered all cases deﬁned in Subection
6.4 for each data reconstruction method. From additive perturbation method I found the
each data reconstruction attack method are more eﬀective on square matrices than on non
square matrices in measuring success of attack, as experimentally analysed in Subsection
6.5.3. Therefore, I consider only square sizes of matrix for further data perturbation
analysis. I prove that these additive reconstruction attack methods can easily attacked
method successfully. I implemented all these three data reconstruction methods on the
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4500 data sets mentioned above. In each case, I obtained an estimated original data
set which was then compared with the original data set. In determining the success of
the recovery, each recovery method has a set of success measures which I have described
in the Section 6.3. It has been pointed out these attack methods on an additive data
perturbation method will also work on a multiplicative data perturbation method as
the latter can be logarithmically transformed into an additive data perturbation method
[Sin12].
Then, I test hybrid perturbation [MZB10] which is also use Chebyshev polynomial
noise. I test this method [MZB10] and prove that this perturbation method also not
resists successfully reconstruction methods the SPF, the BE-DR, the MDMF and the
KSA. I generated same 4500 vectors of varying sizes as above described for additive
method [Sin12]. I tested for each size of data sets and I ﬁnd the results are same for each
size of data sets. So, I present experimental results of only large vector with m = 6400
elements and square size of matrix.
I present my experimental results in two parts. In the ﬁrst part, I analyzed additive
perturbation approach based on Chebyshev polynomial on 4500 vectors using additive
reconstruction attack methods. In the second, I test hybrid perturbation method based
on Chebyshev polynomial also on 4500 vectors and prove that both these methods are
unable to successfully resist the SPF, the BE-DR, the MDMF and the KSA reconstruction
methods.
6.5.2 Experimental Results
The experiments focused on the how close estimated data set elements to original
data set elements reconstructed by these SPF, BE-DR and MDMF attacks. I success-
fully tested and calculated criteria of successful reconstruction attacks (SPF, BE-DR and
MDMF) in Subsections 6.5.3 and 6.5.4. I measure the estimated data set matrix elements
for all reconstruction attacks and analysed the comparative study between the SPF, the
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BE-DR and the MDMF reconstruction attacks in terms of closeness of original data set
matrix.
I measured the estimated data set matrix for all four SPF, BE-DR and MDMF ad-
ditive reconstruction methods, the KSA multiplicative reconstruction method. Also, I
calculated criteria of success of reconstruction attack methods for Additive perturbation
method [Sin12] and Hybrid perturbation method [MZB10].
6.5.3 The Chebyshev Polynomial Additive Perturbation
Method [Sin12]
In this subsection I tested Additive perturbation method described in 6.2.2 based
on all four considered data reconstruction methods as described in Section 6.4. I also
considered all three cases of matrices for this method.
Case:1 number of rows = number of columns
Case:2 number of rows > number of columns
Case:3 number of rows < number of columns
Spectral Filtering Method
In this attack I consider two formats of matrices. First I assume that the number
of rows l of the matrix is equal to the number of its columns D; the second assumption
is that l > D. My objective is to determine which situation is more easily attacked. I
discuss both cases in parallel and ﬁnd that the square form of the matrix is easier to
break than the second case.
Also, My objective is to determine close estimated matrix to original matrix.
Example 1: Since the results were very similar for all sizes 400 ∗ 1, 1600 ∗ 1 and
6400 ∗ 1 vectors, I consider here for large 6400 size of data sets. Example 1 is a data set
with 6400 elements which I transform into an l = D and l > D matrices for analysis.
1) I calculate the eigenvalues of the covariance matrix of the perturbed matrix P˜ of the
ﬁxed example matrix O; these eigenvalues are, in ascending order: {-0.0000, 0.0001,
0.0008, 0.0011, 0.0019, 0.0031, 0.0046, 0.0055, 0.0092, 0.0098, 0.0114, 0.0122, 0.0165,
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0.0203, 0.0217, 0.0269, 0.0289, 0.0319, 0.0363, 0.0411, 0.0424, 0.0461, 0.0493, 0.0522,
0.0564, 0.0623, 0.0658, 0.0679, 0.0842, 0.0927, 0.0955, 0.0997, 0.1026, 0.1182, 0.1225,
0.1297, 0.1326, 0.1421, 0.1484, 0.1563, 0.1666, 0.1726, 0.1904, 0.2007, 0.2120, 0.2222,
0.2283, 0.2370, 0.2502, 0.2610, 0.2649, 0.2883, 0.2999, 0.3188, 0.3361, 0.3486, 0.3594,
0.3716, 0.3747, 0.4009, 0.4160, 0.4390, 0.4627, 0.4697, 0.4879, 0.4913, 0.5223, 0.5390,
0.5523, 0.5661, 0.5902, 0.6374, 0.6552, 0.6782, 0.6994, 0.7693, 0.7958, 0.8225, 0.8831,
0.9329}.
Then I calculate λmin = 0 and λmax = 0.4556 (consider for l = D ) from which I
obtain those noisy eigenvalues λ˜i which satisfy the inequality λmin ≤ λ˜i ≤ λmax. The
set of noisy eigenvalues in the range (0, 0.4556) is: {0.0001, 0.0008, 0.0011, 0.0019,
0.0031, 0.0046, 0.0055, 0.0092, 0.0098, 0.0114, 0.0122, 0.0165, 0.0203, 0.0217, 0.0269,
0.0289, 0.0319, 0.0363, 0.0411, 0.0424, 0.0461, 0.0493, 0.0522, 0.0564, 0.0623, 0.0658,
0.0679, 0.0842, 0.0927, 0.0955, 0.0997, 0.1026, 0.1182, 0.1225, 0.1297, 0.1326, 0.1421,
0.1484, 0.1563, 0.1666, 0.1726, 0.1904, 0.2007, 0.2120, 0.2222, 0.2283, 0.2370, 0.2502,
0.2610, 0.2649, 0.2883, 0.2999, 0.3188, 0.3361, 0.3486, 0.3594, 0.3716, 0.3747, 0.4009,
0.4160, 0.4390}. The remaining eigenvalues should be those of the original matrix O;
these eigenvalues are: {0.4627, 0.4697, 0.4879, 0.4913, 0.5223, 0.5390, 0.5523, 0.5661,
0.5902, 0.6374, 0.6552, 0.6782, 0.6994, 0.7693, 0.7958, 0.8225, 0.8831, 0.9329}. Now
from the SPF algorithm [KDWS05] I can calculate the eigenvalues of the covariance
matrix of the estimated matrix, which are: {0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0.4627, 0.4697, 0.4879, 0.4913, 0.5223, 0.5390, 0.5523,
0.5661, 0.5902, 0.6374, 0.6552, 0.6782, 0.6994, 0.7693, 0.7958, 0.8225, 0.8831, 0.9329}
In order to obtain the eigenvalues of Oˆ, I need only consider those above or equal to
λmax; these are {0.4627, 0.4697, 0.4879, 0.4913, 0.5223, 0.5390, 0.5523, 0.5661, 0.5902,
0.6374, 0.6552, 0.6782, 0.6994, 0.7693, 0.7958, 0.8225, 0.8831, 0.9329}.
To measure the success of the attack, I calculate the closeness of eigenvalues of the
estimated matrix Oˆ and eigenvalues of the original matrix O. I get |λ63 − λˆ63| =
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0, |λ64 − λˆ64| = 0, ..., |λ80 − λˆ80| = 0, all these diﬀerences are very close to zero, so an
attacker can easily reconstruct the original data by using the SPF method.
Case-2: Now, I take the case where l > D, I calculate λmin = 0.0285 and
λmax = 0.2563. Calculate noisy eigen values {0.0810, 0.0866, 0.0912, 0.1021, 0.1039,
0.1114, 0.1182, 0.1266, 0.1298, 0.1415, 0.1500, 0.1531, 0.1641, 0.1674, 0.1893, 0.1905,
0.1981, 0.2125, 0.2156, 0.2211, 0.2269, 0.2401, 0.2467} are come with the range
[0.0285, 0.2563]. Then calculate eigenvalues of estimated data set matrix are {0.0320,
0.0421, 0.0505, 0.0632, 0.0739, 0.0793, 0.0808, 0.0915, 0.0956, 0.1138, 0.1160, 0.1327,
0.1566, 0.1673, 0.1710, 0.1895, 0.2041, 0.2263, 0.2348, 0.2400, 0.2760, 0.2972, 0.3081,
0.3397, 0.3614, 0.3870, 0.4555, 0.4890, 1.4165} with consideration of below λmin are
negligible. These eigen values are not very close (as 1 = D case of eigen values), to
eigen value of original data set matrix {0.2588, 0.2794, 0.2828, 0.2982, 0.3031, 0.3272,
0.3322, 0.3471, 0.3551, 0.3627, 0.3932, 0.4004, 0.4301, 0.4464, 0.4684, 0.5070, 0.5526}
especially above λmax.
So, from above estimation I ﬁnd that I attack the algorithm [Sin12] using the SPF
method but it is not as good as l = D case. So, for further study I consider l = D
format of matrix data set.
2) To check the condition when values of reconstruction error increases as SNR decreases.
I calculate V arianceoforiginaldataset
NoiseV ariance
and reconstruction error.
I give here only the average of reconstruction error values 0.4384 while the value of
SNR is 0.2408. So, in this case also I achieve a successful attack.
3) Lower and upper bound analysis,
I use lower bound and upper bound analysis estimation [GWL08] for the SPF bound.
In my study I use those bound equations and try to satisfy those bound criteria.
I get values of lower bound from calculation, 37.4507 ≥ 35.0716 satisﬁed lower bound
condition. Then I calculate upper bound 37.4507 ≤ 56.1346. Consequently, I can say
that attacker get close estimated data set values to original data set values by using
SPF method.
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4) I use the RMSE to estimate success of attack for the SPF. The RMSE is deﬁned as:√
1
M∗1
∑m
i=1
∑n
j=1(oij − oˆij)2
I get RMSE = 0.4384
The fact that 0.4384 < 1 means my estimated data set is not erroneous. So, the
attacker has breached the privacy.
From the above analysis I ﬁnd that an attacker breaches the privacy of the algorithm
[Sin12] by using the SPF method.
Bayes-Estimated Data Reconstruction Method
Example 2: I use the same above considered the SPF method, 6400 size of data set
use for the BE-DR method and to determine close estimated matrix to original matrix.
In this method I consider three formats of matrices. First when l = D, second l > D and
Figure 6.1. Additive: Comparative Analysis between Original Data set Elements and
RMSE
third is l < D. I parallel discuss all three cases and ﬁnd that the square form of matrix
is better than other two cases for attacker’s perspective.
1) I calculated RMSE for case l = D, is = 0.5187 < 1. RMSE for case l > D, is
= 0.785 < 1 and for l < D is 0.885 < 1.
From above I can see that the case l = D has less error, however, an attacker can
easily breach the privacy with either case. So, I consider l = D for further analysis.
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2) I plot a graph between numbers of rows and reconstruction error in Figure 6.1. From
the graph I can see that I get lower reconstruction errors when the number of rows
increases.
From the above analysis I can say that I breach the privacy of CDP algorithm [Sin12]
using BE-DR method.
Multiple Data Mining and Fusion Method
Example 3: I consider 6400 size of data set with square form of matrix as deﬁned
the SPF and the BE-DR methods.
Figure 6.2. Additive: Comparative Analysis using Distance Metric
In this method also I consider three formats of matrices same as the BE-DR, such
as l = D, l > D and l < D. I parallel discuss all three cases and ﬁnd that the square
form of matrix is better than other two cases for attacker’s perspective. I use seven data
mining algorithms M7, s = 1, ...., 7 taking P˜ as input and the same matrices for input to
this attack as for the previous attacks. The miner determines a prediction for each row
P˜w of P˜ , 1 ≤ w ≤
√
m as described in Subection 6.4.3. The estimated rows, combined,
form the estimate Oˆ. The following 7 miners, representing four diﬀerent categories, were
selected from the WEKA software package, version 3.7.7 [HFH+09], and used in the
attack: Function-based: Simple linear regression (M1), Meta: CVParameterSelection
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(M2), Stacking (M3), Vote (M4); Rule-based: ZeroR (M5); Tree-based: DecisionStump
(M6) and REPTree (M7).
1) RMSE for case l = D, is = 0.4033 < 1. RMSE for case l > D, is = 0.694 < 1 and
RMSE for case l < D, is = 0.867 < 1
From above I say that the case of l = D has less error comparison with other two
case. So, I choose l = D case for further analysis.
2) I evaluate the success of attack by using this equation
d( ˆowj, owj) < d(p˜ij, owj) (6.5.1)
for all 1 ≤ w, j ≤ √m.
d1 = d( ˆowj, owj), d2 = d(p˜ij, owj). From Figure 6.2, I ﬁnd the d( ˆowj, owj) < d(p˜ij, owj).
I ﬁnd that 5337 elements out of 6400 elements of the matrices have satisﬁed the
inequalities. Thus, the attacker has obtained 83.39% of the original data and failed
to recover 16.61% of it. Figure 6.2 shows this data.
3) Added noise =
∑
owj
| ˜pwj − owj| = 116.1852,
Remaining noise =
∑
owj
| ˆowj − owj| = 31.5011
remainingnoise
addednoise
= 0.2711 < 1.
From above analysis I can see that the % of remaining noise is 27.11%. Attacker has
removed 72.89 % noise.
From above analysis I can say that I attacked successfully the paper algorithm [Sin12]
using MDMF method. For other two cases I satisfy the criteria of successful attacks. But
case1 is better than other two cases.
Known Sample Attack Method
Example 4: I consider 6400 size of data set with square form of matrix as deﬁned the
SPF, the BE-DR and the MDMF methods. In this method also I consider three formats
of matrices same as the BE-DR and the MDMF, such as l = D, l > D and l < D.
239
1) RMSE for case l = D, is = 0.5689 < 1. RMSE for case l > D, is = 0.7394 < 1 and
RMSE for case l < D, is = 0.8385 < 1. From above I say that the case of l = D
has less error comparison with other two cases. So, I choose l = D case for further
analysis.
Figure 6.3. Additive: Comparative Analysis of Probability of Privacy Breach and Original
Data set Elements
Figure 6.4. Additive: Comparative Analysis of Probability of Privacy Breach and Relative
Error Bound
2) The relative error is 1.1749. I calculate the probability of a privacy breach corre-
sponding to every element of the data set as shown in Figure 6.3. From Figure 6.3
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I see that the probability of a privacy breach PoP increases as i ranges from 1 to m
increases, the attack is successful.
3) I calculate the relative error bound corresponding to every element of the data set
as shown in Figure 6.4. From Figure 6.4 I can see that the probability of a privacy
breach increases as the relative error bound increases, So attack is successful.
From the Additive perturbation result I ﬁnd the square size of matrices give good
results compared to the other two cases. I consider square size of matrices for my further
experimental work. I will discuss experimental results of Hybrid method [ZMB] using
square size of matrix.
6.5.4 The Chebyshev Polynomial Hybrid Perturbation Method
[ZMB]
Since the results of Hybrid method [ZMB] were very similar for diﬀerent sizes of vector
400 ∗ 1, 1600 ∗ 1 and 6400 ∗ 1. I consider large size of data set i.e 6400 same as above
experimental analysis of additive perturbation method. Every example is a vector with
6400 elements which I transform into an 80 ∗ 80 matrix for analysis.
Spectral Filtering Method
Example 5:
1) I calculate λmin = 0 and λmax = 40.7794. The vector of noisy eigenvalues in increasing
order is {0.0006, 0.0055, 0.0215, 0.0398, 0.0733, 0.1007, 0.1029, 0.1899, 0.2416, 0.2733,
0.3994, 0.5662, 0.6047, 0.7125, 0.8179, 0.8751, 0.9884, 1.1827, 1.3439, 1.4131, 1.6102,
1.7383, 1.8229, 1.9237, 2.0291, 2.4428, 2.4755, 2.6477, 2.9731, 3.2811, 3.4828, 3.5893,
4.1934, 4.3984, 4.5651, 4.9408, 5.1395, 5.4470, 5.7345, 6.1949, 6.6859, 7.0255, 7.2938,
7.7463, 8.2977, 8.3199, 9.0277, 9.6608, 9.8505, 10.0332, 10.7101, 10.9375, 11.5108,
12.0301 13.2211, 13.4133, 13.8020, 14.9113, 15.5841, 15.8037, 17.4296, 18.2476,
19.0354, 19.9869, 21.5622, 22.1528, 24.2218, 25.0378, 27.1297, 28.9368, 31.2563,
31.4079, 35.8671, 37.9634} are come with the range (0, 40.7794). This range deﬁnes
the theoretical bound for noise. All noisy eigenvalues are in this range. The rest
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eigenvalues of λ˜i should be eigenvalues of original data eigenvalues λi . So, I get orig-
inal data eigenvalues are: {41.0398, 66.5568, 95.0928, 113.8229, 268.6275} and below
λmin are considered as negligible. Similarly above the SPF calculation, I calculate
eigenvalues of the estimated data set matrix are {6.8997, 8.5888, 11.9944, 14.4170,
510.5151} below λmin or equal to λmin are considered as negligible.
For measuring success criteria, I calculate the closeness of λi and λˆi, I get |λ76 −
λˆ76| = 34.1401, |λ77 − λˆ77| = 57.9680, |λ78 − λˆ78| = 83.0984, |λ79 − λˆ79| = 99.4059,
|λ80 − λˆ80| = 241.8876, all these calculated values are very far from 0.00001. From
above estimation I ﬁnd the eigenvalues of Oˆ are very far from eigenvalues of O. So,
an attacker cannot successfully reconstruct original data by using the SPF method.
2) The value of the reconstruction error is 38.8214 and value of SNR is 1.8569. From this
calculation I can see that the SNR decreases when the reconstruction error increases.
But the error is too large. The attacker has not achieved successful criteria for an
attack.
3) I get values of the lower bound [GWL08] 3.1206e + 003 ≥ 285.1474 satisﬁes the
lower bound condition. But the estimated data elements are far from the original
data elements. Then calculate the upper bound from [GWL08]: 3.1206e + 003 
−6.6277e+ 003 so the upper bound condition is not satisﬁed.
4) I get RMSE = 39.0080 >1.
From above analysis I ﬁnd the attacker has not satisﬁed the success of attack condition
to breach the privacy of the algorithm [ZMB] by using the SPF method. So, I calculate
probability of success in Table 6.2 of Subsection 6.7.2 and I get 0.179% successful privacy
breach using the SPF method.
Bayes-Estimated Data Reconstruction Method
Example 6: I consider the 6400 size of data set in 80 ∗ 80 square size of matrix as
Example 5.
1) RMSE = 2.5607 > 1. The attacker cannot ﬁnd the close estimated value to original
value.
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Figure 6.5. Hybrid: Comparative Analysis between Original Data set Elements and
RMSE
2) I calculate reconstruction error corresponding to every elements of a vector such as for
element1 reconstruction error |o11− oˆ11|, is 4.1384, for element2 |o21− oˆ21| is 0.084208,
element3 |o31 − oˆ31| is 5.3897 and so on till element |o64001 − ˆo64001| is 0.74141. From
calculation I ﬁnd that I did not get lower reconstruction when number of element of
vector increases. I graphically explain this calculation in Figure 6.5.
From above analysis I ﬁnd the attacker has not satisﬁed the success of attack condition
to breach the privacy of the algorithm [ZMB] by using the BE-DR method. I calculate
probability of success as the SPF method in Table 6.2 of Subsection 6.7.2 and I get
23.54% successful privacy breach using the BE-DR method.
Multiple Data Mining and Fusion Method
Example 7: Consider the 6400 large size of data sets in 80∗80 square size of matrix.
1) RMSE = 2.7648 > 1.
2) I evaluate the success of attack by using this equation d( ˆowj, owj) < d( ˜pwj, owj), where
d1 = d( ˆowj, owj), d2 = d( ˜pwj, owj). From Figure 6.6, I can see that I have not satisﬁed
this equation d1 < d2.
3) remaining noise =
∑
owj
| ˆowj − owj| = 182.4197, added noise =
∑
owj
| ˜pwj − owj =
95.0266. Calculate, remainingnoise
addednoise
= 182.4197
95.0266
1.9197 > 1.
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Figure 6.6. Hybrid: Comparative Analysis using Distance Metric
From the MDMF analysis I ﬁnd the same result as the SPF and the BE-DR analysis,
attacker has not satisﬁed the success of attack condition to breach the privacy of the
algorithm [ZMB] by using the MDMF method. I calculate Probability of success as the
SPF and the BE-DR methods in Table 6.2 of Subsection 6.7.2 and I get 21.65% successful
privacy breach using the MDMF method.
Known Sample Attack Method
Example 8: Consider the 6400 sizes of data set and split into 80 ∗ 80 square size of
matrix from.
1) I calculate the RMSE = 39.1155 > 1.
2) Relative error = 1.4845 is ﬁxed and calculate probability of privacy breach [Liu07]
corresponding to every 6400 elements of data.
From Figure 6.7 I ﬁnd that the probability of privacy breach decreases as the elements
of data increases.
3) I calculate the relative error bound and probability of privacy breach correspond- ing
to every 6400 elements of data, and plot graph in Figure 6.8. From Figure 6.8 I can see
that the probability of privacy breach decreases as the relative error bound increases.
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Figure 6.7. Hybrid: Comparative Analysis of Probability of Privacy Breach and Original
Data set Elements
Figure 6.8. Hybrid: Comparative Analysis of Probability of Privacy Breach and Relative
Error Bound
From the KSA analysis also I ﬁnd the attacker has not satisﬁed the success of attack
condition to breach the privacy of the algorithm [ZMB]. I calculate probability of success
as previous reconstruction methods in Table 6.2 of Subsection 6.7.2 and I get 0.02%
successful privacy breach using the MDMF method.
From experimental analysis of Hybrid method I ﬁnd the attacker is unable to satisﬁed
success criteria of reconstruction attack methods; the SPF, the BE-DR, the MDMF
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and the KSA. But attacker can calculate some parts of original data set as deﬁned
by probability of success measure in Table 6.2 of Subsection 6.7.2. From experimental
analysis of both existing perturbation methods [Sin12] and [ZMB] I can say that attacker
can reconstruct data using any of these methods [Sin12] and [ZMB]. Moreover, I have
proposed new hybrid perturbation method which maintains higher level of utility and
level of privacy than both methods [Sin12] and [ZMB]. I present the experimental results
of existing and proposed method in Tables 6.2 and 6.3 of Section 6.7.2.
The Section 6.6 proposes a new hybrid data perturbation method with better privacy
and lower information loss than the former described additive and hybrid data perturba-
tion methods.
6.6 Presentation of Proposed Method and Results of
Attacks
This section is divided into two main component of my proposed methodology. In
ﬁrst part, I provide the proposed Hybrid perturbation method in Subsection 6.6.1. In
second part of this Section I analyse the proposed method (deﬁned in 6.6.2) based on
all four data reconstruction attack methods; the SPF, the BE-DR, the MDMF, and the
KSA. I ﬁnd that my proposed method provides good privacy and good utility compare
to Additive [Sin12] and Hybrid method [ZMB], results are described in Tables 6.2 and
6.3 of Section 6.7.2.
6.6.1 Proposed Method
In this subsection, I propose a new hybrid data perturbation method with better
utility preservation and privacy preservation than that described in Section 6.2. It has
been pointed out that attacks which work on an additive data perturbation method will
also work on a multiplicative data perturbation method as the latter can be logarithmi-
cally transformed into an additive data perturbation method [PSBD12]; hence I avoid a
straight forward additive or multiplicative method.
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While the noise matrix (N) is again generated using a Chebyshev polynomial of the
ﬁrst kind, the proposed method includes an orthogonal, rotation transformation matrix
(R) and a translation matrix (T ). R is added because rotation transformations preserve
the most critical information for many classiﬁcation models [Liu07]. T is added to increase
resilience to attack [Che06]. I is the
√
m×√m identity matrix.
The proposed hybrid perturbation is deﬁned as follows:
1. Data: I use the format of Subsection 6.2.2.
2. Setting parameters: The values m, n and l are as in Subsection 6.2.2.
3. Data perturbation: Data preparation and division are as in Subsection 6.2.2, part
3. Data processing: In this step I generate the orthogonal matrix R to multiply
by the original data and the translation matrix T as well as the noise to add
to the original data. The choice of the type of R is based on observations in
[LKR06] stating “random orthogonal transformation seems to be a good way to
protect data’s privacy while preserving its utility”. And, for a legitimate user, “it
is possible to re-identify the original data through a proper rotation.” Also, as part
of future work, the authors suggest that “The random projection-based technique
may be even more powerful when used with some other geometric transformation
techniques like ... translation, and rotation.” [[LKR06]; p. 105] In addition, the
author of [Che06] demonstrates that a rotation matrix preserves data privacy and
quality. Indeed, my current hybrid proposal conﬁrms this suggestion.
Producing R: I use MATLAB [FP10] to produce an orthogonal matrix [Tod] on
input of the size m.
Producing T: Again, MATLAB produces a translation matrix on input of m.
Each element of the noise vector pt(ti)1 = Tn(−1 + 1n +
2(1− 1
n
)j
|ti|+1 ) is generated as in
Subsection 6.2.2, and
P˜ =
RO2
100
+O + T +N (6.6.1)
where P˜ , O and N are as in Table 6.1. I divide by 100 to bring the values of the perturbed
matrix within the range of values of the original data.
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6.6.2 Data Privacy Attacks on the Proposed Method
I test the proposed method with the three additive attacks (SPF, BE-DR and MDMF)
and one multiplicative attack (KSA) used to test the earlier method described in Section
6.5. The KSA is more suitable for non-additive data perturbation methods. While the
KSA is one of many possible reconstruction methods of non-additive data, I chose it
because the computations involved are similar to those for the SPF and the BE-DR and
so this reduces my work. As in the earlier testing, for all tests I choose 4500 ‘original’
matrices but this time, derive the perturbed matrices from Equation 6.6.1. However, I
give an example based on only one matrix with 6400 elements.
Spectral Filtering Reconstruction Method
Example 9:
1) I calculate λmin = 0 and λmax = 9.8491. The vector of noisy eigenvalues in increas-
ing order and in the range (0, 9.8491) is { 0, 0.0045, 0.0211, 0.0587, 0.0952, 0.1605,
0.2857, 0.2965, 0.3496, 0.4140, 0.6606, 0.8785, 0.9407, 1.0503, 1.2931, 1.4848, 1.5645,
1.8784, 2.0006, 2.4773, 2.7465, 2.9249, 3.3900, 3.4580, 3.7700, 4.1409, 4.4192, 4.9034,
5.1465, 5.5132, 6.0360, 6.5685, 6.8443, 7.4439, 8.2517, 8.4256, 9.3773, 9.5724 }. The
remaining eigenvalues should be eigenvalues of the original data matrix. These are:
{ 10.5585, 10.9103, 11.7238, 11.8442, 12.3361, 12.8515, 13.7241, 14.5359, 15.2634,
16.6736, 17.3271, 18.0092, 18.5451, 19.5574, 20.5705, 20.9295, 22.5732, 23.5842,
24.2906, 24.9679, 25.6576, 27.6132, 28.4370, 29.6516, 30.2333, 31.3860, 31.8208,
33.5229, 35.3517, 36.9057, 37.9716, 40.5131, 40.8867, 42.3157, 46.5608, 48.2808,
49.2589, 50.7645, 55.2154, 56.5771, 59.2799, 77.4939}; those below λmin are considered
as negligible. I now calculate the eigenvalues of the estimated data set matrix to be:
{ 1, 2, 3, 3, 3, 4, 4, 5, 5, 6, 6, 7, 8, 9, 9, 10, 11, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 15, 17, 18, 19, 21,
21, 22, 23, 24, 26, 27, 28, 31, 33, 37, 38, 40, 41, 48, 54514 }.
To measure the success of the reconstruction, I calculate the closeness of the relevant
λi and λˆi and get |λ39−λˆ39| = 10, |λ40−λˆ40| = 9, |λ41−λˆ41| = 9, ......., |λ79−λˆ79| = 11,
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|λ80−λˆ80| = −54437; all these results are far from 0.00001. I conclude that an attacker
cannot reconstruct the original data by using the SPF method.
2) I calculate the reconstruction error and SNR for all elements of the matrix and I
ﬁnd that as SNR increases the value of the reconstruction error decreases. Due to
space limitation, I give only the value of the average reconstruction error, which is
27.8604, and the average SNR is 36.5904. Since 36.5904 > 27.8604, the attack has
not succeeded.
3) The lower bound is 324.5643 and the upper bound is −8.9849 ∗ 103. I calculate
2.7006 ∗ 103 as ‖Oˆ − O‖F [GWL08]. Now 2.7006 ∗ 103 ≥ 324.5643 satisﬁes the lower
bound condition. But 2.7006 ∗ 103  −8.9849 ∗ 103 so the upper bound condition is
not satisﬁed.
4) I get RMSE = 47.7579 > 1, so the attack has not succeeded.
From the SPF analysis result I ﬁnd the attacker has not satisﬁed the success of attack
condition. So, I calculate probability of success in Table 6.2 of Subsection 6.7.2 and I get
0.0419% successful privacy breach, which is less than Hybrid method’s SPF calculation
i.e 0.0419% < 0.179%.
Bayes-Estimated Data Reconstruction Method
Example 10:
1) RMSE = 43.9520 > 1, so the attack has not succeeded.
2) I calculate the reconstruction error corresponding to every element of the data set in
vector form: |o11 − oˆ11| = 40.293, |o21 − oˆ21| = 40.412, |o31 − oˆ31| = 40.412 and so on
until |o64001 − ˆo64001| = 48.717. I graphically demonstrate this calculation in Figure
6.9 and note that the attack has not been successful.
In this analysis result I ﬁnd the same result as the SPF, the attacker has not satisﬁed
the success of attack condition. I calculate the probability of success in Table 6.2 of
Subsection 6.7.2 and I get 0.4406% successful privacy breach, which is less than Hybrid
method’s BE-DR calculation i.e. 0.4406% < 23.54%.
Multiple Data Mining and Fusion Method
Example 11:
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Figure 6.9. Proposed Method: Comparative Analysis between Original Data set Elements
and RMSE
1) RMSE = 45.7781>1.
Figure 6.10. Proposed Method: Comparative Analysis using Distance Metric
2) I evaluate the success of this attack by checking if d( ˆowj, owj < d( ˜pwj, owj)) for all
1 ≤ w, j ≤ √m. I ﬁnd that only 19 elements out of 6400 elements of the matrix
satisfy the inequalities, so I get 99.70% failure for the attacker.
3) The remaining noise is
∑
wj | ˆowj−owj| = 2.7404∗105 and added noise
∑
wj | ˜pwj−owj| =
16453. So remainingnoise
addednoise)
= 2.7404∗10
5
16453
= 16.6558 > 1 In Figure 6.10, we can see that I
have not satisﬁed this equation d1 < d2. So the attack has not succeeded.
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In this analysis result also attacker has not satisﬁed the success of attack condition.
I calculate probability of success in Table 6.2 of Subsection 6.7.2 and I get 0.3038%
successful privacy breach, which is less than Hybrid method’s MDMF calculation i.e.
0.3038% < 21.65%.
Known Sample Attack Method
Example 12:
1) I calculate the RMSE value to be 49.6266 > 1, so privacy is not breached.
Figure 6.11. Proposed Method: Comparative Analysis of Probability of Privacy Breach
and Original Data set Elements
2) The relative error is 0.9996. I calculate the probability of a privacy breach correspond-
ing to every element of the data set PoP11 = 1.0528, PoP21 = 1.0513, ..., PoP64001 =
0.96194. Since these values are decreasing, I have shown that the attack has not been
successful. In Figure 6.11, I ﬁnd that the probability of privacy breach decreases as
the elements of data increases.
3) I calculate the REB corresponding to every element of the data set as: REB11 =
0.96194, REB21 = 0.96343, REB31 = 0.96363, REB41 = 0.96392, REB51 = 0.96402,
REB61 = 0.96448, ....., REB64001 = 1.0528. In addition, the probability of a privacy
breach for every element of the data set is: PoP11 = 1.0528, PoP21 = 1.0513,.....,
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PoP64001 = 0.96194. Thus, the probability of a privacy breach decreases as the relative
error bound increases and so the attack has failed.
Figure 6.12. Proposed Method: Comparative Analysis of Probability of Privacy Breach
and Relative Error Bound
From Figure 6.12 I can see that the probability of privacy breach decreases as the
relative error bound increases.
This analysis result has the same analysis as the SPF, the BE-DR and the MDMF,
attacker has not satisﬁed the success of attack condition. I calculate Probability of success
in Table 6.2 of Subsection 6.7.2 and I get 0% successful privacy breach, which is less than
Hybrid method’s MDMF calculation i.e. 0% < 0.02%.
In summary, I ﬁnd the none of the reconstruction attacks the SPF, the BE-DR and
the MDMF and the KSA was able to breach the privacy of the new hybrid method also
each reconstruction attack method have probability of success less than existing Hybrid
method [ZMB]. So, I ﬁnd the proposed method provides better privacy and utility in
compare to Additive [Sin12] and Hybrid method [ZMB].
Section 6.7 depicts the comparative analysis of Additive, Hybrid and the proposed
methods. Also, represents the comparative analysis of all above-mentioned data recon-
struction attack methods for each perturbation method i.e which data reconstruction
method is more eﬀective compare to other reconstruction methods, for each perturbation
method.
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6.7 Comparison Study
The comparison section is divided into two subsections. In the ﬁrst subsection I
have comparative analysed that which data reconstruction method is more eﬀective for
Additive, Hybrid and the proposed method, presented in Subsection 6.7.1. In Subsection
6.7.2, I present the result analysis of Additive, Hybrid and the proposed method. I
comparatively analysed each method in terms of ‘Level of Privacy’, ‘Level of Utility’,
‘Probability of Success’, ‘Probability of Failure’ and ‘RMSE’.
6.7.1 Comparison Analysis Between SPF, BE-DR, MDMF and
KSA Methods
Based on the attack results, I give a comparative analysis between the success of the
SPF, the BE-DR the MDMF and the KSA attack methods for each data perturbation
method.
Figure 6.13. Comparative Analysis between the SPF, the BE-DR and the MDMF and
the KSA for Additive Perturbation Method [Sin12]
Figures 6.13, 6.14 and 6.15 describe how close estimated values of all these attack
methods the SPF, the BE-DR and the MDMF and the KSA to original data set elements.
The closeness deﬁnes the success of attack (see close deﬁnition in Subsection 6.3.1). In
Y-axis, I have original data set values and estimated data set values of all attack methods.
X-axis shows the number of rows. I measure closeness between estimated values of these
four attack methods and original data set value for every rows. Figure 6.13 presents the
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Figure 6.14. Comparative Analysis between SPF, BE-DR, MDMF and KSA for Hybrid
Perturbation Method [ZMB]
Figure 6.15. Comparative Analysis between the SPF, the BE-DR and the MDMF and
the KSA for the Proposed Method
comparative analysis for the SPF, the BE-DR and the MDMF and the KSA methods
for Additive Perturbation method. I ﬁnd the success of reconstruction attack of the
MDMF is high. The sequence success of reconstruction attack is MDMF > SPF >
BE − DR > KSA. In this study I achieve that the MDMF attack method is better
than the SPF, the BE-DR and the KSA reconstruction attack methods for Additive
method. Figure 6.14 presents the comparative analysis for the SPF, the BE-DR and the
MDMF and the KSA methods for Hybrid Perturbation method. I ﬁnd the success of
reconstruction attack of the BE-DR is high. The sequence of success of reconstruction
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attack is BE −DR > MDMF > SPF > KSA. Figure 6.15 presents the comparative
analysis for the SPF, the BE-DR and the MDMF and the KSA methods for the Proposed
Perturbation method. I ﬁnd the success of reconstruction attack of the BE-DR is high.
The sequence of success of reconstruction attack is BE−DR > MDMF > SPF > KSA.
I also make comparison study between the SPF, the BE-DR and the MDMF and
the KSA methods by considering privacy and utility metric for Additive, Hybrid and
the Proposed perturbation method in Tables 6.2 and 6.3. I choose l = D case of all
methods for comparison analysis because in Subsection 6.5.3. I ﬁnd that all methods
achieve better results in comparisons with other two case l > D and l < D.
6.7.2 Comparison Analysis between Additive, Hybrid and The
Proposed Methods
I choose l = D case of all privatization methods for comparison analysis because in
Subsection 6.7.2, I ﬁnd that all methods achieve better results in l = D case comparisons
with other two case l > D and l < D.
Level of Privacy
First, I calculate success and failure of the attacker attack by attack, averaged over
all the matrices of the same size and for each of the Additive and Hybrid method of
Section 6.2 and the new proposal of Section 6.6. It is interesting to note that the KSA
method worked less well than the other three methods in reconstructing original data for
the old additive method. Table 6.2 indicates the results of Additive and Hybrid method
of Section 6.2. Table 6.3 presents the results of new proposal of Section 6.6. Success
(PoS) measures how much original data is reconstructed successfully by the attacker and
is measured by Numberofelements(|Oˆ−O|<|P˜−O|)
NUmberofelementsofO
[McM11] as a percentage; the Probability of
Failure (PoF ) [McM11] is deﬁned as 100 minus this value. I also use a variance-of-
diﬀerence (VoD) [Liu07] based approach for measuring privacy in order to compare the
two methods discussed in this paper. VoD measures privacy of matrices column-wise
and we can calculate it with no knowledge of the original data. The perfect estimation
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will have zero mean and variance. I deﬁne VoD for all 1 ≤ i ≤ m as Di = oˆ′i1 − oi1,
and calculate E[Di] the mean of all Di and var[Di] the variance of all Di. These values
are shown in Tables 6.2, and 6.3. The fact that the mean and variance of the Di are
higher than one means that the attacker cannot estimate the original data; lower than 1
indicates a breach of privacy. Table 6.4 presents the comparison analysis of Additive and
Hybrid method of Section 6.2, and the new proposal of Section 6.6.
Table 6.2. Experiment Results of Additive method [Sin12] and Hybrid method [ZMB]
Reconst-
ruction
Attack
Methods
Measur-
ement
Factor
Additive Hybrid
Size of Matrices Size of Matrices
400 size 1600 size 6400 size 400 size 1600 size 6400 size
SPF
SNR 0.2132 0.2298 0.2408 0.8728 0.8226 1.2482
RMSE 0.3142 0.3862 0.4384 37.3185 38.6824 37.0567
PoS 80.28 78.63 76.86 0.318 0.287 0.179
PoF 19.72 21.37 23.14 99.682 99.713 99.821
BF-DR
RMSE 0.3869 0.4687 0.5187 2.6733 2.5409 2.8251
PoS 73.68 71.85 69.27 21.17 21.89 23.54
PoF 26.32 28.15 30.73 78.83 78.11 76.46
MDMF
RMSE 0.3689 0.3894 0.4033 1.9742 3.0096 3.6026
PoS 87.45 85.79 83.39 18.83 19.95 21.65
PoF 12.55 14.21 16.61 81.17 80.05 78.34
RelativeNoise
AddedNoise 0.1892 0.2583 0.2711 1.3349 2.1015 2.5477
KSA
RMSE 0.4887 0.4928 0.5689 35.4927 39.1733 38.9483
PoS 42.23 38.45 35.82 0.281 0.162 0.02
PoF 57.77 61.55 64.18 99.719 99.838 99.98
Level of Utility
The level of information loss is measured by using a dissimilarity function [BFP05]
between the original data set O and the perturbed data set P˜ . This dissimilarity function
is denoted by Diss(O, P˜ ) and lies in [0, 1] and is deﬁned as,
Diss(O, P˜ ) =
∑m
i=1 |fO(oi1)− fP˜ (p˜i1)|∑m
i=1 fO(oi1)
(6.7.1)
Where, fO(oi1) and fP˜ (p˜i1) represents the density function of the matrix O and P˜ re-
spectively.
A value of Diss(O, P˜ ) near 0 denotes low information loss. I calculate information
loss for the proposed method using Equation 6.6.1 and obtain 0.004310 so there is low
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Table 6.3. Result Analysis of The Proposed method
Reconst-ruction At-
tack Methods
Measurement
Factor
Proposed Method
Size of Matrices
400 size 1600 size 6400 size
SPF
SNR 34.2465 35.6483 36.5904
RMSE 42.3643 46.4344 47.7579
PoS 0.1150 0.0912 0.0419
PoF 99.8850 99.9088 99.9581
BF-DR
RMSE 38.9253 42.0321 43.9520
PoS 0.4925 0.4544 0.4406
PoF 99.5075 99.5456 99.5594
MDMF
RMSE 40.0071 44.4860 45.7781
PoS 0.4275 0.4163 0.3038
PoF 99.5725 99.5837 99.6962
RelativeNoise
AddedNoise 10.2723 14.3599 15.8506
KSA
RMSE 46.8608 48.8469 49.6266
PoS 0 0 0
PoF 100 100 100
Table 6.4. Comparative Analysis between Additive [Sin12], Hybrid [ZMB] and The Pro-
posed methods
Reconstruction At-
tack Methods and
Information loss
Additive Hybrid Proposed Method
Level of Pri-
vacy (V oD)
Level of Pri-
vacy (V oD)
Level of Pri-
vacy (V oD)
E[D] Var[D] E[D] Var[D] E[D] Var[D]
SPF 0.2032 0.1509 38.3162 9.7354 48.4432 16.2345
BE-DR 0.4960 0.0230 3.9187 1.2854 44.6523 16.1154
MDMF 0.5047 0.0610 4.7581 1.3169 46.3462 16.6579
KSA 0.7043 0.1619 39.8918 9.8912 49.4587 16.6368
Information Loss 86.4534% 11.3473% 0.4310%
information loss. I also calculate the dissimilarity function for the additive method [Sin12]
obtaining Diss(O, P˜ ) = 0.864534. For Hybrid method [ZMB], obtain Diss(O, P˜ ) =
0.1134725. So, I can say that information loss for the proposed is 0.4310%, for Hybrid
method [ZMB] is 11.34725% and for additive method [Sin12] is 86.4534%. I conclude that
the proposed method has achieved low information loss in comparison with the Hybrid
and Additive perturbation methods. These values are shown in Table 6.4.
Section 6.8 summarizes the experimental results, discusses the important outcomes
and limitations of my presented work.
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6.8 Discussion
In this section I summarize my experimental results and discuss the important ﬁndings
of discussed work and limitations of the proposed work.
6.8.1 Summary of the Experiments
I observed the following points from the experimental analysis of the presented work
in the above sections:
• I have analysed and tested the Chebyshev Polynomial data privatization methods
which are proposed in [Sin12] and [ZMB]. My reconstruction attacks were the
SPF, the BE-DR, the MDMF, and the KSA methods. All four attack methods
were successful for Additive perturbation method. From comparison analysis of all
four SPF, BE-DR, MDMF and KSA methods, I ﬁnd the MDMF attack method
was more successful than the other methods.
• For Additive Method, I calculated RMSE values in Subsection 6.5.3. Across the
entire data set of 6400 samples, the average values are: RMSE of SPF = 0.4384,
RMSE of BE −DR = 0.5187, RMSE of MDMF = 0.4033 and RMSE of KSA =
0.5689. I know that this indicates a privacy breach, presented in Table 6.2. RMSE
of KSA > BE − DR > SPF > MDMF for Additive method, indicating that
the MDMF is a better recovery algorithm than the SPF which, in turn is a better
recovery algorithm than the BE-DR and the BE-DR provides better recovery than
the KSA. Notwithstanding this result, all four methods were successful in breaking
the Chebyshev Additive data privatization method [Sin12].
• For Hybrid method, the MDMF and the BE-DR were more successful than other
two reconstruction methods; the SPF and the KSA. From comparison analysis of
all four SPF, BE-DR, MDMF and KSA methods I ﬁnd the BE-DR attack method
was more successful than the other methods. In Figure 6.14, I ﬁnd that an attacker
cannot calculate estimated data close to original data as Additive method but still
an attacker can reconstruct data 0.179% using the SPF Method, 23.54% using
the BE-DR method, 21.65% using the MDMF method and 0.02% using the KSA
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method, calculated in Table 6.2 of Section 6.7. So, an attacker was able to breach a
large % of privacy of data using the BE-DR and the MDMF in Hybrid method. In
Hybrid method, I achieve that the BE-DR attack method is better than the SPF,
the MDMF and the KSA for adversary.
I calculated RMSE values in Subsection 6.5.4 for Hybrid method. Across the en-
tire data set of 6400 samples, the average values are: RMSE of SPF = 37.0567,
RMSE of BE − DR = 2.8251, RMSE of MDMF = 3.6026 and RMSE of
KSA = 38.9483. I know that this indicates a privacy breach [see Subsection 6.5.4].
I conclude that, in comparing my four chosen attack methods, in general, RMSE of
KSA > SPF > MDMF > BE−DR for Hybrid method, indicating that the BE-
DR is a better recovery algorithm than MDMF which, in turn is a better recovery
algorithm than the SPF and the SPF provides better recovery than the KSA. Two
of these reconstruction methods breach high % of data and all these four methods
were successful in breaking the Chebyshev Hybrid data privatization method.
• The proposed method resist all reconstruction attack methods. I get low infor-
mation loss and high privacy compare to other two Additive and Hybrid method,
results are presented in Table 6.4.
I calculated the RMSE values of same entire data set of 6400 samples, the average
values are: RMSE of SPF = 47.7579, RMSE of BE − DR = 43.9520, RMSE of
MDMF = 45.7781 and RMSE of KSA = 49.6266. I know that this indicates a
privacy breach [see Subsection 6.5.4], results are shown in Table 6.3. I conclude
that, in comparing the four chosen attack methods, in general, RMSE of KSA >
MDMF > BE − DR > SPF for the proposed method, indicating that the SPF
is a better recovery algorithm than the BE-DR which, in turn is a better recovery
algorithm than the MDMF and the MDMF provides better recovery than the KSA.
All these reconstruction methods has low privacy breach high than Additive and
Hybrid Perturbation methods.
In Figure 6.15, I ﬁnd better results than both existing methods; Additive and
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Hybrid. In the proposed method, attacker can only breach 0.0419% of data using
SPF, 0.440% using the BE-DR, 0.3038% using MDMF and 0% using the KSA. The
success of attack is low compare to Additive and Hybrid method result. I get 0%
success probability using the KSA method for adversary. The proposed method
provides better utility and privacy in comparison to Additive and Hybrid methods.
6.8.2 Important Findings
1. I tested the four attack methods by considering three sizes of matrices l > D, l = D
and l < D for the BE-DR, the MDMF and the KSA attack methods. For the SPF
attack method I choose l > D and l = D size of matrix. I ﬁnd that l = D size of
metrics resist all these SPF, BE-DR, MDMF and KSA attacks better than l > D
and l < D.
2. I calculate 86.4534 % information loss for Additive method, 11.34725 % information
loss for Hybrid method and for the proposed method I got 0.4310% information loss.
I have achieved high utility compare to Additive and Hybrid method.
3. Probability of success for each data privatization method
a) In Additive method, attacker get high % of success probability using all four
reconstruction attack methods: 76.86% for the SPF, 69.27% for the BE-DR,
83.39% for the MDMF and 35.82% for the KSA.
b) In Hybrid method, attacker get 0.179% for the SPF, 23.54% for the BE-DR,
21.65% for the MDMF and 0.02% for the KSA; success of probability.
c) For the proposed method, attacker get only 0.0419 % for the SPF, 0.4406% for
the BE-DR, 0.3038% for the MDMF and 0% for the KSA; success of probability.
6.8.3 Limitations
• I tested and analysed my proposed approach method only on four data reconstruc-
tion attack methods.
• I considered only 4500 size of matrix and numerical data sets. I did not consider
categorical data sets.
• I set my assumptions for each data reconstruction attack methods, deﬁned in 6.3.
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6.9 Summary of the Chapter
I have analysed and tested additive privatization and hybrid privatization method
based on Chebyshev polynomials of the ﬁrst kind which are proposed in [Sin12] and
[ZMB] respectively. The reconstruction attacks were the SPF, the BE-DR, the MDMF,
and the KSA methods. I tested the four attack methods by considering three sizes of
matrices l > D, l = D and l < D for the BE-DR, the MDMF and the KSA attack
methods. For the SPF attack method I choose l > D and l = D size of matrix. I ﬁnd
that l = D size of metrics resist all these SPF, BE-DR, MDMF and KSA attacks better
than l > D and l < D.
The proposed method, attacker can only breach 0.0419% of data using the SPF,
0.440% using the BE-DR, 0.3038% using the MDMF and 0% using the KSA. The success
of the attack is low compare to Additive and Hybrid method result. The calculated
86.4534 % information loss for Additive method, 11.34725 % information loss for Hybrid
method and for the proposed method I got 0.4310% information loss. I achieve high
utility compare to Additive and Hybrid method. In considering the implications of this
analysis for the Chebyshev polynomial data privatization method, we can say that if
the original data set does not have a normal distribution, does not have independent
original data elements or identically distributed noise data, then the SPF method will
likely fail to recover the private data. This statement can also be made for the BE-DR
and the KSA methods. Since it is possible, given a data set, to determine its statistical
distribution in advance of privatization, the original data set should ﬁrst be tested before
Chebyshev polynomial privatization is used. However, the MDMF reconstruction method
will recover the data no matter what its distribution. In the proposed method attacker
can get only 0.3038% success probability using the MDMF method. I ﬁnd the proposed
method achieve good privacy and utility compare to Additive and Hybrid method.
The next chapter summarizes the body of work presented in Chapters 2 to 6. The
implications of this work and the directions for future work will be presented.
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Chapter 7
Conclusion and Future Work
7.1 Conclusions
In this thesis, I have analysed the challenges of aggregation and data querying of
published privatized sensitive data and proposed a solution. This thesis delineates the
applications of aggregation and querying of sensitive medical data in several application
scenarios, and also tests data privatization techniques to assist in improving the strength
of both their privacy and utility.
I have identiﬁed the following research problems in this thesis:
1. How to provide a solution by means of which a small group of researchers in a closed
environment may share sensitive data in order to analyse it for research purposes?
2. How to provide an architecture in which a large number of data contributors publish
their privatized data sets on a cloud so that all the data can be made available
to anyone who wants access to it, for whatever purpose. Additionally, how data
requesters can be eﬃciently queried, while retaining privacy not only of the data,
but also of the original data owner and of both the query and person querying?
3. How to develop a privacy preserving, secure and eﬃcient architecture which aggre-
gates large medical data sets in order to share it to support emergency response to
a patient in a remote region?
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4. How to examine a data privatization method by testing it using well-known data-
reconstruction attacks?
Regarding question 1, In Chapter 3, I have proposed a solution by means of which
several parties in a closed environment share sensitive data in order to analyse it for
research purposes. The proposed solution includes four steps: (i) All initial participants
choose an appropriate list of potential privatization techniques, tailored to comply both
with the format of the data and with local legal requirements; (ii) All participants select
a short list of potential techniques and apply each of these techniques to their data and
choose those which provide good privacy and good (querying) utility; (iii) Each party
focuses on privatized versions of their data based on the short list selection from Step 2.
These privatized versions are compared with the original data set to determine the one
with features closest to the original data using a comparative analysis method of their
choosing; (iv) All parties select a single privatization method using an agreed method
and, participants are now able to send each other privatized versions of their data.
My analysis of experimental results based on the data (see data sets description in
Section 3.3 of Chapter 3 and detail description of data sets presented in Appendix A)
is shown in Section 3.7 of Chapter 3. From the results, I ﬁnd the proposed approach
provides a crucial for choosing a privatization method suitable for common privatization
of several data sets which are to be shared.
Regarding question 2, In Chapter 4, I have provided an architecture for sharing of
sensitive data by a large number of data contributors who want to publish their privatized
data sets on a cloud so that all the data can be made available to anyone who wants access
to it. The architecture ﬁrst deals with aggregation and publishing of privatized data sets
on a cloud with acceptable privacy, acceptable utility, and practical computation cost.
Secondly, the architecture determines how it can be eﬃciently queried, while retaining
the privacy of the data querier, the original data owner and the data query with practical
query performance and supporting diﬀerent types of queries.
I analysed the proposed architecture for sharing sensitive data in Section 4.17 of
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Chapter 4. The experimental results show that the data aggregation is managed in an
eﬃcient, privacy preserved manner and that the data querying method used by the data
requester is practical. The comparison study in Section 4.17 of Chapter 4 has shown
that the proposed data aggregation and data querying methods are eﬃcient and preserve
higher levels of privacy compared to existing architectures. In summary, the proposed
architecture is generic, preserves privacy, is practical and consistent in data sharing.
Regarding question 3, In Chapter 5, I have developed an architecture for privatizing
aggregated data and delivering them in a secure manner from a server to a remote wireless
device. The proposed architecture implements (i) a solution for maintaining the privacy
of aggregated data released en masse in a controlled manner, and for providing secure
access to the original data for authorized users without compromising data accuracy; (ii)
a detailed description of a data privatization module from the server side of data delivery
as well as the protocol between server and client and develops practical implementation
of our data provisioning utility as it would operate in an insecure environment; (iii) a
system designed to enhance privacy protection of sensitive data downloaded to a mobile
client device from a remote server, such as in the case of accessing medical information
in emergency situations.
I discuss the experimental analysis of the proposed architecture in Section 5.7 of
Chapter 5 which is divided into three parts. In the ﬁrst part, I simulate the proposed
architecture and comparison with existing solutions. The basis of comparison was three-
fold: privacy, security and eﬃciency, experimentally analysed in Subsection 5.7.2. In the
second part of the experiment, I test the responsiveness of the server and the communi-
cation setup. I calculated the time needed for the authentication process to be completed
between the client and server. I also comparatively analysed the existing method with
the proposed architecture of Server side module, which was experimentally analysed in
Subsection 5.7.3. In the last part of the experiment, I focus on the mobile device end
and the communication between client and server, experimentally analysed in Subsec-
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tion 5.7.4. The experimental results have shown that the solution is provably secure and
maintains privacy in a more eﬃcient manner than previous solutions.
Regarding question 4, In Chapter 6, I examine attack analysis on privacy preserv-
ing data mining methods. For a ﬁxed data set, privatized using 4500 data sets which is
divided into 1500 data sets of 400 ∗ 1 matrix, 1500 data sets of 1600 ∗ 1 matrix and 1500
data sets of 6400∗1 matrix. I split the 400∗1 matrix into 20∗20, 16∗25 and 25∗16 sizes
of matrix, 1600∗1 matrix split into 40∗40, 32∗50 and 50∗32 sizes of matrix and 6400∗1
matrix split into 80 ∗ 80, 40 ∗ 160 and 160 ∗ 40 sizes of matrix, but I did not consider
16 ∗ 25 for 400 ∗ 1, 32 ∗ 50 for 1600 ∗ 1 and 40 ∗ 160 for 6400 ∗ 1 sizes of matrix for Spectral
Filtering (SPF) reconstruction method. Because, I cannot choose rows < columns size
of matrix for SPF. I test recently proposed data privatization methods against the well-
known classical data-reconstruction methods: Spectral Filtering (SPF), Bayes-Estimated
Data Reconstruction (BE-DR), Multiple Data Mining and Fusion (MDMF), and Known
Sample Attack (KSA) methods. I show that all of these data reconstruction methods
successfully retrieve a relatively large (and unacceptable) portion of the original data.
This work is described in Section 6.5 of Chapter 6. I compare the strengths of these data
reconstruction methods based on over 4500 data sets in Subsection 6.7.1 of Chapter 6.
I then indicate how the data privatization methods examined can be modiﬁed to assist
it to withstand these attacks. The results show that the modiﬁed solution is provably
secure from data reconstruction attacks and maintains better privacy and utility than
previous solutions. I compare the performance of the proposed method with existing
privatization methods in Subsection 6.7.2 of Chapter 6. I also show that the proposed
method has better privacy and lower information loss than the former methods.
7.2 Further Research Directions
The ﬁnal section addresses future work that can be performed based on the research
in this thesis. I address the following to investigate in future research:
• In case data need to be shared - for instance, when governments are trying to
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identify a disease outbreak to be queried by government members then privatized
versions of the data can be posted on the same cloud. All government members
have access to the posted results so that they can conﬁrm the same conclusions.
The research problem in this case is:
If a group member posts false results, how would these be detected?
• Many organizations are interested in facilitating tracking of infectious diseases.
Examples include CORDS (Connecting Organizations for Regional Disease Surveil-
lance) based in Lyon, France, the World Health Organization (WHO), the World
Organization for Animal Health (OIE) based in Paris, France, and the Food and
Animal Organization of the United nations (FAO). In addition to these well-known
international organizations, there are numerous clusters of regional groups sharing
data related to health issues.
In 2013, WHO published a joint report with China (China - WHO joint mis-
sion on human infection with Avian Inﬂuenza A(H7N9) virus available at
http://www.who.int/influenza/human_animal_interface/influenza_h7n9/
ChinaH7N9JointMissionReport2013u.pdf). On page 9 of this report it is stated
that “China’s transparent and timely sharing of technical information, data and
viruses is greatly appreciated and has contributed immensely to current global un-
derstanding of the H7N9 virus, risk assessment and actions required to manage the
shared risk.” The report recommends on page 11 that there be “frequent mutual
sharing of information, close and timely communication and ... appropriate coor-
dinated or joint investigations and research among ministries of health, agriculture
and forestry” and continued “high level scientiﬁc collaboration, communication
and sharing of sequence data and viruses with WHO and international partners
because the threat of H7N9 is also an international shared risk and concern.”
In case data need to be shared - for instance, if governments are trying to supply
a “synthetic” data set and pretending as a real data set, that is cheats perhaps in
order to hide a real data set. The research problem in this case is:
266
If a group member posts an artiﬁcial, synthetic data set, how can it be detected?
• In chapter 5, we develop the architecture for privatizing aggregated data set and
delivering it in a secure manner from a server to a remote wireless device in an
emergency situation. I consider ﬁle sizes ranging from 55 kb to 890 kb of text and
image data for experimental work.
Health data volume is expected to grow dramatically in the years ahead [RR14].
A report delivered to the U.S. Congress in August 2012 says data from the U.S.
healthcare system alone reached, 150 exabytes in 2011. At this rate of growth,
big data for U.S. healthcare will soon reach the zettabyte (1021 gigabytes) scale
and, not long after, the yottabyte (1024 gigabytes) [RR14]. Kaiser Permanente,
the California-based health network, which has more than 9 million members, is
believed to have between 26.5 and 44 petabytes of potentially rich data from health
data sets, including images and annotations [RR14]. The complex health data sets
include radiology images, human genetics and population data genomic sequences,
3D imaging, genomics and biometric sensor readings.
I did not consider this type of large and complex data sets in my work. In future
work, I plan to develop a prototype of the proposed architecture to handle large and
complex data sets such as 3D imaging, genomics and biometric sensor readings,
radiology images in gigabytes sizes.
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Appendix A
Appendix: Synthetic Data Sets
This appendix describes the descriptions of generated synthetic heart disease data
sets.
Heart disease is Australia’s leading single cause of death with 21,513 Australian lives
lost in 2011. On average, one Australian dies as a result of heart disease in every 24 min-
utes (http://www.abs.gov.au/ausstats/abs@.nsf/mf/3303.0/). Heart disease ac-
counted for 15% of all deaths in Australia in 2011, including 14% for males and 16% for fe-
males (http://www.abs.gov.au/ausstats/abs@.nsf/mf/3303.0/). Heart disease was
the main cause for 154,000 hospitalisations in 2009/10 (http://meteor.aihw.gov.au/
content/index.phtml/itemId/511338). In 2011/2012, 3% of the population reported
having a long term heart disease condition, accounting for 679,600 Australians (http://
www.abs.gov.au/ausstats/abs@.nsf/Lookup/4364.0.55.001Chapter1202011-12).
We ﬁnd the heart disease is one of Australia’s largest health problem [AIH11]. So,
we are interested in analyze heart disease data sets for our experimental work.
A.1 Heart Disease in Australia
Heart disease or diseases of the circulatory system (also known as cardiovascular
disease) covers any disease of the circulatory system, namely the heart (cardio) or blood
vessels (vascular), includes heart attack, angina and peripheral vascular heart disease
also known as heart failure. In Australia, these diseases mostly result from impeded or
diminished supply of blood to the heart, brain or leg muscles. Diseases of the circulatory
system are classiﬁed according to the International Classiﬁcation of Diseases (ICD). The
most recent revision (ICD-10) is implemented in Australia in 1999 and comprises the
following conditions for cardiovascular disease [PHM03], [AIH11]:
1. Acute rheumatic fever and chronic rheumatic heart diseases (I00-I09);
2. Hypertensive diseases (I10-I15);
3. Ischaemic heart diseases (I20-I25);
4. Pulmonary heart disease and diseases of pulmonary circulation (I26-I28);
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5. Other forms of heart disease (I30-I52);
6. Cerebrovascular diseases (I60-I69);
7. Diseases of arteries, arterioles and capillaries (I70-I79);
8. Diseases of veins, lymphatic vessels and lymph nodes, not elsewhere classiﬁed (I80-
I89); and
9. Other and unspeciﬁed diseases of the circulatory system (I95-99).
In a report recently published by the Australian Institute of Health & Welfare (AIHW
2011), the main types of cardiovascular disease (CVD) aﬀecting Australians are noted as
coronary heart disease, stroke and heart failure associated with cardiomyopathy (http:
//www.aihw.gov.au/publication-detail/?id=10737418510).
The Impact of Heart Disease in Australia
Heart disease was endorsed as a National Health Priority Area at the Australian
Health Ministers Conference in 1996 in recognition of the high prevalence of the dis-
ease in Australia, its impact on morbidity and mortality, and its potential for health
improvements through prevention and treatment programs [AIH11].
We ﬁnd statistics report of heart diseases from the heart foundation (http://www.
heartfoundation.org.au/information-for-professionals/data-and-statistics/
Pages/default.aspx), as follows:
• In 2007-08, it was estimated that 3.4 million Australians had one or more long-term
cardiovascular conditions, with prevalence increasing with age - 62% of those aged
75 years and older were aﬀected by CVD; 19% of those aged 45-54 years; and 5%
of those aged younger than 45 years.
• CVD is the leading cause of death in Australia. In 2010, CVD caused 32% of
all deaths nationally, with coronary heart disease and stroke alone causing almost
33,000 deaths, and more than 6,700 additional deaths being caused by heart failure,
hypertensive disease and cardiac arrhythmias.
• CVD kills one Australian every 12 minutes and aﬀects one in six Australians or 3.7
million.
• CVD was the main cause for 482,000 hospitalisations in 2009-10 and played a
secondary role in a further 800,000.
• CVD claimed the lives of 45,600 Australians (31% of all deaths) in 2011 - deaths
that are largely preventable.
• There are many risk factors for CVD, some of which cannot be altered, such as
increasing age and family history, and some of which can, including smoking, phys-
ical inactivity, poor diet, high blood pressure, high blood cholesterol and obesity.
Most Australians have at least one risk factor for CVD, for example, more than
90% fail to consume the recommended daily intake of vegetables, and almost 60%
do not get enough physical activity.
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• Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people and those living in remote areas had
the highest rate of hospitalisation and death resulting from CVD in Australia.
• Coronary heart disease (CHD) aﬀects around 1.4 million Australians.
• CHD claimed the lives of over 21,500 Australians (14% of all deaths) in 2011.
• CHD kills 59 Australians each day or one Australian every 24 minutes.
• Each year, around 55,000 Australians suﬀer a heart attack. This equates to one
heart attack every 10 minutes.
• Heart attack claimed 9,811 lives in 2011, or on average, 27 each day.
We consider a number of attributes for maintaining the heart disease patient’s medical
records. These attributes are as follows:
A.2 Data Set Descriptions
We presented the use of Melbourne and Darwin data sets in Subsection 3.3.2 of
Chapter 3. We discuss in detail of each attribute in this section.
We consider the hospitals in two diﬀerent locations of Australia. The ﬁrst hospital is
in Melbourne and the second hospital is in Darwin. We choose these two diﬀerent places
because we need to analyse the heart diseases of diﬀerent locations of people and the
people have diﬀerent environment factor. In Melbourne we ﬁnd a number of diﬀerent
countries of people, so we can see the heart disease condition of diﬀerent countries people.
We choose Darwin place because we ﬁnd the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people.
According to the Australian report Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people have
more possibility of heart disease [AIH11]. So, we can analyse diﬀerent countries and
diﬀerent types of environment people.
A.2.1 Melbourne Data Sets
Age and Gender Attributes
From Australian Bureau of Statistics report http://www.censusdata.
abs.gov.au/census_services/getproduct/census/2011/quickstat/SSC20867?
opendocument&navpos=220, we ﬁnd the % of diﬀerent countries of people such as
28.0% of people were born in Australia. The most common countries of birth were China
(excludes SARs and Taiwan) 11.4%, Malaysia 7.8%, India 5.7%, Indonesia 5.2% and
England 2.6%. We ﬁnd the % of male and female, there were 28,371 people in Melbourne
(State Suburbs) of these 50.4% were male and 49.6% were female. The median age of
people in Melbourne was 28 years. Children aged 0 - 14 years made up 4.0% of the
population and people aged 65 years and over made up 5.4% of the population. So, we
have considered in our data sets the same % distribution of people name, age and gender
according to the Australian Bureau of Statistics report, 2011.
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A.2.2 Darwin Data Sets
Age and Gender Attributes
For Darwin, we also consider the Australian Bureau of Statistics report
http://www.censusdata.abs.gov.au/census_services/getproduct/census/2011/
quickstat/SED70022?opendocument&navpos=220 and same as Melbourne hospital data
set we ﬁnd the % of diﬀerent countries of people, 56.6% of people were born in Australia.
The most common countries of birth were England 4.0%, New Zealand 3.3%, Philippines
2.3%, Ireland 1.6% and India 1.5%. There were 9,349 people in Darwin (State Electoral
Divisions) of these 56.0% were male and 44.0% were female. Aboriginal and Torres Strait
Islander people made up 5.0% of the population. The median age of people in Darwin
was 32 years. Children aged 0 - 14 years made up 10.0% of the population and people
aged 65 years and over made up 6.4% of the population. We consider people name, age
and gender for preparing the data sets of Darwin hospital.
The other attribute’s values are chosen by Australian standard speciﬁed range values,
as follows:
Chest Pain Type (CP)
Chest pain [AIH11] may be serious and you should always seek urgent medical help.
Chest pain may be caused by poor blood ﬂow to the heart leading to an angina or by a
sudden blockage in the coronary arteries resulting in a heart attack. Angina is a short-
lived chest pain that occurs when the heart muscle has an inadequate blood supply. An
angina does not usually cause damage to the heart. The cause of the pain is coronary
artery narrowing (atherosclerosis), also referred to as coronary artery disease. If the vessel
occludes (is blocked), heart attack results and the heart muscle is damaged. We use chest
pain test data values from the Australian result values [ANS+04] in our synthetic data
sets.
Blood Pressure (Trestbps)
Blood pressure (http://www.bupa.com.au/health-and-wellness/health-information/
az-health-information/high-blood-pressure-hypertension) is the pressure that
blood exerts on the walls of the arteries as it is pumped by the heart around the body. It
is written as systolic over diastolic pressure. Blood pressure readings are a combination
of two measurements, deﬁned as follows:
• Systolic - is the highest pressure against the arteries as the heart pumps. The
normal systolic pressure is usually between 110 and 130mmHg.
• Diastolic - is the pressure against the arteries as the heart relaxes and ﬁlls with
blood. The normal diastolic pressure is usually between 70 and 80mmHg.
We use blood pressure test data values from the Australian result val-
ues (http://www.bupa.com.au/health-and-wellness/health-information/
az-health-information/high-blood-pressure-hypertension) in our synthetic data
sets.
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Cholesterol (Chol)
The cholesterol test is a blood test that measures levels of fatty substances
called lipids in the blood. Cholesterol is one type of lipid. The cholesterol lev-
els can cause cholesterol to be deposited within the walls of arteries, making it dif-
ﬁcult for blood to ﬂow through. This build-up in the walls of the arteries, which
is called an atherosclerosis, puts a person at signiﬁcant risk of heart disease and
stroke. High levels of cholesterol in the blood stream are a risk factor for coro-
nary artery disease (heart attacks and angina) (http://www.csiro.au/en/Outcomes/
Health-and-Wellbeing/Prevention/CholesterolFacts.aspx). It is one of the main
causes of the process by which the blood vessels that supply the heart and other parts of
the body become clogged (http://www.aihw.gov.au/high-blood-cholesterol/). We
consider cholesterol data values from the Australian result values [AIH11].
Fasting Blood Sugar (Fbs)
The diabetes is diagnosed when the levels of glucose in the blood are too high. The
fasting blood glucose test will conﬁrm that the person has diabetes if it shows that the
level of glucose in their blood is higher than normal when they are fasting. Blood glucose
levels are checked after fasting for between 12 and 14 hours. We consider fasting blood
sugar test data values from the Australian result values [DA] in our synthetic data sets.
Electrocardiogram (Restecg)
An electrocardiogram (ECG) [NHF11] is a medical test that detects cardiac (heart)
abnormalities by measuring the electrical activity generated by the heart as it contracts.
The machine that records the patient’s ECG is called an electrocardiograph. ECGs
from normal, healthy hearts have a characteristic shape. Any irregularity in the heart
rhythm or damage to the heart muscle can change the electrical activity of the heart
so that the shape of the ECG is changed. An ECG can help diagnose a range of
conditions including heart arrhythmias, heart enlargement, heart inﬂammation (peri-
carditis or myocarditis) and coronary heart disease. We utilize electrocardiogram test
data values from the Australian result values (http://www.healthinfonet.ecu.edu.
au/key-resources/promotion-resources?lid=1453) in our synthetic data sets.
Maximum Heart Rate (Thalach)
Heart rate is measured in beats per minute (bps) (http://www.betterhealth.vic.
gov.au/bhcv2/bhcarticles.nsf/pages/Heart_arrhythmia_and_palpitations).
Bradycardia refers to a slow heart rate, deﬁned as below 60 bpm. Tachycardia refers to a
Table A.1. Heart Rate Test and Australian Range Values of the Test
Test Name Result Unit Result Values
Heart rate beats per minute (bpm)
Bradycardia < 60 bpm
Tachycardia >100 bpm
fast heart rate, deﬁned as above 100 bpm. When the heart rate is not regular in a regular
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pattern, this is referred to as an arrhythmia. These certain conditions can increase your
risk of developing tachycardia: Coronary artery disease, Heart failure, Heart attack,
Congenital heart defects, Inﬂammatory or degenerative heart conditions, Chronic lung
disease. Bradycardia can also be caused by many physical disorders, including sick sinus
syndrome and heart block. So, we measure the heart rate of every patient in our data
sets.
Exercise Induced Angina (Exang)
An angina (http://www.heartfoundation.org.au/sitecollectiondocuments/
coronary-artery-spasm.pdf) is generally caused from not getting enough blood
through the arteries to supply the walls of the heart with enough blood ﬂow to ad-
equately pump. An angina can be caused by blockage, injury or spasms. It can be
particularly irritating when it comes on with an exercise. This is known as exercise
induced angina. An exercise-induced angina is a common complaint of cardiac patients,
particularly when exercising in the cold. We use this attribute in our data sets and
speciﬁed with ‘yes/no’ value type. ‘yes’ presents person with exercise induced angina
and ‘no’ denotes a person does not suﬀer from exercise induced angina.
Exercise Stress Test (Oldpeak)
An Exercise Stress Test (EST) (http://www.monashheart.org.au/content/
Document/MonashHeart_Patient_Brochure_EST.pdf) is an ECG performed under
conditions of gradually increasing physical exercise. The “stress” placed on the heart
and cardiovascular system by running on a treadmill or pedalling an exercise cycle may
reveal changes on the ECG to suggest coronary artery disease (angina). We use an EST
attribute and mentioned following result values: Abnormal heart rhythms, coronary
artery disease, Normal. If a person suﬀers from coronary artery disease or heart problem
during EST then we mention these values abnormal heart rhythms, coronary artery
disease which shows abnormality condition of a person. If a person does not suﬀer any
problem related to heart, lung and artery disease then person’s condition is normal.
Echocardiography & Colour Doppler Report (Ca and Thal)
An echocardiography (http://www.heartresearch.com.au/echocardiogram.html,
http://www.rhdaustralia.org.au/sites/default/files/guideline_0.pdf) is a
painless and very useful test on the heart. An echocardiography (or Echocardiogram)
uses ultrasound (sound waves) to evaluate your heart’s health in real-time, including
heart shape, size and function, valve and vessel narrowing of incompetence, and heart
function. The test is performed for a variety of reasons, such as:
• To evaluate heart sounds and heart size.
• To assess how well the heart and valves are working.
The colour ﬂow information (Doppler) is superimposed on the two-dimensional
(black and white) images. This colour ﬂow doppler displays the blood velocity and
its direction within the heart. The doppler (http://www.cvs.net.au/?tabid=90)
shows blood ﬂowing into the heart, through the four chambers and back out again.
306
If there are any abnormal communications between the left and right side of the
heart, leaking of blood through the valves, and estimate how eﬀectively the heart
valves are opening. Multiple measurements are taken and compared to normal and
abnormal ranges, for example blood velocity, wall thickness, area of regurgitation
or valve stenosis, this whole process is also knows as colour doppler echocardiogra-
phy (http://www.tga.gov.au/pdf/auspar/auspar-indocid.pdf). These sound waves
(http://www.heartcarewa.com.au/facts10.php) are also used to judge the speed,
amount and direction of the blood cells ﬂowing through parts of your heart and great
vessels (doppler echocardiography). This test can be used to determine if there are any
congenital heart defects, valve abnormalities or abnormalities of the pumping cham-
bers. Echocardiography & colour doppler identiﬁes following disorders, as follows:
Echocardiography & colour doppler (http://cicm.org.au/journal/1999/september/
Echo2.pdf, http://www.rhdaustralia.org.au/sites/default/files/guideline_0.
pdf) performed for the evaluation of signs or symptoms in cardiac structures, cardiac
walls and the velocity of blood ﬂow at certain points in the heart. These tissues are as
follows: Aortic Valve, Left Atrium, Left Ventricle, Right Atrium, Right Ventricle, Mitral
Valve, Pulmonic Valve, Tricuspid Valve, Velocity ﬂow such as mitral valve ﬂow, Aortic
valve ﬂow. We use echocardiography & colour doppler tests data values from Australian
range test [RA12], [DC99], and [DC99].
The Slope of the Peak Exercise ST Segment (Slope)
We use slope of the peak exercise ST segment test data values from the http://www.
racgp.org.au/afp/2012/march/cardiac-stress-testing/.
We listed 13 attributes, which are used in our test analysis deﬁned in Subsection 3.3.2
of Chapter 3. The other attributes are described as follows:
A.2.3 Other Tests
Haematology Test
Haematology (http://www.health.act.gov.au/health-services/canberra
-hospital/our-services/act-pathology/what-is-pathology/) is the study of blood
and its disorders. Hematologists are specially trained doctors who look speciﬁcally at
blood components, such as blood count, blood and bone marrow cells. It is the area of
general pathology that is concerned with diseases that aﬀect the blood, such as blood clot-
ting disorders, anaemia, haemophilia, lymphoma, leukaemia and haemoglobinopathies
(http://www.usc.edu.au/study/courses-and-programs/courses/course-library/
mls/mls210-advanced-haematology). Lists of Haematology tests and their Australian
normal ranges of the test are considered from (http://www.rcpamanual.edu.au/
index.php?option=com_pttests&task=show_tests&subdivision_id=9&Itemid=77).
Haematology tests are as follows: Normal WBC count, Total leukocyte, Hemoglobin, Ery-
throcyte, Reticulocyte, PCV, Absolute Eosinophil Count, Absolute Neutrophil Count,
Bleeding Time, Clotting Time, Prothrombin time and G6PD. Normal WBC count,
Total leukocyte, Hemoglobin, Erythrocyte, Reticulocyte, PCV, Absolute Eosinophil
Count, Absolute Neutrophil Count, Bleeding Time, Clotting Time, Prothrombin time
and G6PD. Haematology can be broken down into three speciﬁc test groupings:
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1. The Complete Blood Count (CBC) (http://www.rcpamanual.edu.au/
index.php?option=com_pttests&task=show_test&id=257&Itemid=77, http:
//www.mydr.com.au/tests-investi-gations/full-blood-count-fbc). Inside
CBC we consider the White blood cell diﬀerential (neutrophils, lymphocytes,
monocytes, eosinophils, and basophils), Red blood cell (RBC), Mean corpus-
cular volume (MCV), Mean corpuscular hemoglobin (MCH), Mean corpuscular
hemoglobin concentration (MCHC), Red cell distribution width (RDW), Mean
platelet volume (MPV), Platelet distribution width (PDW), Packed cell volume
(PCV)
2. Erythrocyte Sedimentation Rate (ESR) (numeric): (http://www.
rcpamanual.edu.au/index.php?option=com_pttests&task=show_test&id=
249&Itemid=77)
3. C-Reactive Protein (numeric): (http://www.rcpamanual.edu.au/index.
php?option=com_pttests&task=show_test&id=468&Itemid=77)
Liver Function Test
Liver function tests (LFT) [AIH11] include several blood tests measuring speciﬁc
proteins and liver enzymes in the blood, produced by the liver. This test measures the
blood levels of total protein, albumin, bilirubin, and liver enzymes. High or low levels
may mean that liver damage or disease is present.
The LFT (http://www.csanz.edu.au/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=TGB_
bO-yI1k%3D) speciﬁcally includes the following blood test measurements: Serum
Albumin, Serum Globulin, Ratio of Albumin and Globulin, Serum Protein, Aspar-
tate aminotransferase (AST), Alanine transaminase (ALT), Bilirubin Total, Bilirubin
Direct, Bilirubin Indirect, Gamma-glutamyl transferase (GGT) and Alkaline phospha-
tise. We consider the range values of each liver test in our data sets from http:
//www.racgp.org.au/download/documents/AFP/2011/March/201103coates.pdf.
Serology Tests
A serology (or Serologic) test is a medical test that examines the blood
serum for antibodies associated with an infection (http://www.criver.com/
sitecollectiondocuments/rm_ld_r_serologic_methods_manual.pdf). Several car-
diovascular germs have been identiﬁed, most of the research has centered on the Heart
Attack Germ, Chlamydia pneumoniae (C. pneumoniae) (https://www.mja.com.au/
journal/2002/177/10/chlamydia-pneumoniae-and-cardiovascular-disease). The
number of serology tests are performed as follows:
1. Venereal Disease Research Laboratory (VDRL) test (negative and positive),
2. Complement Fixation Test (CFT) (negative and positive),
3. Enzyme-Linked Immuno Sorbent Assay (ELISA) (Quantitative, Qualitative and
Semi-quantitative),
4. Agar Gel Immuno Diﬀusion (AGID) (False positive and False negative),
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5. Serum Agglutination Test (SAT) (negative and positive),
6. Microscopic Agglutination Test (MAT) (positive and negative),
7. Indirect Fluorescent Antibody Test (IFAT) (negative and positive),
8. Rapid Plate Test (RPT) (speciﬁc and sensitive),
9. Latex Agglutination Test (LAT) (negative and positive),
10. Radio Immuno Assay (RIA) (negative and positive),
11. Serum Neutralization Tests (SNT) (speciﬁc and sensitive)
We get range values of each test from http://www.criver.com/sitecollectiondocuments/
rm_ld_r_serologic_methods_manual.pdf.
Coronary Angiogram Report
The coronary angiogram is a special x-ray of the heart. The purpose of this x-ray is
to look for abnormalities of your heart muscle or heart valves, and to see if your coronary
arteries are narrowed or blocked. The coronary angiography is performed if you have, or
are suspected to have, coronary heart disease. In this test we considered the following
attributes:
1. Left main coronary artery (LMCA) (Normal, blocked artery),
2. Left Anterior Descending (LAD) (Apical and LAD Diﬀuse, Normal LAD),
3. Posterior Descending Artery (PDA) (Normal, Narrow and Blocked),
4. Right Coronary Artery (RCA) (Plaque, angina, damaged intima and normal), and
5. Left Circumﬂex artery (LCx) (Normal, Narrow and Blocked).
We consider the Australian result values of the test for each attribute from
http://espace.library.curtin.edu.au/cgi-bin/espace.pdf?file=/2013/05/14/
file_1/191667.
Whole Abdomen Sonography
Sonography is used to demonstrate an internal body structures, is commonly used to
study the developing fetus, abdominal and pelvic organs, muscles and joints, the heart
and blood vessels. An abdominal sonography is the most useful in viewing and evaluating
the following organs:
1. Gallbladder (nominal): Distended and normal,
2. Left Kidney (numeric),
3. Right Kidney (nominal): Lower pole cortical cyst 2.4 cm, Acute Kidney Failure,
Chronic Kidney Disease and Normal,
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4. Liver (nominal): Appears normal in size & shape, contour & echopattern and Liver
Injury,
5. Pancreas (nominal): Normal in size, shape & echopattern, Mild Pancreatitis, Severe
Pancreatitis and Chronis Pancreatitis,
6. Spleen (nominal): Normal size & homogeneous echopattern, ruptured spleen, dam-
aged spleen,
7. Prostate (nominal): Normal, prostate enlargement, prostatitis (inﬂammation of the
prostate gland) and prostate cancer (Female - N/A, The prostate gland is a small
gland that is only found in men),
8. Urinary bladder(nominal): Normal, inﬂammation of the bladder, loss of bladder
control, bladder squeezes urine out at the wrong time, bladder pain and frequent,
urgent urination, Bladder cancer.
Calcium Channel Blocker
The calcium channel blockers (CCBs) are heart disease drugs that relax the
blood vessels and increase the supply of blood and oxygen to the heart while
also reducing the heart’s workload. This lowers the blood pressure. The CCBs
(http://www.heartfoundation.org.au/sitecollectiondocuments/chronic_heart_
failure_guidelines_2011.pdf) are often useful for older people and people with
asthma or angina or peripheral vascular disease. We use this attributes as ‘Yes/No’
value type. If person use the CCBs we mention as ‘Yes’, if person not use the CCBs we
mention as ‘No’.
Beta Blocker
The Beta-blockers (http//www.nhmrc.gov.au/_files_nhmrc/file/nics/
material_resources/appropriate_medications.pdf) are one of the most widely
prescribed classes of drugs to treat hypertension (high blood pressure) and are a main-
stay treatment of congestive heart failure. We use this attributes as ‘Yes/No’ value
type. If person use beta blockers we mention as ‘Yes’, if person not use beta blocker we
mention as ‘No’.
Nitrates
The nitrates [AIH11], [NHF11] work by dilating both arteries and veins, in the heart
and elsewhere. This general dilation of blood vessels reduces stress on the heart muscle,
and thus reduces the amount of oxygen the heart requires. We use this attribute as
‘Yes/No’ value type. If person use nitrates we mention as ‘Yes’, if person not use nitrates
we mention as ‘No’.
Diabetes
Diabetes (http://www.heartfoundation.org.au/your-heart/know-the-risks/
Pages/diabetes.aspx) is a condition that aﬀects the way body cells take up and use
glucose from the blood. In this attribute we use ‘Yes/No’ values. ‘Yes-1’ represents the
person with diabetes and ‘No-0’ represents the person has no symptoms of diabetes.
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Hypertension
High blood pressure (also known as ‘hypertension’’) (http://www.heartfoundation.
org.au/your-heart/cardiovascular-conditions/pages/blood-pressure.aspx) can
lead to serious health problems, such as a heart attack, a stroke, heart failure or kidney
disease. We use ‘Yes/No’ values. ‘Yes-1’ represents the person with hypertension and
‘No-0’ represents the person has not suﬀered from hypertension.
Stroke
Stroke [AIH11] occurs when an artery supplying blood to the brain either suddenly
becomes blocked or begins to bleed. We use stroke in our data sets which represented
by ‘Yes/No’ values. ‘Yes-1’ represents the person is suﬀered from stroke and ‘No-0’
represents the person is not suﬀered from stroke.
Coronary Heart Disease (CHD)
The CHD (http://www.heartresearch.com.au/coronary-heart-disease.html)
is a condition in which the heart’s arteries (blood vessels) become narrower. It is also
known as coronary artery disease. In our data sets, we use ‘Yes-1’ for a person suﬀered
from CHD and ‘No-0’ denotes person not suﬀered from CHD.
Smoking
Smoking [AIH11] is considered a major risk factor for cardiovascular disease and
nearly 40% of all the people who die from smoking, stroke or blood vessel (cardiovascular)
disease. Smoking increases the risk of: (i) Heart attack by two to six times; (ii) Heart
disease in women, particularly those on the oral contraceptive pill; (iii) Stroke by three
times.
The descriptions of the values are as follows: Current, Former, Not current, Never
and Ever.
Body Mass Index
Overweight and obesity are deﬁned by the World Health Organization using the
body mass index (BMI) (http://www.health.gov.au/internet/main/publishing.
nsf/content/health-pubhlth-strateg-hlthwt-obesity.htm). It’s useful to know
because if your weight increases or decreases outside the ideal range, risks may in-
creases. BMI is calculated by dividing your weight in kilograms by the square of
your height in meters (kg/m2). We consider the Australian range values of the
BMI test (http://www.health.gov.au/internet/main/publishing.nsf/content/
health-pubhlth-strateg-hlthwt-obesity.htm).
Family History of Coronary Artery Disease (CAD)
We use ‘Yes/No’ value type for this attribute. ‘Yes-1’ represents the person has family
history of coronary artery disease. ‘No-0’ represents the person has no family history of
coronary artery disease.
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Diuretic
Diuretic [AIH11] is a useful technique for reducing blood pressure when treating
the symptoms of heart failure. We use ‘Yes/No’ value type for this attribute. ‘Yes-1’
represents the person with diuretic and ‘No-0’ represents the person does not use diuretic.
Chest X-ray
A chest X-ray (http://intensivecare.hsnet.nsw.gov.au/chest-x-ray) is a pic-
ture of the chest that shows your heart, lungs, airway, blood vessels, and lymph nodes. A
chest x-ray [NHF11] is an invaluable diagnostic tool for detecting possible problems and
is used as a method of monitoring the progress of a patient. A chest x-ray can detect:
1. Changes in the size and shape of the heart
2. Abnormalities in the major blood vessels such as the Aorta
3. Fluid collection in the air sacs of the lungs caused by heart failure (pulmonary
oedema)
4. Lung problems including collapse of the lungs, pneumonia, tumors and pneumoth-
oracies
We use ‘Abnormal/Normal’ value type for this attribute. ‘Abnormal’ value denotes a
person has abnormality in his/her chest result and ‘Normal’ value represents a person’s
chest x-ray does not detect abnormality values.
Cardiac Computed Tomography (CT)
Cardiac computed tomography (CT) (http://www.bupa.com.au/health-and-well
ness/health-information/heart-health/tests-and-diagnosis/tests/cardiac
-computed-tomography-scanning) scanning is a test used to view the heart and
coronary arteries. We use the CT attribute in our data sets and result is presented by
two values diseased heart arteries and Normal values. ‘Diseased heart arteries’ denotes if
a person has problem identiﬁed by the CT in his heart and coronary arteries. ‘Normal’
values denote if a person has no problem identiﬁed by CT.
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